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i 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates how manipulating intention to learn (learning orientation) 
through verbal instructions affects learning in a range of putatively associative and 
implicit tasks. Within three different paradigms, learning orientation was manipulated 
so that learning was either incidental to, or aligned with (i.e. intentional) the aims of 
the task. The first series of experiments investigated sequence learning, as measured 
in the serial reaction time task. Sequence learning was found to result reliably under 
incidental conditions and was selectively improved by instructions promoting 
discovery of a relational rule describing a set of probabilistic contingencies. The 
second series of experiments used the prototype distortion task, where it has been 
claimed that implicit learning of a category of prototype-centered stimuli can occur 
automatically as a result of exposure. Using a visual search task as a means of 
incidental exposure, equivocal evidence for the implicit status of learning in the 
prototype distortion task was found, and instructions directing participants to 
memorize the stimuli resulted in greater evidence of learning the similarity structure 
of the category. Finally, the third series of experiments assessed generalization along 
stimulus dimensions following a difficult discrimination task. Instructions directing 
attention to a particular stimulus dimension promoted rule-based generalization and 
facilitated a dissociation in the pattern of generalization obtained as a result of 
reducing rule applicability on test. The results suggest that human learning is highly 
susceptible to learning orientation, which has implications for the way implicit 
learning should be viewed as a psychological construct. Theories of learning, whether 
single- or dual-process, need to better account for this seemingly pervasive role of 
learning orientation.   
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1 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
“Learning without thought is labor lost.”  
-Confucius  
 
Humans possess a remarkable ability to learn about and adapt to their 
environment. However, learning is not uniform across situations. Variables including 
the exact instructions given, the goals and requirements of the task, and the 
knowledge possessed by the individual about the contingencies and rules in the task 
can all determine how an individual engages with the task and therefore what is 
learned. Manipulating these task parameters can thus create situations in which 
learning might occur incidentally in the absence of reasoned thought, or situations in 
which learning is intentional and effortful. The degree to which an individual has the 
intention to learn will henceforth be referred to as learning orientation. In this thesis, 
the effects of learning orientation, as manipulated through verbal instructions, will be 
explored.  
The aim of this thesis is to explore how the content of learning changes as a 
result of manipulating learning orientation, and to examine the theoretical 
implications of such effects. This chapter will briefly outline the historical 
development of learning theory, describing the origins of conditioning and its 
connection with the contemporary field of associative learning. Theoretical debates in 
learning theory relevant to this thesis will then be discussed, along with the 
significance of learning orientation within each debate. It will be shown that the 
effects of orientation have implications for the question of whether humans possess 
separable learning processes, as well as the question of whether a common 
mechanism underlies human and animal learning. Finally, the three different 
paradigms (prototype-category learning, sequence learning, post-discrimination 
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generalization) and manipulations used in this thesis will be summarized and research 
questions posed.  
 
1.1 The Nature of Associative Learning 
 Learning in this context refers to enduring changes in an organism that result 
from experience and make a change in behavior possible. By this definition, learning 
encompasses a wide range of behaviors which can include anticipatory behavior 
towards stimuli that signal pleasant or aversive consequences, faster responses to 
impending events that can be predicted based on the recent history of trials, or an 
ability to generalize knowledge of experienced instances to novel instances that have 
never been encountered. The goal of learning theory is to formulate a set of general 
principles under which a wide range of behavior can be understood. This section will 
briefly outline how, in pursuing this goal, the psychology of learning has been 
historically linked to ideas of associationism and automaticity. 
 Learning theory has been dominated by associationism (De Houwer, 2009; 
Shanks, 2010), the idea that learning occurs as the result of the formation of 
associative links between mental representations of events or stimuli, such that 
activation of one idea can ‘bring to mind’ another. This idea of associative thought 
can be traced back to Aristotle, who presented a number of laws governing the kinds 
of ideas that could be brought to mind by other ideas (Aristotle, trans. 1906)1. For 
example, Aristotle’s ‘Law of Contiguity’ states that recall of an object will elicit the 
recall of other things that were experienced with that object, with these associations 
forming the basis for memories. Associative links were also credited as the building 
blocks for the emergence of complex ideas by British empiricists such as Hume and 
                                                
1 Aristotle’s laws of Contiguity (recall of things experienced with an object), Similarity (recall of things 
similar to an object), and Frequency (increased probability of recalling something that has been 
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Locke. For example, Locke believed that since we could not directly observe 
causality, our causal understanding of the world was an inference arising from 
empirical observation of associations between events (Locke, 1690). Thus, the idea of 
associations being the building blocks of mental life emerged quite early in 
philosophy.  
Despite the prominence of assocationism in philosophy, associative learning 
as a field of scientific enquiry did not develop until the discovery of classical 
conditioning by Ivan Pavlov. Pavlov conducted experiments on animals where he 
observed changes in their behavior as a result of pairing stimuli together in their 
environment. Pavlov (1927) termed this process ‘classical conditioning’, and 
described it as the result of repeated pairings of an initially neutral conditioned 
stimulus (CS) with a biologically relevant unconditioned stimulus (US), with the CS 
acquiring the ability to elicit a conditioned response (CR) through its association with 
the US. Conditioned responding was thought to be reflexive, elicited automatically by 
external stimuli and operating without careful thought or evaluation. In fact, Pavlov 
himself termed the CR the “psychic reflex”, likening conditioning to the automaticity 
of a biological reflex (Pavlov, 1927).  
Instrumental conditioning, whereby animals learn to perform specific 
behaviors as a result of associations between responses and their consequences and 
antecedents, was similarly thought to operate automatically. Instrumental learning 
was first investigated by Thorndike, who coined the “law of effect” (Thorndike, 1911) 
to describe how behavior was controlled by its consequences. According to the law of 
effect, behaviors that are followed by pleasurable consequences are reinforced, 
meaning that the animal is more likely to repeat the action when in a similar context. 
Thorndike explained how stimuli in the environment came to control behavior 
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through the “stamping in” of connections between a stimulus and a response (S-R) 
through reinforcement. Thorndike believed that this S-R learning could occur 
implicitly or without awareness of the learning process (Thorndike, 1911)2. Thus it is 
clear that early theorists in both classical and instrumental conditioning conceived of 
the process of learning as automatic and associative3. 
 The contemporary field of ‘associative learning’ encompasses a wider range 
of associations than just those of simple conditioning between a CS and a US or a 
stimulus and a response. Associative learning is concerned with associations that form 
between mental representations of any events or stimuli. The idea of learning being 
reflexive was gradually replaced as researchers began to discover that many 
conditions needed to be met in order for associations to form and learning to occur. 
For instance, the phenomenon of blocking (Kamin, 1969), shows that the mere co-
occurrence of two stimuli is not sufficient for an association to form. Blocking occurs 
when a stimulus (A) is first paired with an outcome (+) in an initial phase, and is then 
presented with a novel stimulus along with that same outcome in a second phase 
(A+/AB+). Compared to control cues that are presented in compound only in the 
second phase (CD+), learning about the blocked cue B is usually weaker than learning 
to C or D, despite the blocked and control cues being paired with the outcome an 
equal number of times. Blocking was first demonstrated by Kamin (1969), and was 
significant in showing that when multiple stimuli were presented with an outcome, 
competition amongst those stimuli for association with the outcome (i.e. cue 
competition) occurred.  
                                                
2 Thorndike is often credited as the pioneer of implicit learning, for this reason.  
3 Although, even at these early stages, precursors to the cognitive view were starting to emerge. For 
example, Tolman believed that learning was goal-directed and intentional and that focus on internal 
states was necessary to explain behavior (Tolman, 1938, 1948). 
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Cue competition effects such as blocking demonstrate that associations do not 
form unconditionally. Models of learning formulated after the discovery of blocking 
thus attempted to specify the conditions that dictated whether and to what extent 
learning occurs. For example, according to the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972), in order for learning to occur, there must be a discrepancy between 
what an animal expects will happen, and what actually happens. In other words, there 
must be a prediction error that makes a stimulus surprising in order for learning to 
occur. Using the notion of prediction error, cue competition effects are explainable 
using the same associative links used to explain simple conditioning, and do not 
require explanation in terms of higher-order problem-solving or decision processes. 
That is, learning is controlled by the predictive value inherent in the stimulus’ 
contingency with other events and is detected by the animal through its experience of 
the environment. Other associative models describe how learning is dependent on, 
and modulated by attention (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980), or place 
emphasis on concepts such as short-term memory (Wagner, 1981). These associative 
models are considerably more complex than the simple CS-US or S-R links originally 
proposed to explain learning, and also acknowledge a role for other cognitive 
functions.  
One interpretation of these models is that despite the modulating effects of 
processes such as attention and memory, associative learning is automatic in that it is 
essentially governed by mechanistic operations. In other words, the models are 
assumed to contain all the mental components that are necessary for learning to occur. 
Therefore, in this context, automaticity does not mean that learning always occurs, but 
rather once the relevant conditions are satisfied, learning (the formation of 
associations) proceeds in an incremental, continuous, and lawful fashion. It is this 
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definition of automatic that will be used throughout this thesis (see Hasher & Zacks, 
1979; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; and Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, for more 
comprehensive discussion of the concept of automaticity). Note that most associative 
models are silent regarding the effects of effortful cognitive processes, implying that 
their operation does not depend on the intentions of the individual as long as the 
relevant information is processed. Such associative mechanisms are remarkably 
simple but have been hugely successful in explaining a wide range of sophisticated 
behavior in animals. 
 
1.2 Learning in Humans 
 The translation of animal learning paradigms and application of associative 
learning theory to humans during and after the 1980s brought novel challenges in 
designing human paradigms that were analogous to animal paradigms, and the related 
difficulty in accounting for the obvious fact that humans, when confronted with a task, 
will tend to reason, formulate hypotheses and derive rules about the situation. This is 
especially the case if humans are given instructions that encourage them to learn or 
solve the problem at hand. In other words (to state the obvious), humans think, and 
importantly for learning theory, they think in ways that are said to be beyond the 
capabilities of other animals (Herrnstein, 1990; Penn, Holyoak, & Povenelli, 2008). 
Much of the early human learning research was aimed at establishing that 
conditioning effects found in animals do in fact occur in humans (e.g. Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984). However, it also became 
clear that humans were capable of forms of learning that lie beyond the capabilities of 
animals. For example, humans are able to form abstract rules that allow them to 
generalize beyond the physical features of their experiences to novel instances that 
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may not share many physical features with previous experiences in the experimental 
context (Shanks & Darby, 1998; Penn et al., 2008; Wills & Mackintosh, 1998). 
Further, while humans demonstrate similar learning effects to that of conditioning in 
animals, the strength of particular learning effects can depend on the broader 
assumptions about the underlying rules of the causal scenario (Shanks, 2010), making 
it difficult to attribute learning effects in humans solely to associative learning 
mechanisms. 
This departure from the cognitive abilities of animals has been attributed to 
the capacity for humans to use language and higher-order cognitive processes to form 
rules and reason about associations in their environment (Carruthers, 2002; Penn et al., 
2008). This capacity also means that human learning can be influenced in ways in 
which animal learning cannot. The precise instructions given about the task, whether 
the learner is given additional explicit knowledge about the content to-be-learned, and 
whether learning is intentional or incidental to the task performed, can all potentially 
affect the content of learning. If learning in a given task is altered by instructions, this 
has practical implications for experimental design, and theoretical implications for the 
interpretation of the results, especially if the aim is to investigate associative 
processes and the experiment is designed to be analogous to animal experiments. 
Researchers who wish to compare results between different paradigms or even 
between studies that use the same task need to know what potential differences could 
arise through altering the instructions and demands of the learning task.  
More generally, the effects of learning orientation are important because a 
complete theory of learning should be able to account for the ways in which learning 
is altered as a result of cognitive manipulation. The potential impact of verbal 
instructions is suggestive of an additional contribution to learning that is verbally 
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mediated. In other words, if learning is susceptible to instructional manipulations, 
associative learning mechanisms may well be cognitively penetrable and are not 
sufficient to explain human learning.  
 
1.3 Dual-Process Theories 
Dual-process theories postulate two qualitatively different processes4 through 
which humans learn. Within such theories, separate debates exist about whether 
learning is driven by a combination of associative and ‘propositional’ processes 
(Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), and whether there exist separable 
‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ modes of learning (Reber, 1987). In order to frame the 
theoretical significance of the manipulations contained in this thesis, the 
associative/propositional and implicit/explicit distinctions will be briefly reviewed, as 
well as the distinction between rules and associations. These reviews will be brief and 
highly selective, since a more specific review of the theoretical issue with respect to 
particular paradigms will be undertaken within each of the following chapters. Note 
that while the subject of this thesis is relevant to these dual-process debates (and will 
be interpreted with respect to each), the aim of the ensuing chapters is not to conclude 
in favor of one process or another, nor to defend the single- or dual-process approach, 
but rather to characterize the nature of the interaction of these processes, should they 
each exist. Note that this approach of comparing learning conditions is equally 
relevant to single-process theories of learning, since they too should be able to specify 
how a single process can come to elicit different behavior as a result of changing 
verbal instructions.   
                                                
4 Note that the debate will be framed in terms of dual-processes and not dual-systems. While these 
terms are often used interchangeably in the literature (e.g. Stanovich & West, 2000), the idea of 
‘systems’ implies modularity and complete independence, while ‘processes’ might interact within a 
single system.  
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Neisser (1963) stated, “The psychology of thinking seems to breed 
dichotomies” (p. 1). Indeed, dual-process theories abound in cognitive psychology, 
with two processes posited to explain a wide range of cognitive functions such as 
memory (Jacoby, 1991; Schacter, 1987), reasoning (Evans, 2003; Sloman, 1996), and 
decision-making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Although there is some variation 
between theories, attempts have been made to map dual-process theories onto a 
general System I and System II (Stanovich & West, 2000). System I is usually 
described as a more primitive but automatic system operating non-analytically on 
associative information, while System II is described as a more sophisticated but 
effortful system, operating analytically on symbolic information (Evans, 2008). The 
distinction between systems can be drawn in different ways, but most theorists agree 
that what is important in distinguishing between systems is their computation (e.g. 
Sloman, 1996). In other words, the learning process differs in qualitative ways, even 
if the content of learning and effects on behavior might appear to be the same. 
Nevertheless, the content of learning (and in particular, awareness) has often been 
taken as evidence of the operation of a specific learning process. As will be discussed 
below, this has proved to be highly controversial. 
 
1.3.1 Associative and Propositional Learning 
The distinction between associative thought where ideas simply ‘come to 
mind’ and effortful, reasoned thought can be traced back to William James (1890). 
The notion that learning is sometimes driven by a carefully controlled reasoning 
process, and at other times driven by an automatic link-formation mechanism has 
intuitive appeal, which may account for the proliferation of dual-process theories in 
cognitive psychology. It seems natural that at some times, learning is effortful, 
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carefully reasoned and results in conscious knowledge, but at other times, it occurs 
without much careful thought or intention. As will be discussed, one of the most 
controversial issues in learning theory concerns whether the obvious role of higher-
order cognition in human learning means that an associative mechanism, as 
traditionally conceived, is not needed to explain human behavior (Shanks, 2010).  
The notion that humans and animals share a common learning mechanism was 
popularized with the discovery that many of the conditioning phenomena found in 
animals were also found in human studies where participants were required to 
actively learn causal relationships (e.g. Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984). 
However, despite similarities between human and animal behavior, it was not clear 
whether learning was accomplished through the same primitive mechanism, leading 
some to propose a rejection of associative mechanisms in humans altogether (Mitchell 
et al., 2009). Multiple lines of evidence motivated this conclusion. Several reviews 
concluded that there was little evidence to support the idea that conditioning occurs in 
the absence of awareness (e.g. Brewer, 1974; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), early 
studies showed that the same conditioning effects could be found by simply giving 
participants the equivalent instructions (e.g. Colgan, 1970; Cook & Harris, 1937), and 
manipulating factors that influenced reasoning also affected cue competition effects in 
learning (e.g. Mitchell & Lovibond, 2002; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1990). Together, 
these studies suggest that rather than learning being the result of automatic associative 
links, learning involves deliberate reasoning and higher-order cognitive processes.  
This was exactly the stance taken by Mitchell et al. (2009) in proposing the 
propositional account of learning, which attributes associative learning phenomena in 
  
11 
humans to “effortful, attention-demanding reasoning processes” (pp. 186)5. 
Propositional learning involves manipulation of symbolic information to generate 
inferences. The output of this learning process is conscious and propositional in 
nature, meaning that it contains symbolic information and can be evaluated to be true 
or false (e.g. X was followed by Y). Such a learning process is clearly different to an 
associative mechanism, both in process and in the psychological qualities of the 
output. However, distinguishing between learning that arises due to associative and 
propositional mechanisms is not a trivial task. This is because many human learning 
phenomena are explainable using both systems (see Shanks, 2010, for a comparison 
of associative and cognitive accounts of blocking). One of the more popular ways of 
distinguishing between the two systems has been awareness (Lovibond & Shanks, 
2002). Propositional learning is assumed to be necessarily conscious, while an 
associative model has no explicit representation of awareness. This is because 
associative models were formulated to explain animal behavior, and consciousness 
has not traditionally been attributed to animals (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). Therefore, 
showing that learning is possible in the absence of awareness would be strong 
evidence for an associative process (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).  
In practice, convincing evidence of unaware learning has been difficult to 
attain due to various methodological problems in measuring awareness (see Lovibond 
& Shanks, 2002). For example, researchers do not usually ensure that their measure of 
awareness is equally sensitive to their measure of learning, often having a large 
number of training trials (measuring learning) but only a small number of test trials 
(measuring awareness). Lovibond and Shanks concluded that using their strict criteria 
                                                
5 Within this thesis, propositional learning and associative learning will be treated as qualitatively 
different processes, ignoring the fact that propositions or abstract representations might be an emergent 
feature of more complex associative networks (e.g. see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985, McClelland, 
Rumelhart, & the PDP research group,1986). 
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for assessing awareness, there was no convincing evidence of unconscious learning. 
While the methodological issues raised by Lovibond and Shanks concerning previous 
assessments of awareness are valid, there is still considerable controversy over 
whether unconscious learning occurs, especially from the implicit learning literature, 
which will be reviewed shortly. Note also that if it is accepted that an associative 
mechanism can produce declarative, explicit knowledge (e.g. see Shanks, 2007), then 
the usefulness of awareness as a distinguishing feature becomes questionable.  
An alternative approach to distinguishing between associative and 
propositional processes uses the ‘irrationality’ of behavior as indicative of associative 
learning (Shanks, 2007). A good example is the phenomenon of second-order 
conditioning (e.g. Rescorla, 1973), where one stimulus is paired with an 
unconditioned stimulus (A+), and subsequently a second stimulus is paired with the 
first stimulus (AB). The second stimulus (B) usually elicits a conditioned response, 
despite never being paired with the outcome. This effect is non-rational from a 
propositional perspective, since the addition of B to the compound AB produces no 
outcome, so participants should learn that B is inhibitory rather than excitatory 
(Karazinov & Boakes, 2007). Second-order conditioning is uniquely predicted by 
associative theories and accordingly, has been found to eventuate in causal learning 
scenarios only when participants undergo paced training trials that restrict their 
opportunity to think (Karazinov & Boakes, 2007, Lee & Livesey, 2012). Further, 
second-order conditioning disappears when participants are presented with all the 
relevant contingencies and asked to make the ‘correct’ inference (Lee & Livesey, 
2012). However, Mitchell et al. (2009) have noted that it is possible for the 
propositional system to reason incorrectly, and therefore the irrationality of learning is 
not convincing evidence for an associative process. Thus, it is clear that using the 
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output of learning to determine whether an associative or propositional system is 
operating is far from definitive.  
Mitchell et al. (2009) state that in contrast to the clear evidence for the role of 
higher-order reasoning in human learning, there is little evidence to support an 
automatic associative mechanism in humans (using awareness or otherwise), and 
therefore all human learning should be explained propositionally. While this 
conclusion is extreme in abandoning associative mechanisms, it is impossible to deny 
the role of higher-order cognitive processes in human learning6. Cognitive 
manipulations and instructions have large effects on learning, and are even able to 
replace experience of the actual contingencies (e.g. Colgan, 1970; Cook & Harris, 
1937; Lovibond, 2003). Thus, one way to account for the susceptibility of learning to 
cognitive influences is to adopt a dual-process stance and claim that humans learn 
propositionally and associatively.  
Proposing the existence of both an associative and propositional learning 
system has multiple advantages. It allows us to retain associative learning 
mechanisms to explain animal learning and suggests a degree of continuity in the 
mental faculties of humans and animals. Most importantly for this thesis, a dual-
process theory readily accounts for any potential effects of instructional 
manipulations, as we can postulate that verbal instructions affect the relative 
contribution of each learning process to behavior. Situations in which humans are 
given verbal instructions to learn within a task might allow the propositional system 
to dominate as the learner has additional motivation to learn and would actively test 
hypotheses and reason about salient events in their environment. In contrast, 
associative learning mechanisms may only be evident under incidental learning 
                                                
6 Indeed, even the radical behaviorists did not deny that ‘private’ mental events existed, they just 
rejected them in the pursuit of objective, scientific investigation.   
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conditions where the participant does not have the intention to learn (Mackintosh, 
1995), or cognitive control is low due to the nature of the task (McLaren et al., 2014). 
Such a dual-process theory implies that the propositional learning process has 
primacy in determining behavior, with associative processes only able to influence 
behavior when propositional learning is hindered in some way (Mackintosh, 1995; 
McLaren et al., 2014). This is entirely plausible since propositional learning entails 
conscious knowledge of both the output and the process of learning, providing a 
stronger justification for behavior. Any effect that is not readily explained by 
associative theory can be accounted for by assuming that the propositional system had 
a larger influence on behavior. The dual-process approach thus readily accommodates 
differences in the content of learning that arise as the result of verbal instruction or 
changing learning orientation. 
It is important to note at this point that this flexibility of the dual-process 
model to accommodate any result post-hoc by attributing it freely to either 
mechanism has led to some suggesting that it is unfalsifiable (Mitchell et al., 2009). 
While in practice it is true that such a dual-process model is difficult to test, some 
attempt has been made by McLaren and colleagues to specify the manner in which 
these processes interact (e.g. McLaren et al., 2014). This is important since a dual-
process theory should be able to specify a priori the kinds of situations under which 
associative and propositional mechanisms will dominate, rather than simply 
attributing results to the more appropriate system. Dual-process theories assume that 
propositional processes are more controlled and deliberate, have a large effect on 
learning and therefore the capability to suppress the operation of associative processes, 
or at least mask its effects (Livesey & McLaren, 2009; McLaren et al., 2014). 
However, another assumption made by some dual-process theorists is that associative 
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processes operate automatically while propositional processes can be engaged and 
disengaged more or less at will (McLaren et al., 2014). This implies that the dual-
process view should be able to predict differences in learning that arise when 
comparing conditions where propositional processes are encouraged versus situations 
where they are not.   
McLaren et al. (2014) have provided the most precise specification to date of a 
dual-process theory involving associative and propositional processes. They propose 
that the relative influence of each process is determined by the degree of cognitive 
control exerted over the behavior. One implication of this is that propositional 
processes will dominate under situations where cognitive control is high and evidence 
of associative processes might only manifest in situations where cognitive control is 
low. Similarly, Mackintosh (1995) argued that in order to study associative learning 
in people, we either need to distract them from the task by presenting them with a 
cover story, make them work rapidly, or overload their working memory so they 
cannot ‘figure out’ what is going on.  In other words, associative learning can only be 
observed if measures are taken to ensure that participants are not actively thinking 
about the task at hand, but may occur incidentally in the absence of conscious thought. 
If we accept this potential interaction between learning mechanisms, then it follows 
that verbal instructions can be used to change the relative influence of propositional 
and associative processes, by encouraging or hindering the use of propositional 
learning.  
Alternatively, under a single-process view, it may be the case that people 
always learn propositionally, and that instructions facilitate more effective and 
accurate reasoning. For example, additional instructions may simply enhance 
propositional learning processes by increasing motivation to learn, or drawing 
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attention to relevant aspects of the task or content to-be-learned that otherwise would 
have been ignored. While this is certainly possible, the propositional account as it 
stands currently does not specify the way in which learning can differ as a result of 
changing learning orientation, nor what the minimal conditions are for propositional 
learning to occur (e.g. whether incidental learning is possible). Thus, while the role of 
instructions in learning does not provide clear evidence for either a single- or dual-
process view of learning (and indeed it is not the aim of this thesis to discriminate 
between these two views), it is certainly relevant for future theory development from 
both perspectives. Human learning is flexible, and can be influenced by a wide variety 
of factors. Specifying how learning orientation can affect learning is needed for a 
complete understanding of behavior, and will aid in characterizing the potential 
interaction between propositional and associative processes, should they both exist. 
The need to move away from proving the existence of associative processes, towards 
characterizing the interaction between associative learning and other forms of 
cognition has been voiced by multiple researchers from both sides of the debate as a 
more fruitful avenue of future research (McLaren et al., 2014; Mitchell et al., 2009; 
Sloman, 1996). Adopting this research goal would lend predictive utility to the dual-
systems approach as well as offer more careful specification of the exact contribution 
of propositional processes to human learning.  
 
1.3.2 Implicit and Explicit Learning 
A separate debate has been raging for the past 50 years concerning whether 
there are independent implicit and explicit learning processes. Unlike associative 
learning, the field of implicit learning grew from an interest in language acquisition 
borne out of the ‘cognitive revolution’ that swept psychology in the 1950s. The term 
  
17 
“implicit learning” was originally coined by Reber (1967), whose research was 
inspired by the observation that humans seemed adept at learning complex rules 
inherent in language without the ability to report knowledge of those rules or 
awareness of the process of learning. Reber’s experiments involved presenting 
participants with nonsense letter strings that conformed to a specific artificial 
grammar consisting of rules determining whether different combinations of letter 
strings were permissible. Despite participants only being told to memorize the strings, 
they were subsequently able to correctly categorize novel strings as grammatical or 
nongrammatical (Reber, 1967). Reber interpreted this result as evidence of a 
fundamental ability to induce rules implicitly in the absence of awareness. Reber’s 
initial findings sparked a wealth of research investigating whether it was possible to 
learn implicitly without awareness, and whether implicit learning represented an 
independent mode of learning.  
Controversy over how to define implicit learning and the exact characteristics 
of implicit learning has dominated learning research since. In particular, Reber’s 
(1967) original conceptualization of implicit learning as rule abstraction in the 
absence of awareness was challenged by findings showing that artificial grammar 
learning tasks could be learnt through memorizing specific pairs or chunks of the 
grammar (e.g. Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990), and that an ability to recognize 
grammatical strings was accompanied by explicit knowledge given an appropriate 
awareness measure (see Shanks & St. John, 1994). The field of implicit learning 
moved away from the idea of unconscious rule abstraction and today, is most 
commonly defined as learning without awareness (Reber, 1987). Thus, the role of 
awareness in learning has become paramount in demonstrating the existence of 
implicit learning (Shanks & St. John, 1994), and as such, much of the implicit 
  
18 
learning literature is devoted to this issue. The debate about the necessity of 
awareness in implicit learning continues to this day (see Lovibond & Shanks, 2002, 
and Shanks, 2010, for parallel discussion of the role of awareness in conditioning). 
While some researchers might agree that implicit learning is a qualitatively 
distinct mode of learning, it is much more mysterious what its defining properties are. 
Different authors use the term ‘implicit’ to refer to a wide range of things such as the 
nature of the learning process, the nature of the memory retrieval process, and the 
type of resultant knowledge (Frensch, 1998). Different authors also ascribe different 
meanings to the word ‘implicit’, further complicating the debate. Frensch classified a 
wide range of meanings of implicit learning into two broad categories: 
unconscious/unaware and nonintentional/automatic. He concluded that the most 
scientifically useful way to define implicit learning was nonintentional/automatic 
rather than unconscious/unaware, since awareness tests could never be ensured to be 
sufficiently sensitive to show that awareness is absent (Shanks & St. John, 1994), and 
defining implicit learning as nonintentional/automatic leads to a number of testable 
predictions regarding its functional characteristics (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979, for a 
discussion of differences between automatic and controlled processes).  
Indeed, many of the paradigms used to demonstrate implicit learning are tasks 
in which participants are either not informed about the presence of structured material 
they could learn, or are performing other tasks that made any learning that occurred 
incidental. Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that implicit learning does not 
require an intention to learn, and in this way can be said to be different to explicit 
learning, which necessarily involves deliberate, controlled processes. The fact that 
implicit learning occurs incidentally has led some to propose that implicit learning 
represents a by-product of attentive information processing (Jiménez, 2003). However, 
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a single-system account might describe the phenomenon of implicit learning (as 
stated) as a situation where learning is easily accomplished with minimal cognitive 
effort, and in which the resultant knowledge is difficult to report, perhaps due to the 
nature of the content being complex or difficult to describe verbally (see Perruchet & 
Amorim, 1992; Shanks & St John, 1994).  
Indeed, there are many demonstrations of reportable explicit knowledge in 
implicit learning paradigms given appropriately sensitive awareness tests (e.g. 
Perruchet & Amorim, 1992). Under a single-system account, learning occurs given 
the necessary conditions, and awareness is always present, but whether it is detected 
or not is determined by the methodology used for a particular experiment. This graded 
view of implicit learning allows for awareness to emerge at some threshold along the 
continuum, an idea that is supported by connectionist networks of implicit learning 
(Cleeremans, 2008). If it is accepted that concepts such as awareness are dynamic 
then implicit and explicit can be thought of as simply two extremes on a single 
continuum (Cleeremans, 1994, 1995, 2008), removing the (false) dichotomy between 
implicit and explicit learning7.  
Nevertheless, many researchers still view implicit learning as qualitatively 
distinct from explicit learning. In addition to its functional characteristics, another 
way in which implicit learning is generally more accepted to differ from explicit 
learning is in its resultant output. In contrast to Reber’s (1967) original idea of 
implicit learning as unconscious abstraction of rules, implicit learning as a mechanism 
might be better thought of as an accumulator of statistical regularities (Cleeremans, 
1996). Thus, the output of implicit learning is represented in terms of instances or 
simple associations, rather than abstract rules of the sort that Reber (1967) originally 
                                                
7 Interestingly, it was Reber (1993) who cautioned against being seduced by the “polarity fallacy”. 
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surmised. It has also been suggested that representations that result from implicit 
learning are weaker than that of explicit learning, but are still able to influence 
behavior (Cleeremans, 2006). This thesis will not attempt to clarify the properties of 
implicit learning as a process or assess the qualitative properties of implicit 
knowledge. However, a working definition is needed due to the multiple definitions 
of implicit learning that punctuate the literature (Frensch, 1998). Thus, for the 
purposes of this thesis, implicit learning will be conceptualized as a learning 
mechanism that operates incidentally without the intention to learn, and whose output 
is approximated by an incremental learning mechanism accumulating knowledge 
from instances.  
In addition to disagreement about the definition of implicit learning, there is 
also disagreement on how implicit and explicit processes interact. Much of the 
implicit learning literature has focused on establishing its existence as a qualitatively 
distinct learning process or showing that awareness is absent, with far less research 
testing the potential interaction between implicit and explicit learning, should the 
distinction between the two be meaningful. Note that conceiving of implicit learning 
as unconscious, or non-intentional, or as an incremental accumulator of information, 
is silent as to the effects of abstract, conscious knowledge. Some researchers have 
adopted the position that implicit learning is completely independent of explicit 
processes and knowledge (e.g. Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Curran & Keele, 1993; 
Reber, 1990; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989; Willingham, Nissen, & 
Bullemer, 1989). This extreme position claims that implicit learning is “cognitively 
impenetrable”, with implicit and explicit learning processes producing independent 
forms of knowledge. This view is supported by studies showing that the degree of 
implicit learning is not altered by providing participants with the intention to learn or 
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giving them knowledge about the content to-be-learned (e.g. Jimenez, Mendez, & 
Cleeremans, 1996). If there are situations in which explicit processes do not improve 
learning, this might suggest that any learning observed under normal incidental 
conditions can only be explained using implicit learning processes, since the addition 
of explicit learning has no effect. In other words, if there are some situations in which 
explicit processes are not efficient, there must be another (implicit) learning process 
that operates optimally under those conditions (e.g. Reber, 1989).  
Alternatively, it could be that while implicit and explicit learning processes 
are separable, they interact in such a way that the addition of explicit knowledge 
changes learning qualitatively or quantitatively. In this thesis, quantitative changes 
refer to changes in the amount of learning, while qualitative changes refer to changes 
in the content of learning (e.g. learning of rules vs. associations). Quantitative 
changes in learning are not especially useful in determining whether a task is tapping 
into implicit learning since such an effect can easily be explained by the additional 
instructions boosting explicit learning processes or strengthening the resulting 
knowledge. Qualitative changes however, have been argued to provide stronger 
evidence that implicit and explicit processes operate differently and are dissociable 
(Jones & McLaren, 2009).  
Thus in implicit learning, the comparison between learning under incidental 
conditions, and learning under intentional conditions where participants are given 
additional information about the task have been utilized to show that there are 
separable implicit and explicit learning processes (e.g. Dominey, Lelekov, Ventre-
Dominey, & Jeannerod, 1998; Jones & McLaren, 2009; Sanchez & Reber, 2013). In 
order to draw these conclusions, many of these studies (and the studies contained in 
this thesis) assume that incidental conditions are sufficient to engage implicit learning, 
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and intentional learning conditions are sufficient to engage explicit learning. It will 
not be assumed that each process is exclusively engaged due to the difficulty in 
ensuring that tasks are ‘process-pure’ (Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Reingold & 
Merikle, 1988). Thus, the aim of this thesis is not to prove that learning under 
incidental conditions is implicit but rather to examine the effects of verbal instructions 
and explicit learning on learning in tasks where it is believed that learning can occur 
implicitly.  
 
1.3.3 Rules and Associations 
At this point, it is worth defining and introducing the significance of rules in 
learning, since they are often cited as a type of learning that is uncontroversial in 
incorporating explicit higher-order abilities such as reasoning and hypothesis-testing 
(Sloman, 1996). Rules in this context refer to mental representations consisting of 
variables and logical statements. Since they can apply to a whole class of stimuli that 
satisfy its constraints, they are necessarily abstract (Sloman, 1996). This means that 
rules allow for generalization of knowledge in ways that go beyond the surface 
similarity of a novel instance and a known instance (Shanks & Darby, 1998). Most 
importantly, rules are assumed to be real psychological entities that have a causal 
relationship with behavior (i.e. behavior that is rule-following), in contrast to a 
description that merely happens to be consistent with behavior (i.e. behavior that is 
rule-conforming, see Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992, for more on this distinction). 
Sloman (1996) has stated that all representations can be couched in terms of rules, and 
thus it is important to clearly define what is meant by a rule so that systems of 
learning that do not use rules can be identified empirically and the term does not 
become empirically vacuous. Therefore, henceforth the word ‘rule’ will be used to 
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describe abstract, symbolic representations only and not descriptions of simple 
associations or any other behavior traditionally considered explainable in associative 
terms (e.g. responding to a novel instance based on the similarity to a known instance).  
With this definition of rules in mind, rule learning can be clearly contrasted 
with learning that is instance-based or purely associative in content. As discussed 
above, rules are necessarily abstract and therefore their content is markedly different 
from that of simple associations. In certain tasks, the presence of rules is clearly 
distinguishable in the pattern of behavior exhibited. For example, in a simple 
discrimination task between two stimuli lying on the same dimension (e.g. a green 
circle leading to no reward and a blueish-green circle leading to a reward), 
participants can either learn about the instances (i.e. that each individual stimulus 
leads to its respective outcome), or they can derive a relational rule describing the 
difference between the stimuli (i.e. that bluer circles lead to rewards). Whether 
learning is instance-based or rule-based can then be discerned from testing how 
participants generalize to novel stimuli along the dimension. If participants have 
merely learned about the instances they have seen, they should generalize on the basis 
of similarity to the known instances, with their behavior indicating the highest level of 
expectancy of reward for stimuli similar to the blueish-green circle. If, however, 
participants have learned a relational rule, their behavior should indicate the highest 
level of expectancy of reward for the bluest circles. Thus throughout this thesis, some 
of the instructions will encourage participants to form rules to ensure use of 
propositional and explicit learning, and in order to provide a clear contrast to 
situations in which participants may be learning associatively or implicitly. 
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1.4 Some Commonalities 
While the associative/propositional and implicit/explicit debates have been 
presented here as independent, there are obvious similarities between associative and 
implicit learning. Conceiving of implicit learning as the result of incremental learning 
mechanisms sensitive to statistical structure in the environment bears obvious 
resemblances to an associative learning mechanism. This has led some theorists to 
propose that implicit learning effects in humans are indicative of an associative 
system in which associations are learnt automatically (Mackintosh, 1995; McLaren, 
Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). If this notion of implicit learning is adopted, this would 
suggest that what controls the relative influence of associative and propositional 
processes is the nature of the task itself. Many implicit learning tasks contain complex 
stimuli that are difficult to encode propositionally and are not conducive to reasoning 
(e.g. contextual cueing, Chun & Jiang, 1998), or are speeded tasks that do not allow 
the participant to reason about the content of learning (e.g. serial reaction time tasks, 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Implicit learning tasks do not involve telling the 
participant that there is content to be learned and are easy to perform without learning 
this content, and thus the participant does not usually have the motivation to reason or 
formulate rules about the task. In other words, implicit learning tasks may be 
instances where propositional influences have little chance to operate, allowing 
behavior to be determined primarily by associative mechanisms.  
 
1.4.1 Learning without Awareness? 
 As discussed above, independence from awareness has been cited as a 
defining feature of both associative and implicit learning, and much of the literature 
has been devoted to examining this issue (Lovibond & Shanks, 2001; Shanks & St. 
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John, 1994). However, if it is accepted that awareness can emerge as a result of 
associative and implicit learning (e.g. see Cleeremans, 2008; Dickinson, 1980), then 
the usefulness of awareness as a criterion disappears. If this stance is adopted, it is 
certainly difficult to see how awareness as a causal determinant of behavior and 
awareness as an epiphenomal accompaniment to learning can be empirically 
distinguished. In any case, the focus on awareness detracts from what might be argued 
as the more important difference between learning processes – their functional 
characteristics.   
 
1.4.2 Learning without Thought? 
Even if implicit learning is not considered to be equivalent to associative 
learning, both mechanisms suggest that it is possible for learning to occur incidentally, 
in the apparent absence of reasoned thought or conscious intention. This carries 
significant theoretical weight, as it would show that deliberate and effortful 
mechanisms are not sufficient to explain all behavior, providing evidence for a dual-
process theory of learning. However, it is possible that learning that occurs under 
incidental conditions may in fact be explicit and intentional. It may be the case that 
participants are naturally suspicious within experimental situations and actively look 
for regularities and rules when confronted with a task. This could occur at the 
beginning of a task despite the experimenter devising a distracting cover story or 
alternative task, or could occur during the task when the participant has become 
competent and mastered control over their responses. Thus what appears to be 
incidental learning could be the result of explicit processes. This argument may be 
harder to defend if there are genuine differences between incidental and intentional 
learning orientations, or if the task was sufficiently engaging so it would be difficult 
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to learn explicitly even if the intention to do so was present. Then, the difficult 
question becomes how to reconcile the obvious role of higher-order cognitive 
faculties in learning with the apparent lack of need for those same processes. This 
question will be addressed in the General Discussion in Chapter 5.  
 
1.4.3 Theoretical Questions 
The associative/propositional and implicit/explicit debates arise from different 
contexts and have different motivations for their respective methods of explaining 
behavior, but they ask similar theoretical questions couched in different terms. 
Researchers in associative learning ask comparative questions, attempting to connect 
learning in humans with that of other animals, and delineating what the differences in 
mental capacities between humans and non-humans are. Implicit learning on the other 
hand, attempts to understand whether complex phenomena such as language 
acquisition can be accomplished in the absence of effort and/or intention. What 
researchers in these seemingly disparate areas of research share in common is a desire 
to understand situations in which participants learn X or Y, where X and Y are 
acknowledged to be different in content. The main theoretical issues concern whether 
a single learning process is sufficient to describe all human behavior, or if multiple 
processes are needed. If participants can learn in different ways, one driven by System 
I and the other by System II, then it is to our advantage to discover what situations 
lead to the dominance of one process over another. This will allow us to predict how 
the two processes work together and whether there is an optimal process for particular 
tasks. Alternatively, if a single-process approach is adopted, it is nevertheless 
important to specify the conditions under which a single mechanism can produce 
learning that has different qualitative properties. 
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At the heart of both of these debates are three fundamental questions: 1) do 
both processes exist, and if so, 2) how can we tell which process is operating, and 3) 
how do the two processes interact? As discussed, the first and second questions have 
proved to be highly controversial in both literatures and are currently unresolved. The 
third question has received much less direct attention in the literature. This may be 
because specifying the nature of interaction is difficult when it has not yet been 
decided how best to determine the operation of each learning system. Previous efforts 
to use awareness have not provided a clear answer, and miss the critical point that 
what differs between learning processes is not just awareness of the output of learning, 
but the computation. Experimental approaches which attempt to increase or decrease 
the likelihood of a given learning process operating are not only more informative in 
investigating potential differences between learning processes, but also allow for 
investigation into what most dual-process theories fail to specify – their mode of 
interaction (Mitchell et al., 2009; Sloman, 1996). Note that failure to specify how 
associative and propositional processes interact is one of the key criticisms leveled at 
dual-process theories (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009). Manipulating verbal instructions to 
change learning orientation seems to be one way in which to start investigating this 
potential interaction. 
 
1.5 General Aims 
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of verbal instructions 
on different learning paradigms in humans. As mentioned above, the aim of this thesis 
is not to prove the existence of any particular mechanism in humans, nor to conclude 
in favor of a single- or dual-process account. Whatever approach is adopted, it is 
undeniable that verbal instructions alter how people learn, and what they learn. 
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However, if humans are capable of learning associatively and implicitly, testing the 
effect of learning orientation induced by instructions bears directly on the question of 
how best to characterize the nature of interaction between associative and 
propositional processes. Using instructions to induce an intention to learn or to give 
participants additional knowledge about a task will presumably encourage the use of 
explicit, propositional processes. A comparison to a condition where participants are 
not given this additional knowledge therefore provides information on exactly how 
the propositional system uses such knowledge and applies it to the task. This 
additional information can either increase what is learned, change what is learned, or 
have no effect at all. General improvements in learning might suggest that the effect 
of instructions may simply be to increase the effectiveness of propositional learning 
processes, which are operating in both conditions. Alternatively, qualitative or 
selective differences in learning may be indicative that dissociable learning processes 
exist.  
 While different instructional manipulations will be used for different 
paradigms, they are all similar in the sense that they are useful instructions or hints 
designed to aid the participant through providing explicit knowledge about their task. 
In other words, they are not misleading and should help participants to learn within 
each task. In Chapter 2, a hint will be provided where participants are told to look for 
an underlying rule that summarizes a set of probabilistic contingencies. In Chapter 3, 
participants will be told to memorize a set of stimuli for an impending memory test. 
In Chapter 4, participants will receive a hint to attend to a category dimension that 
will help them form a relational rule to aid them in a difficult discrimination task. 
While these manipulations are varied, two common themes emerge. The instructions 
either attempt to induce an intention to learn which would otherwise not be present 
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(comparing incidental and intentional learning conditions, Chapters 2 and 3), or direct 
participants to uncover a relational rule that might be difficult otherwise (comparing 
rule and associative learning, Chapters 2 and 4). In all chapters the comparison will be 
to conditions where this additional information is not presented (Chapters 2 and 4) or 
where participants are performing a task where the goal is not related to learning 
(Chapters 2 and 3).  
 
1.6 Research Questions 
There are three research questions examined in this thesis: 
1. What effect do the additional instructions have on learning?  
2. To what extent does learning occur incidentally, in the absence of these 
instructions? 
3. What are the theoretical implications for human learning? 
The first question involves a comparison of learning between the two 
conditions. If a dual-process approach is taken, this comparison should be informative 
in exposing the role of explicit processes in learning, if certain assumptions are made. 
Firstly, a kind of ‘subtraction logic’ is needed whereby implicit or associative 
processes are assumed to be equally operational in both conditions but explicit or 
propositional processes are assumed to be more operational in Condition 2. If 
associative or implicit processes are assumed to be automatic, then one criterion of 
automaticity is that they function similarly in different situations (Hasher & Zacks, 
1979). Of course, this assumption may be misguided. It may be that instructions 
simply enhance motivation to learn so more attention is given to the task at hand, 
perhaps resulting in more efficient learning. A comparison between conditions that 
yields general additive effects would support this possibility. However, if qualitative 
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differences in learning emerge between the conditions, then this conclusion may be 
less tenable. In any case, results from Chapters 2-4 will primarily be interpreted as 
resulting from the interaction between dual-processes, but analogous conclusions can 
be made for single-process theories, given that they too should be able to account for 
the sensitivity of learning to orientation and instructions.  
The second question alludes to the possibility of observing evidence of 
associative and/or implicit learning processes under incidental learning conditions 
when participants have low motivation to use explicit or propositional strategies. This 
requires the assumption that whatever task participants are engaging in, the 
contribution of explicit or propositional learning will be minimal. This assumption is 
problematic because it is impossible to ensure that the influence of a particular 
process in any given task is zero (see Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Reingold & Merikle, 
1988, for a discussion of process-pure tasks). As mentioned above, incidental learning 
has been cited as a defining feature of implicit learning (Frensch, 1998), and may 
provide a means to observe associative processes in humans (Mackintosh, 1995), and 
thus what is learnt in the uninstructed or incidental conditions will be informative not 
just in comparison to the instructed or intentional conditions, but in testing the limits 
of associative and/or implicit processes. 
 
1.7 Outline of Chapters 
 What follows, are a series of experiments in three different paradigms 
comparing learning in a condition where participants perform a task where they might 
learn incidentally, against a condition where participants are given additional 
instruction that gives them the intention to learn or derive a rule. The three paradigms 
used in this thesis are the serial reaction time (SRT) task (Chapter 2), the prototype 
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distortion task (Chapter 3), and a dimensional category learning task (Chapter 4). 
While the content of learning in each of these paradigms and the manipulations across 
chapters are markedly different, it is hoped that they will enable general conclusions 
to be drawn about the nature of human learning.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 examine learning effects that have been labeled as implicit 
for various reasons. Sequence learning, as investigated in the SRT task, has been 
singled out as the best incidental learning paradigm currently available (Destrebecqz, 
2004; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003), since participants are engaged in a task 
involving speeded responses to targets and do not usually suspect that the sequence of 
the targets is structured and therefore predictable. Participants usually learn about 
complex deterministic and probabilistic sequences in these types of tasks in the 
absence of instructions to do so, and sometimes in the absence of reportable 
knowledge about the sequence (e.g. Sanchez, Gobel, & Reber, 2010). Chapter 2 will 
involve a manipulation where one group of participants are given a rule about a 
probabilistic sequence underlying the contingencies, and another group will not be 
told anything about the underlying contingencies.  
 Chapter 3 concerns learning in the prototype distortion task. In this task, 
participants are able to learn about the similarity structure of a category of stimuli 
centered on a prototype simply through exposure. These prototype effects have 
typically been deemed to be implicit due to intact categorization of novel stimuli in 
amnesic patients in the absence of accurate recognition of seen exemplars (e.g. 
Knowlton & Squire, 1993). Chapter 3 will test an often-assumed property of 
prototype effects (that they result under incidental conditions) in a more conservative 
way than has been done in the past. To create an incidental learning condition, a 
visual search task will be appropriated from another implicit learning paradigm 
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(contextual cueing, Chun & Jiang, 1998) to consume participants’ explicit cognitive 
functions such that any learning can be more confidently deemed as incidental. In 
Chapter 3, the ability of participants to generalize to novel stimuli within the 
‘category’, and ability to discriminate between new and old stimuli, will be compared 
between a group who are exposed to the stimuli incidentally while searching through 
the stimuli, and a group who are told to memorize the stimuli for a subsequent 
recognition test. 
 Chapter 4, like Chapter 2, will involve a manipulation where participants are 
given a hint to discover a relational rule on one of two relevant category dimensions. 
Participants will be required to first discriminate between two categories of stimuli 
that are very similar perceptually, but differ on two dimensions (one of which will be 
manipulated to be attended, and the other unattended). Note that unlike Chapters 2 
and 3, instructions will be used here to manipulate attention rather than learning 
orientation. The experiments in this chapter contained an additional manipulation of 
rule applicability that substantially influenced the pattern of results. As such, much of 
the focus in Chapter 4 is on this manipulation. The conclusions within each chapter 
will be self-contained and will not draw upon the results or conclusions from the 
previous chapter, however the General Discussion (Chapter 5) will draw parallels 
between the three paradigms and integrate their separate conclusions into a general 
theoretical conclusion about the nature of learning in humans.  
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Chapter 2: Sequence Learning 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Implicit learning theorists assume that individuals learn about their 
surroundings incidentally, in a manner that does not easily give rise to verbalizable 
propositions, but rather a form of tacit knowledge that improves their ability to 
engage with their environment and anticipate events (e.g. Reber, 1989). It is generally 
accepted that explicit learning requires higher-order cognitive processes such as 
reasoning and hypothesis-testing, and results in knowledge that is declarative 
(Anderson, 1976) and/or propositional (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). In 
contrast to explicit learning, definitions of implicit learning have been much more 
varied. Frensch (1998) has noted that different researchers often use the word 
‘implicit’ synonymously with either unconscious/unaware (e.g. Reber, 1989, 1993; 
Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987; Shanks & St. John, 1994), or non-
intentional/automatic (e.g. Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999).  
Much of the early implicit learning studies focused on the former definition, with 
results from initial studies alluding to the possibility that learning was possible despite 
some participants being unable to verbalize what they had learned (e.g. Reber, 1967; 
Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1987). These observations sparked a wealth of 
research into implicit learning as “learning without awareness” (Reber, 1987), and 
fierce debate regarding the validity of different awareness measures (Perruchet & 
Amorim, 1992; Shanks & St. John, 1994). The role of awareness in implicit learning 
still remains a point of contention today (e.g. Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Shanks & St. 
John, 1994). 
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While awareness does carry significant theoretical weight in differentiating 
implicit from explicit learning, experiments that simply test for the presence of 
awareness as proof of implicit learning miss a crucial point – that awareness may 
directly influence learning itself, but may also emerge epiphenomenally with learning 
(Sanchez & Reber, 2013). It has been argued that what is more important theoretically 
in differentiating implicit and explicit learning is not the nature of the resulting 
knowledge, but the nature of the learning process itself (Frensch, Lin, & Buchner, 
1998). Frensch (1998) concluded that conceiving of implicit learning in terms of the 
automaticity of the learning process (rather than awareness) was the most 
scientifically useful since it leads to a number of testable predictions which can 
provide a more meaningful contrast with explicit learning. According to this account 
of implicit learning, its defining characteristics are that it occurs incidentally without 
the intention to learn (Lewicki, 1986; Reber, 1989, 1993), and therefore requires little 
mental effort (Frensch, 1998; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999). This definition accords with 
the emphasis that many implicit learning researchers place on the automaticity of 
implicit learning (e.g. Reber, 1989, Berry & Dienes, 1993; Frensch, 1998; Perruchet 
& Gallego, 1997; Underwood & Bright, 1996), as well as on the independence of 
implicit learning from the explicit thoughts and conscious motivations of the 
individual (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Destrebecqz, 2004; Jiménez, Méndez, & 
Cleeremans, 1996; Perruchet & Vinter, 1998; Song, Howard Jr., & Howard, 2007; 
Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). 
In this regard, one of the best examples of implicit learning is sequence 
learning as investigated in the serial reaction time (SRT) task. In a typical paradigm, a 
target appears in different locations on the screen and participants have to respond to 
the location of the target with a corresponding key press. Unbeknownst to participants 
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performing the task, the location of the target follows a deterministic or probabilistic 
sequence, such that some or all of the responses can be predicted. Learning is evident 
when reaction times are faster on trials that follow the sequence, compared to trials 
that do not8. Sequence learning, as measured in this task, is a robust finding and 
occurs despite participants having no intention to learn about an underlying sequence, 
and poor ability to verbalize their knowledge on more direct tests (e.g. Jiménez, 
Méndez, & Cleeremans, 1996; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). The SRT 
paradigm has been cited as the best task to investigate implicit learning in humans 
since responding is speeded so participants have little opportunity to think before they 
respond, and learning is truly incidental since the task is easy to perform and 
participants normally do not suspect an underlying sequence (Cleeremans, 1993; 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003).  
Thus, sequence learning seems to embody some of the characteristics of 
implicit learning. However, it has been argued that stronger support for implicit 
learning as a separate learning process would be provided if it could be shown that 
explicit knowledge or intention to learn do not affect SRT performance (Jiménez, 
Méndez, and Cleeremans, 1996; Reber, 1989), or alternatively, produce dissociable 
patterns of learning (Jones & McLaren, 2009; Stadler & Frensch, 1994). The former 
result, that learning is not amenable to conscious control, would show that learning is 
not cognitively penetrable. This can be taken as evidence that implicit learning 
operates automatically but also independently from explicit learning, meaning that 
one process cannot affect or share information with the other (Curran & Keele, 1993; 
Lewicki, 1986; Stadler & Frensch, 1994). The latter result, where explicit and implicit 
orientations produce dissociable patterns of learning would suggest that while implicit 
                                                
8 This can be manipulated either within- or between-subjects. 
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learning is cognitively penetrable, manipulating intention to learn engages a separate 
explicit learning process that operates in a qualitatively different way (Jones & 
McLaren, 2009; Stadler & Frensch, 1994). In either case, the assumption is that 
explicit processes can be engaged at will and thus encouraging these processes in one 
group but not another might reveal the contribution of explicit processes to so-called 
implicit learning effects. 
Recent work has therefore focused on demonstrating that implicit learning is 
in some sense automatic or operates independently of voluntary control by 
manipulating explicit knowledge and/or the intention to learn9. For example, Curran 
and Keele (1993, Experiment 1) compared learning of a simple six-item repeating 
sequence between an incidental group who were not told anything about a sequence, 
and an intentional group who were explicitly taught the sequence to which they would 
be responding. When participants in the incidental group were divided post-hoc into 
‘more aware’ or ‘less aware’ based on whether they could produce at least four of the 
six sequence positions in a questionnaire, the ‘less aware’ participants showed less 
learning in the training phase of the SRT task than the ‘more aware’ and intentional 
groups10. A similar result was reported by Frensch and Miner (Experiment 1, 1994), 
who tested participants on a 12-item fixed, repeating sequence interspersed 
periodically with random sequences in a four-choice SRT task. The intentional group 
were told that the sequence of the target followed a repeating pattern, while the 
incidental group were simply told that they needed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Again, the intentional group showed a larger difference 
between their RTs for sequential and random sequences (see also Destrebecqz, 2004).  
                                                
9 Other methods to demonstrate automaticity have involved showing that learning is impervious to 
secondary tasks (e.g. Jiménez & Méndez, 1999; Jiménez & Vázquez, 2005), or the presence of explicit 
cues (Jiménez & Méndez, 2001). 
10 Interestingly, these differences did not transfer to a phase where a secondary task was added.  
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These results suggest that explicit knowledge and intention to learn aid 
performance in tasks that are assumed to measure implicit learning, suggesting that 
such knowledge enhances learning, at least when deterministic sequences are used 
(but see Sanchez & Reber, 2013, for an exception with a modified task). Probabilistic 
sequences, on the other hand, are less amenable to such explicit strategies because any 
attempts to induce rules are often hindered by elements of the sequence that do not 
conform to the rule (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998). Under these circumstances, 
participants may either give up searching for a rule, or their attempts to do so may not 
benefit their RT performance, producing no difference between incidental and 
intentional learning. Thus, it is possible that this advantage for intentional learners 
may be confined to deterministic sequences like those used by Curran and Keele 
(1993) and Frensch and Miner (1994). If this were the case then one might question 
the relevance of these findings given that sequence learning has been found in many 
probabilistic tasks, and probabilistic sequences arguably provide a better laboratory 
model of the imperfect contingencies between events that we experience in most 
environments (Deroost, Zeeuws, & Soetens, 2006). 
Jiménez, Méndez, and Cleeremans (1996) provide support for the hypothesis 
that the learning of probabilistic sequences might be resistant to the explicit intentions 
of the individual. They manipulated learning orientation by telling participants 
allocated to the intentional group that a set of rules determined where the stimulus 
would appear, and that they should try to work out the rules for a subsequent 
generation test where they could earn extra payment for accurate performance. Both 
groups were trained on a six-choice SRT task where on 85% of the trials, the next 
target location could be predicted, either with 50% accuracy (i.e. from one of two 
possible locations), or with 100% accuracy. On the other 15% of trials, the location 
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was made unpredictable by substituting the target location for another random 
location. Despite the intentional group being more accurate and slower in their 
responding (suggesting they were trying to work out the sequence)11, the two groups 
showed equivalent evidence of learning in responding in the SRT task and a 
continuous generation task where participants had to predict the location of the next 
target with feedback on where the ‘correct’ (grammatical or random) target was.   
A similar result was obtained by Stefaniak et al. (2008) who looked at the 
effect of intention to learn on probabilistic and deterministic sequences. In 
Experiment 1, participants in the intentional group first responded to an 8-item 
deterministic sequence, and then had to generate the sequence themselves until they 
could produce the sequence in its entirety twice in a row. Those in the incidental 
group began the training phase without the chance to learn about the sequence 
beforehand. Reaction times for the intentional group during the training phase were 
significantly faster than those for the incidental group during the initial 12 sequential 
blocks, and the difference in RT for the trained sequence in block 12 (the last 
sequential block) and another, untrained sequence introduced in block 13 was larger 
in the intentional group. Experiment 2 investigated the same group manipulation 
using a sequence with half of its positions deterministic and the other half 
probabilistic, which amounted to an improbable (i.e. infrequent) position occurring on 
10% of the trials. The comparison of RTs for the training sequence in block 12 versus 
an untrained sequence in block 13 showed that both incidental and intentional groups 
learned about the sequence equally well, such that the increase in RT for the untrained 
block was the same between groups. Stefaniak et al. concluded that although 
participants possessed relevant sequence knowledge (based on better performance 
                                                
11 This stands in contrast to the effect of intentional instructions in deterministic sequences, where the 
intentional group are usually faster at responding than the incidental group (e.g. Destrebecqz, 2004). 
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than the incidental group in a subsequent generation test), it could not be used 
effectively due to the probabilistic nature of the sequence, and therefore any learning 
observed must be due to implicit learning mechanisms (see also Cleeremans & 
Jiménez, 1998, and Song, Howard Jr., & Howard, 2007). However, Stefaniak et al. 
note that there was no difference between RTs for improbable, compared to probable 
positions, suggesting that participants did not learn these contingencies, making these 
results difficult to interpret.  
 In summary, the finding that intentional learning produces no advantage in 
sequence learning over incidental learning (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998; Jiménez, 
Méndez, and Cleeremans, 1996; Stefaniak et al., 2008) has been used as evidence in 
favor of an independent, implicit learning mechanism that operates effectively in 
situations where explicit mechanisms are hindered (e.g. Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998). 
This argument is based on the assumption that the difference between incidental and 
intentional conditions is the addition of explicit processes12, and therefore a lack of 
difference between these learning orientations implies that explicit mechanisms are 
not useful and therefore not responsible for any learning effects observed under 
incidental conditions. Thus, one way to show that implicit learning exists is to 
demonstrate that there are some conditions under which explicit processes do not aid 
sequence learning.  
Rather than searching for this particular result as a proof of existence, what 
may be more informative for characterizing implicit learning at a process level is 
distinguishing the situations in which explicit knowledge is helpful for sequence 
learning from the situations in which it is not. Stefaniak et al. (2008) have proposed 
that whether the sequence is deterministic or probabilistic may determine whether 
                                                
12 Note that this does not assume that explicit processes are absent under incidental conditions.  
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explicit knowledge is helpful or not, while other authors have suggested that the 
difficulty of the sequence is the determining factor (Destrebecqz, 2004; Stadler & 
Frensch, 1994). Both these suggestions adequately account for the findings reviewed 
above regarding the effects of explicit knowledge (but see Sanchez & Reber, 2013).  
However, some authors have suggested that more convincing evidence for 
separable implicit and explicit sequence learning processes would be provided if 
incidental and intentional learning orientations produced qualitatively different results 
(Stadler & Frensch, 1994; Jones & McLaren, 2009). Jones and McLaren (2009) 
provide such a demonstration in a 2-choice (left or right) SRT task by comparing 
reaction times between a control group trained on a pseudorandom sequence and an 
experimental group trained on a probabilistic sequence. The sequence could be 
summarized as: “on two-thirds of the trials, if the previous two trials were different 
(e.g. XY or YX), then the next trial will be Y, if the previous two trials were the same 
(e.g. XX or YY), then the next trial will be an X”. The test phase was a pseudorandom 
sequence that did not follow this rule and was the same for both groups, enabling any 
group differences to be attributed to sequence learning and not sequential effects 
intrinsic to the task.  
Learning on different subsequences was examined by dividing up trials into 
the 4 possible subsequences based on trial history (XX, YY, XY, YX) and subtracting 
the RT for the consistent trials (e.g. XXX, YYX) from the RT for the inconsistent 
trials (e.g. XXY, YYY), producing a difference score. Experiment 1 tested a control 
and experimental group under incidental learning conditions. Both groups were told 
that the purpose of the task was to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to 
maximize their earnings.  The experimental group showed significantly larger 
difference scores than the control group on subsequences that ended with an 
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alternation (YYX and YXY), but there were no group differences in learning 
subsequences that ended in a repetition (XXX and XYY). Interestingly, in Experiment 
3 where participants in the experimental group were told that they could use the 
sequence history to predict the location of the target, this pattern of learning reversed, 
with the best learning occurring for XXX and XYY, and no group differences for the 
sequences that ended in an alternation (YYX, YXY). Jones and McLaren argue that 
their study offers evidence of dissociable learning systems that are based on 
associative-, and rule-based learning processes.  
The results of Jones and McLaren (2009) contradict the claim made by 
Stefaniak et al. (2008) and Cleeremans and Jiménez (1998) that there are no 
differences in SRT performance between incidental and intentional learning 
conditions with a probabilistic sequence. One noteworthy difference between the 
sequence in Jones and McLaren (2009) and those of other studies is the fact that their 
sequence can be summarized with an abstract relational rule, that is, one where the 
next response can be predicted (at least probabilistically) from a comparison of the 
previous two responses (“same” vs. “different”) and this rule applies regardless of the 
exact physical properties of the last response cue. This rule is distinct from the type of 
explicit knowledge participants may acquire about the individual subsequences. For 
instance, knowing that Left-Left-Left is more likely to occur than Left-Left-Right 
does not require abstract knowledge of the rule that connects the first two responses 
with the third. However, even though the sequence could be summarized using a 
probabilistic rule, the rule itself was still relatively difficult and it is not clear whether 
participants improved because they acquired this rule. Jones and McLaren suggest 
that those in the intentional condition learned best about the XXX subsequence purely 
because the repetition of target location was highly salient. Thus it is clear that the 
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intention to learn in this probabilistic SRT task affected learning, but this may not 
reflect explicit knowledge of the rule itself. The effect of actually giving participants 
knowledge in this abstract rule-based form has not been explored in any depth in the 
sequence learning literature.  
A plausible explanation for the results to date is that additional explicit 
knowledge or intention to learn potentially affects sequence learning in any form, 
whether it be deterministic or probabilistic, but the impact of this knowledge is a 
function of how easy it is to discover the relevant rules governing the transitions, as 
well as how easy it is to apply this knowledge to the task. In this regard, an obvious 
reason why explicit knowledge did not improve probabilistic sequence learning in the 
studies by Stefaniak et al. (2008) and Jiménez, Méndez, and Cleeremans (1996) is the 
complexity of the sequences themselves. One can assume that participants required 
considerable cognitive resources to discover, retain and apply the multiple rules 
describing the sequence. The rule used in Jones and McLaren’s study also required 
maintenance of both the rule and the previous two trials in memory for successful 
prediction. Since the SRT task is speeded, simplifying the rule might increase the 
likelihood of its use. To date, there are no studies that examine the application of an 
explicit abstract rule where the rule itself is just as simple or easier to apply than 
learning the individual contingencies between the responses in the sequence.  
 The current study achieved this by devising a set of response contingencies 
that can be explicitly described in very simple relational terms. The value of acquiring 
explicit knowledge is especially obvious when a complex set of contingencies 
between events or properties is encapsulated by a simple relational concept. Examples 
abound from other learning paradigms where discovering a relational rule or abstract 
structure is associated with improved performance and more flexible transfer of 
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learning to new problems (e.g. Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Gick & Holyoak, 
1983; Harris & Livesey, 2008; Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Shanks & Darby, 1998). In 
sequence learning, especially simple versions of the SRT task where the spatial 
location on screen dictates the appropriate response, one of the most salient relations 
is the direction of motion of the target, that is, the position of the current target 
relative to the last. This is a simple property to describe and one that can be easily 
manipulated such that there is a prevailing direction of motion with which the current 
transition may be consistent or inconsistent.   
The aim of the following experiments was to investigate to what extent an 
explicit hint about a relational rule describing a set of probabilistic contingencies 
could impact on performance in a three-choice SRT task. As discussed, one 
conceptualization of implicit learning is that it is independent of explicit knowledge. 
While the experiments attempting to demonstrate learning in the absence of explicit 
knowledge have produced mixed results and suffer from methodological problems 
(Shanks & St. John, 1994), testing the effect of explicit knowledge on sequence 
learning may be a more useful method of investigating the relationship between 
learning and explicit knowledge. This manipulation was similar to intentional learning 
conditions reviewed above except that the hint was designed to guide participants 
towards explicit relational knowledge that captured the probabilistic contingencies of 
the entire sequence in a very simple description. A SRT task (previously reported in 
Lee & Livesey, 2013, and Lee, Beesley, & Livesey, 2016) with three response 
locations (left, top and right of the screen) was used, with a prevailing direction of 
motion randomly chosen for each participant (either clockwise or anticlockwise). The 
contingencies were arranged such that 75% of the time, the target would appear to be 
moving in one direction (e.g. clockwise) and on the other 25% of trials the target 
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would move in the opposite direction (e.g. anticlockwise). For example, if the target 
appeared at the top position, there was a 75% chance that it would next appear at the 
right position, and a 25% chance that it would next appear at the left position (see 
Figure 2.1). Since the target could not appear in the same position twice in a row, 
trials could be classified as either cued or miscued: where the location of the target 
can either be consistent with the particular direction of motion (curved, bold lines in 
Figure 2.1), or inconsistent with the direction of motion (straight, dotted lines in 
Figure 2.1) respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic diagram of the three-choice SRT task. The target could appear 
in either the left, top, or right position on screen (dotted circles, not seen in actual 
experiment) and participants had to respond by pressing the corresponding arrow key. 
The target could never appear in the same location twice in a row, which meant that 
the target would transition in a clockwise or anticlockwise direction on each trial (i.e. 
if the target appeared at the top, the next target location would either be left or right). 
In Experiment 1, the target direction was randomly determined so that there was a 
50% chance of transitioning clockwise or anticlockwise on each trial. In Experiment 2 
onwards, there was a cued direction of motion whereby the target would travel in a 
predominant direction 75% of the time (in this example, clockwise, as represented by 
the bold, curved lines), and in the miscued direction 25% of the time (anticlockwise, 
as represented by the straight, dotted lines). 
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 Experiments 1 and 2 were first performed to determine the pattern of 
sequential effects present in this task since arranging three target locations around the 
screen had not been implemented in an SRT task before, and controlling for 
sequential effects (differences in responding that occur due to recent history of trials 
and not the presence of contingencies) has been noted as important in accurately 
measuring sequence learning (Jones, Curran, Mozer, & Wilder, 2013). Experiment 1 
investigated what pattern of sequential effects would be shown in the absence of 
contingencies, while Experiment 2 tested whether the same pattern of sequential 
effects would result when probabilistic contingencies were added to the task. 
Experiments 3-5 compared learning between two groups: one given an explicit hint 
about an underlying rule that described the contingencies (Hint group), and another 
group not given any additional information (No Hint group). Experiments 4-6 also 
included an additional transfer phase after the training phase, to determine whether 
the hint affected the persistence of the cueing effect when the contingencies were 
removed and aspects of the task were changed. Finally, Experiment 6 clarified a 
discrepancy in results between Experiments 3-4 and Experiment 5 by comparing two 
different modes of hint delivery.  
 
2.2 Experiment 1 
Before attempting to measure sequence learning in a novel task, it is important 
to investigate the pattern of sequential effects that may arise, as they may obscure or 
inflate any evidence of learning (Jones et al., 2013). Sequential effects are transient 
differences in performance that arise as a function of trial history, and have been 
studied most extensively in SRT procedures, the same procedure used to investigate 
sequence learning. When the task is entirely unstructured, such that there is no 
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consistent sequence to the target’s movement between positions (and the target’s 
location cannot be predicted), participants are nevertheless faster to respond on 
certain trials. These sequential effects suggest that in the absence of any predictive 
information, participants’ responses are still influenced by recent events. In sequence 
learning experiments, sequential effects are often regarded as variance to be 
controlled for or minimized on test (Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999; Jones et al., 
2013). The methods that researchers have employed to this end include devising an 
appropriate sequence to minimize sequential effects (e.g. avoiding first-order 
repetitions, Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), or using a control group who are 
trained with a pseudorandom sequence containing no contingencies and tested with a 
trial order that would produce equivalent sequential effects to an experimental group 
(e.g. Jones & McLaren, 2009).  
Sequential effects have been studied most extensively in two-choice SRT 
tasks, where the possible number of events (e.g. left and right) and transitions 
(repetitions and alternations of target location) is constrained. In a two-choice RT task 
(e.g. left and right responses) where the appearance of the target is randomly 
determined, participants are usually fastest to respond on trials where either 
repetitions or alternations of target location have occurred consecutively (e.g. 
Bertelson, 1961; Cho et al., 2002). This means that if a target had just appeared on the 
left 3 times, participants are usually faster to respond left than they are to respond 
right (i.e. LLLL would be faster than LLLR). Conversely, if participants have just 
experienced a series of alternations (left, right, left), they are faster at responding right 
than left (i.e. LRLR is faster than LRLL), but this facilitation is usually observed to be 
weaker than the equivalent effect for repetitions (e.g. Bertelson, 1961; Cho et al., 
2002; Remington, 1969). These patterns of sequential effects have been attributed to 
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participants’ subjective expectancies (Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985), which in this 
context refer to the predictions generated by some internal learning process. However, 
it is worth noting that these expectancies have been shown to be independent of the 
individual’s explicit beliefs about impending events: recent work that has directly 
compared trends in choice RT and trends in explicit expectancy for the relevant 
events has found them to be widely divergent (Barrett & Livesey, 2010; Livesey & 
Costa, 2014; Lee Cheong Lem, Harris & Livesey, 2015, see also Hale, 1967, and 
Hyman, 1953, for earlier informal observations of similar trends).  
While the presence of sequential effects is well established in two-choice SRT 
tasks where the target can repeat its location, it is unknown what pattern of sequential 
effects will result in the current three-choice SRT task since tasks with three targets 
are rarely employed (but see Gökaydin, Ma-Wyatt, Navarro, & Perfors, 2011)13. In 
the current SRT task, three target locations were arranged on the edges of a computer 
screen (e.g. left-top-right) and repetitions of target location (e.g. top-top) were 
prohibited. This meant that the sequential effects concerned the repetition and 
alternation of the direction of target transitions, rather than target location (see Figure 
2.1). Using this paradigm, sequential effects were assessed by allowing an equal 
probability of clockwise or anticlockwise transitions such that there was no dominant 
direction of motion.  
The aim of Experiment 1 was to explore the sequential effects present in a three-
choice SRT task that contained no response repetitions, such that all sequential effects 
would be based on sequences of transitions between target locations. Since neither 
direction of motion prevailed consistently, for any given target location, the other two 
                                                
13 In Experiment 3 of Gökaydin et al. (2011), participants responded to one of three geometric shapes 
that appeared in the same location. Participants pressed the corresponding button with one finger, 
returning their finger to a central position at the start of each trial. 
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target positions were equally likely to follow and therefore the target always moved in 
either a clockwise or anticlockwise direction. However, taking any three consecutive 
responses, the direction of motion itself would repeat if the three different target 
locations were shown consecutively in any order (in abstract terms, responses X, Y, 
then Z), whereas the direction of motion would reverse or alternate if the last response 
was the same as that occurring two presentations prior (that is, Z, Y, then Z again). A 
difference between these trial types can be thought of as second-order sequential 
effects (i.e. XYZ vs. ZYZ). A similar logic was applied to examine third-order 
sequential effects, that is, RT on the last of four consecutive responses that constitute 
three directional transitions, and fourth-order sequential effects, that is, RT on the last 
of five consecutive responses that constitute four directional transitions (see Figure 
2.2 and Table 2.1). A response-stimulus interval (RSI) of 500ms was chosen because 
this delay between responses should be long enough to avoid response priming effects 
that dramatically alter sequential effects with short RSIs (< 200ms) (e.g. Vervaeck & 
Boer, 1980) but short enough for participants to retain a sense of directional transition 
from one target location to another. 
Table 2.1.  
Subsequences at fourth-, third-, and second-order level coded in three different ways.  
Fourth Order Third Order Second Order 
SSS YZXYZ (RRR) 
SS ZXYZ (RR) 
S XYZ (R) 
DSS XZXYZ (ARR) 
DDS ZYXYZ (RAR) 
DS YXYZ (AR) 
SDS XYXYZ (AAR) 
DDD YXZYZ (RRA) 
DD XZYZ (RA) 
D ZYZ (A) 
SDD ZXZYZ (ARA) 
SSD XYZYZ (RAA) 
SD YZYZ (AA) 
DSD ZYZYZ (AAA) 
Note. The subsequences read from left (past trials) to right (current trial). X, Y and Z represent any one 
of the 3 target locations left, top, and right. R and A represent whether each subsequence consists of a 
repetition or alternation of direction, referenced from the previous trial. S and D represent whether the 
nth-order transition is the same (S) or different (D) direction to the first-order transition (YZ). 
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Figure 2.2. Example of how a fourth-order subsequence was coded as a series of 
target locations (XYXYZ), a series of movements with reference to the direction of 
the first-order transition (SDS), and a series of directional repetitions and alternations 
(AAR). X, Y, and Z can stand for any of the three target locations (left, top, right), 
with subsequences reading from left (past trials) to right (current trial, n), and 
therefore direction 1 and direction 2 can represent either clockwise or anticlockwise. 
Subsequences were entered into the ANOVA based on whether transitions at the nth 
level were in the same direction (S) or different direction (D) to the first-order 
transition (YZ, direction 1 in this example). Subsequences can also be conceived of as 
a series of repetitions (R) and alternations (A) of target direction, which are 
referenced from the direction of movement on the previous trial.  
 
 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants and Apparatus 
Fifteen participants (11 female, M age = 26.87, SD = 7.90) who were either 
first year Psychology students at the University of Sydney or respondents to an online 
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advertisement took part in the experiment14. Students received course credit and 
respondents received payment (AUD$15/hour) for their participation. All experiments 
were programmed using Psychophysics Toolbox for Matlab (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997) and run on Apple Mac Mini desktop computers connected to 17 inch CRT 
monitors, refreshed at a rate of 85 Hz. A standard Apple keyboard and mouse were 
used, and testing was conducted in individual cubicles in groups of up to six. 
Participants in this, and all subsequent experiments, gave informed consent and the 
study was approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee.  
 
2.2.1.2 Procedure 
 Participants were told that the purpose of the task was to respond as quickly 
and as accurately as possible to a target (a magenta circle) that would appear in one of 
three positions on the screen. Participants had to press the ‘left’ arrow key if the target 
appeared on the left, the ‘up’ arrow key if the target appeared at the top, and the ‘right’ 
arrow key if the target appeared on the right of the screen. Participants were not told 
that the target could not appear in the same location twice in a row, and were not 
explicitly encouraged to attend to the movement of the target.  Participants were 
asked to use their non-dominant hand to respond during training. If participants used 
their left hand, they placed their index finger on the right arrow key, their middle 
finger on the up arrow key, and their ring finger on the left arrow key. The target 
stayed on screen until a response (correct or incorrect) was made and after a blank 
RSI of 500ms, the next target appeared. After a short practice phase (48 trials), 
participants completed 720 trials where the location of the target had an equal chance 
                                                
14 Target sample sizes for experiments in this chapter were 24 per group for experiments testing the 
hint manipulation and 15 otherwise. These target sample sizes were based on initial pilot experiments 
aimed at testing the general paradigm. The final sample size was affected by availability of 
participants.  
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of moving clockwise or anticlockwise and thus its location could not be predicted. 
Trials were randomized in blocks of 12, maintaining the 50/50 ratio of clockwise and 
anticlockwise transitions within each block. The experiment was completed in one 
continuous block without a break and lasted for approximately fifteen minutes.  
 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
All subsequent RT analyses refer to mean RTs for correct responses excluding 
any greater than one second and Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were performed for 
violations of sphericity. Participants took on average 337ms (SD = 40.9) to respond 
with 96% (SD = 2.1) accuracy. Henceforth X, Y, and Z will be used to describe the 
various subsequences with X, Y and Z representing any one of the 3 positions left, top, 
right (see Figure 2.1). This coding of subsequences is designed to capture the 
sequence of target locations, but not the direction of movement. Thus, an XYZ 
subsequence could equally stand for either a left-top-right or left-right-top sequence. 
Reaction times and error data always represent performance on the final trial of each 
subsequence (Z). Trials were divided into subsequence type at the second-, third-, and 
fourth-order level (see Table 2.1). Within each level (n), trials were classified 
according to whether the transition at the nth level was the same (S) or different (D) 
from the direction of motion of the first-order transition (Y to Z, see Figure 2.2 for an 
example of how a fourth-order subsequence was coded in this way), as well as 
whether the subsequence contained a series of alternations (A) or repetitions (R) of 
target direction. This yielded 2 different subsequences at the second-order level (R, 
A), 4 subsequences at the third-order level (RR, RA, AR, RR), and 8 subsequences at 
the fourth-order level (RRR, RRA, RAR, RAA, ARR, ARA, AAR, AAA).  
 
  
53 
Figure 2.3 displays mean RTs and errors for the eight fourth-order 
subsequences, split according to whether the fourth-order transition was the same (left 
side of the figures) or different (right side of the figures) to the first-order transition. It 
is firstly apparent that the overall pattern of sequential effects is very similar for the 
RTs (top panels) and errors (bottom panels), and that there are very large differences 
between the two second-order subsequences (XYZ and ZYZ shown as separate lines), 
with performance on subsequences with a final repetition of motion (XYZ) faster than 
subsequences with a final alternation of motion (ZYZ). Within XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences, the recent history of alternations and repetitions seemed to further 
impact performance.  
To examine the pattern of sequential effects, an (2 x 2 x 2) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with fourth-, third-, and second-order transition as within-subjects 
factors was performed on mean RTs and errors for the fourth-order subsequences. 
Note that the subsequences were entered into the ANOVA coded according to 
whether the nth transition was in the same or different direction to the first-order 
transition (see Table 2.1). For the RT data, there was a main effect of fourth-order, 
F(1,14) = 6.40, p = .024, ηp2 = .314, and third-order, F(1,14) = 5.31, p = .037, ηp2 
= .275, and a very large main effect of second-order, F(1,14) = 103.3,  p < .001, ηp2 
= .881. In the error data, there was also a main effect for second-order, F(1,14) = 
17.11, p = .001, ηp2 = .550, but no significant main effect of third- or fourth-order, 
largest F(1,14) = 2.68, p = .124, ηp2 = 161.  
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Figure 2.3. RTs (a) and proportion of errors (b) for each fourth-order subsequence 
(coded as a series of repetitions (R) and alternations (A) of target direction) in 
Experiment 1. Subsequences that end with an alternation are shown on the top and 
subsequences that end with a repetition are shown on the bottom. Subsequences are 
divided according to whether transitions at the second-order (XYZ vs. ZYZ, shown as 
separate lines), were the same or different direction to the first-order transition (YZ). 
Within each pair of connected data points, the left point has the same third-order 
transition and the right has a different third-order transition to the direction of the 
first-order transition (YZ). The pairs of connected data points on the left side of the 
figure have the same fourth-order transition, and the pairs on the right side of the 
figure have a different fourth-order transition to the first-order transition (YZ). 
 
It is clear that the strongest main effect in both RT and errors was at the 
second-order level, specifically comparing the XYZ subsequences (RT: M = 317ms, 
SD = 39.5, errors: M = .023, SD = .013) to the ZYZ subsequences (RT: M = 363ms, 
SD = 44.1, errors: M = .061, SD = .035). Participants were on average 46ms faster and 
also made on average 3.8% fewer errors when the target travelled in a consistent 
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direction on 2 consecutive transitions (those ending in XYZ), compared to when the 
target appeared to alternate directions (those ending in ZYZ). The main effects of 
third- and fourth-order in the RT data show that participants were 10ms faster to 
respond when the third-order transition was the same direction as the first 
(subsequences of the form S_ were faster than D_ ), but 4ms slower to respond when 
the fourth-order transition was the same direction as the first (subsequences of the 
form S_ _ were slower than D_ _). Note however, that these main effects are qualified 
by the significant interactions discussed below.  
In RTs, there was a significant third-order x second-order interaction, F(1,14) 
= 7.12, p = .018, ηp2 = .337, and significant fourth-order x second-order interaction, 
F(1,14) = 5.31, p = .037, ηp2 = .275. A significant 3-way interaction between fourth-, 
third-, and second-order factors was found in both RTs, F(1,14) = 31.34, p < .001, ηp2 
= .691, and accuracy, F(1,14) = 16.13, p = .001, ηp2 = .535 (see Figure 2.3). The 
easiest way to interpret the three-way interaction is by conceptualizing the 
subsequences as a series of directional repetitions and alternations (see Table 2.1). If 
we examine the 4 fourth-order subsequences where the fourth-order transition was 
consistent with the first-order transition (left side of Figure 2.3), it is clear that RT and 
accuracy were influenced primarily by second-order differences. That is, whether the 
last trial in the subsequence contained a repetition (R) or alternation (A). However, 
within the XYZ subsequences, responding was facilitated when the subsequence 
contained several repetitions in a row (RRR was easier to respond to than AAR), and 
within the ZYZ subsequences, responding was facilitated when the subsequence 
contained a repetition before the last alternation (ARA), compared to when there were 
2 alternations to respond after (RAA).  
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This pattern seems to reverse for the examination of those subsequences where 
the fourth-order transition is inconsistent with the first-order transition (right side of 
the Figure 2.3). For the XYZ subsequences, there seemed to be little difference 
between whether the third-order transition contained a repetition (ARR) or alternation 
(RAR), as responding seemed to be generally facilitated by the repetition of a 
direction of motion on the last trial of the subsequence. On the other hand, for the 
ZYZ subsequences, responding was both faster and more accurate when the 
subsequence contained a series of alternations in a row (AAA) than when it contained 
a series of repetitions and then a final alternation (RRA). The pattern of data in 
Experiment 1 can be summarized in the following way: general facilitation in 
responding occurred when the target moved in the same direction a few times in a row 
(i.e. there was a repetition of a direction of motion), and responding was hindered 
when the direction alternated, except when the direction alternated several times (i.e. 
ZYZYZ).  
It is clear from this experiment that higher-order sequential effects exist in this 
task, and while some interactions between second-, third- and fourth-order levels of 
subsequences were significant in this experiment, by far the most substantial 
difference was at the second-order level between the XYZ and ZYZ subsequences. 
The biggest determinant for whether responding in this task was facilitated was 
whether the previous direction of motion was consistent with the current direction of 
motion. It appears that sequences of trials in which the target changed direction were 
particularly difficult to respond to, leading to slower responses than when the target 
moved in a consistent direction on two consecutive trials. Note that the fastest ZYZ 
subsequence (ZYZYZ) was still numerically slower than the slowest XYZ 
subsequence (XYXYZ, see Figure 2.3). These sequential effects informed the choice 
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of analyses to follow in later experiments, but first it is necessary to examine whether 
they are perturbed by the introduction of probabilistic contingencies required for 
sequence learning.  
 
2.3 Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to explore whether the pattern of sequential 
effects in Experiment 1 could also be found when the probabilistic contingencies were 
added to the task. In Experiment 2, the direction of motion was biased in a 
predominant direction such that the target would appear to be moving in one direction 
75% of the time during training (see Figure 2.1), and a transfer phase was added 
where these contingencies were removed and the target direction had equal 
probability of transitioning clockwise or anticlockwise. This transfer phase tests 
whether participants have learned the contingencies, with learning evident (i.e. a 
cueing effect present) if participants are faster to respond on trials where the target 
moved in the previously cued direction of motion (cued trials) than the previously 
miscued direction (miscued trials). This transfer phase also enables assessment of 
sequential effects under conditions that are similar to Experiment 1, where no 
contingencies were present. Thus for Experiment 2 the focus was on the data from the 
transfer phase (see Appendix A for the results from the training phase). 
 
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
All fifteen participants (9 female, M age = 25.47, SD = 7.22) in Experiment 2 
were respondents to an online advertisement and were paid AUD $15/hour for their 
participation.  
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2.3.1.2 Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except for the following changes. 
After completing a short practice phase (48 trials) with no contingencies, participants 
responded to 720 trials where the target moved in a prevailing direction of motion on 
75% of trials (which was randomly chosen to be clockwise or anticlockwise for each 
participant) and 360 trials where there were no contingencies (there was no prevailing 
direction of motion). For the initial 720 trials with prevailing direction of motion, 
trials were randomized in blocks of 12 trials maintaining the 75% cued and 25% 
miscued ratio of contingencies within each block. Participants continued to use the 
same response keys and hand to respond and there was no break between the training 
and transfer phase, such that there was nothing to mark the transition into a separate 
phase for participants. The instructions given to participants were exactly the same as 
Experiment 1, meaning that participants were not informed that there was a bias in the 
direction of motion. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 The data were analyzed in a similar way to Experiment 1, with cueing added 
as a within-subjects factor. A (2 x 2 x 2 x 2) within-subjects ANOVA with cueing, 
fourth-, third-, and second-order as factors was run on RTs (Figure 2.4a) and errors 
(Figure 2.4b) for the transfer phase. For the RTs in the transfer phase, there was a 
significant main effect of cueing, F(1,14) = 45.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .767, with faster 
responses for cued trials indicating that participants learned about the cued direction 
of motion. As with Experiment 1, there was also a main effect of second-order, 
F(1,14) = 42.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .750, and a significant interaction between fourth-, 
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third-, and second-order, F(1,14) = 49. 31, p < .001, ηp2 = .779. 
 
Figure 2.4. RTs (a) and proportion of errors (b) for cued and miscued trials for each 
fourth-order subsequence (coded as a series of repetitions (R) and alternations (A) of 
target direction) in the transfer phase of Experiment 2. Subsequences that end with an 
alternation are shown on the top and subsequences that end with a repetition are 
shown on the bottom. Subsequences are divided according to whether transitions at 
the second-order (XYZ vs. ZYZ, shown as separate lines), third-order (left vs. right 
points connected by lines), and fourth-order (left vs. right side of the figures) level 
were the same or different direction to the first-order transition (YZ). Cued and 
miscued trials are shown as separate lines. 
 
In errors, there was a main effect of second-order, F(1,14) = 9.25, p = .009, ηp2 
= .398, a significant interaction between fourth- and third-order, F(1,14) = 12.81, p 
= .003, ηp2 = .478, and also a significant 3-way interaction between fourth-, third-, and 
second-order, F(1,14) = 13.43, p =.003, ηp2 = .490. This broadly replicates the 
sequential effects found in Experiment 1, where participants showed large differences 
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in the speed and accuracy of their responses between XYZ and ZYZ subsequences, 
and produced both repetition and alternation effects that explain the 3-way interaction. 
Interestingly, while participants showed very strong cueing effects overall, the 4-way 
interaction was not significant in either RTs or errors, F < 1, nor were any other 
interactions significant, largest F(1,14) = 2.06, p = .174, ηp2 = .128, suggesting that 
the pattern of sequential effects did not differ on cued and miscued trials (see Figure 
2.4).  
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
Using a novel three-choice RT task where the target locations were arranged 
on the left, top and right of a computer screen, a robust pattern of sequential effects 
was found in the absence of a cued direction of motion in Experiment 1, and for cued 
and miscued trials in a transfer phase following training with a biased direction of 
motion in Experiment 2. When the contingencies were biased in one direction 75% of 
the time, participants appeared to learn this probabilistic sequence by showing a 
cueing effect once the contingencies were removed in the transfer phase of 
Experiment 2. While RTs in the transfer phase were generally lower for cued than for 
miscued trials, the pattern of sequential effects did not appear to differ between cued 
and miscued trials. Participants responded fastest to subsequences containing 
repetitions of target direction (YZXYZ trials), similar to advantages for repetitions of 
target location observed in the two-choice RT literature (e.g. Bertelson, 1961). 
Interestingly, within the ZYZ subsequences, the fourth-order subsequence that was 
responded to most rapidly was the one where the target direction alternated 
consistently (ZYZYZ), again similar to the alternation effects found using two-choice 
RT tasks (e.g. Cho et al., 2002). While higher-order sequential effects were found 
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suggesting that responding was influenced by the target location occurring 4 trials 
back, it was clear that the largest sequential effect was at the second-order level, 
specifically between XYZ subsequences (e.g. left-top-right or right-top, left), where 
the target direction travelled in a consistent direction on consecutive trials, and ZYZ 
subsequences (e.g. left-top-left, right-top-right), where the target alternated its 
direction (see Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Participants found trials where the target rotation 
travelled in the same direction twice in a row much easier to respond to than trials 
where the target travelled in different directions on successive trials. 
 
2.4 Experiment 3 
The sequential effects found in Experiments 1 and 2 highlight an important 
consideration for the experiments that follow, concerning the relative proportion of 
XYZ trials to ZYZ trials when the contingencies are added to the task. Table 2.2 
displays the frequencies of the various subsequences for cued and miscued trials. A 
natural consequence of introducing a prevailing direction of motion is that some 
subsequences occur more often on cued trials and less often on miscued trials (or vice 
versa). At the second-order level, if we divide all trials according to whether they are 
cued or miscued, and XYZ or ZYZ subsequences, there are a greater proportion of 
cued trials that are XYZ trials (.5625) than ZYZ trials (.1875), whereas the reverse is 
true for the miscued trials (.0625 are XYZ and .1875 ZYZ, see Table 2.2). Given that 
participants naturally respond faster to XYZ trials, this means that any cueing effects 
obtained could be inflated when averaging over all cued and all miscued trials.  
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Table 2.2.  
Frequencies and probabilities of subsequences at second-, third-, and fourth-order 
levels. 
Subsequence Cued/Miscued p(subsequence) p(target t | target t-1) 
XYZ – Cued 
XYZ – Miscued 
ZYZ – Cued 
ZYZ – Miscued 
C-C 
M-M 
M-C 
C-M 
0.5625 
0.0625 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
ZXYZ - Cued 
ZXYZ – Miscued 
YXYZ – Cued 
YXYZ – Miscued 
XZYZ – Cued 
XZYZ – Miscued 
YZYZ – Cued 
YZYZ – Miscued 
C-C-C 
M-M-M 
M-C-C 
C-M-M 
M-M-C 
C-C-M 
C-M-C 
M-C-M 
0.421875 
0.015625 
0.140625 
0.046875 
0.046875 
0.140625 
0.140625 
0.046875 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
YZXYZ – Cued 
YZXYZ – Miscued 
XZXYZ – Cued 
XZXYZ – Miscued 
ZYXYZ – Cued 
ZYXYZ – Miscued 
XYXYZ – Cued 
XYXYZ – Miscued 
YXZYZ – Cued 
YXZYZ – Miscued 
ZXZYZ – Cued 
ZXZYZ – Miscued 
XYZYZ – Cued 
XYZYZ – Miscued 
ZYZYZ – Cued 
ZYZYZ – Miscued 
C-C-C-C 
M-M-M-M 
M-C-C-C 
C-M-M-M 
M-M-C-C 
C-C-M-M 
C-M-C-C 
M-C-M-M 
M-M-M-C 
C-C-C-M 
C-M-M-C 
M-C-C-M 
C-C-M-C 
M-M-C-M 
M-C-M-C 
C-M-C-M 
0.31640625 
0.00390625 
0.10546875 
0.01171875 
0.03515625 
0.03515625 
0.10546875 
0.01171875 
0.01171875 
0.10546875 
0.03515625 
0.03515625 
0.10546875 
0.01171875 
0.03515625 
0.03515625 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
0.75 
0.25 
  
This confound would not be the cause of any observed group differences, 
since the relative proportions of each trial type would be the same in all groups. 
However, it means that any calculation of overall cueing effects may reflect a 
combination of learning and sequential effects. To minimize this confound, in the 
subsequent experiments the cueing effect was calculated separately for XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences. This confound, coupled with the strength of the main effect at the 
second-order level compared to other levels found in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
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provided the impetus for focusing on analyses at the second-order level for the 
following experiments. This distinction between the second-order subsequences 
turned out to be critical in the experiments that follow.  
The aim of Experiment 3 was to examine the effect of a hint about a relational 
rule on SRT performance by comparing learning between a Hint group and a No Hint 
group. The rule adequately summarized a set of probabilistic contingencies using a 
very simple spatial relation, namely the prevailing direction of motion (clockwise or 
anticlockwise). The ratio of cued to miscued trials used in Experiment 2 (75:25) is 
high enough that the prevailing direction of motion should be relatively easy to 
discover (at least when given explicit knowledge of its possible existence). This 
makes the Hint group more similar to the groups in previous studies who were taught 
the sequence (e.g. Stefaniak et al., 2008), rather than those who were simply told to 
look for one (e.g. Jones & McLaren, 2009).  
As noted previously, the simplicity of the probabilistic rule differs from 
previous studies, which tend to use more complex probabilistic sequences that may 
limit the usefulness of explicit knowledge (e.g. Jiménez, Méndez, and Cleeremans, 
1996). Another notable difference between the Hint group and those of other studies 
is that in addition to giving participants the intention to search for a sequence (e.g. 
Jones & McLaren, 2009), participants were given a hint to discover a relational rule 
that captured abstract qualities of the contingencies. The effect of abstract relational 
knowledge on SRT performance has not been examined in depth, as most SRT tasks 
are not constructed in a way where such knowledge is immediately applicable. The 
most relevant explicit knowledge usually consists of memorized sections of the 
sequence itself in the case of deterministic sequences (e.g. Curran & Keele, 1993), or 
individual rules about permissible or probable transitions in the case of probabilistic 
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sequences (e.g. Jiménez, Méndez, and Cleeremans, 1996). Knowing that there is a 
prevailing direction of motion is abstract but is still closely related to the individual 
contingencies (e.g. knowing that the target moves mostly clockwise necessarily 
entails knowledge that the target should appear in the right position after the top 
position). This knowledge should be easy to apply due to both the simplistic nature of 
the task (only 3 target locations, only 2 possible directions of target movement), and 
also the simplicity of the rule, which does not require keeping a large amount of 
information in working memory.  
If Stefaniak et al. (2008) are correct, the probabilistic nature of the 
contingencies may mean that this knowledge will be difficult to use because it does 
not allow for 100% successful prediction. On the other hand, if the major determinant 
for whether explicit knowledge will be utilized is the ease of application to the task 
rather than whether the sequence was probabilistic or deterministic, then the Hint 
group should produce a larger cueing effect than the group not given the hint. It was 
also expected that the Hint group would exhibit higher levels of sequence knowledge 
on subsequent tests of explicit knowledge. These were included primarily to check 
whether the hint was successful in producing explicit and transferable sequence 
knowledge, rather than to assess absolute levels of awareness.  
 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants  
Forty-six University of Sydney students (33 female, M age = 19.6, SD = 3.40) 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit or payment (AUD 
$15/hour). Participants were randomly allocated to either the Hint (n = 23) or No Hint 
(n = 23) group. 
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2.4.1.2 Procedure 
The instructions given to both groups were the same as the previous 
experiments, and did not allude to the fact that the target could not appear in the same 
location twice in a row, nor that they should attend to the movement of the target. 
After a practice phase (48 trials) the No Hint group were told that they would now 
start the experiment, while the Hint group were given a written hint on a piece of 
paper that read “A hint that will help you in this experiment: The location of pink 
circles follows a pattern. Most of the time, the location will either go in a 
CLOCKWISE direction or an ANTI-CLOCKWISE direction.  Try and work out 
which direction it goes. You will be tested on this afterwards.” The training phase was 
identical to Experiment 2, with 720 trials in total completed in one continuous session. 
There was no transfer phase in Experiment 3. 
After the training phase participants completed a recognition test, and then a 
prediction test. The recognition test consisted of 10 trials where participants 
responded to 2 sequences consisting of 24 target locations each. One of these 
sequences followed the same .75 cued/.25 miscued contingencies the participant had 
been responding to during training, and the other sequence followed the reverse 
contingencies, such that the target was travelling predominantly clockwise in one of 
the sequences and anticlockwise for the other (with the order counterbalanced). After 
the participant had responded to both sequences they were asked to select which 
sequence (the first or second) they thought most closely matched the sequence to 
which they responded to during training.  
The prediction test consisted of 3 trials where the target was shown in each of 
the 3 possible locations in randomized order, and participants had to select which of 
the remaining two locations they thought the target was most likely to appear next.  
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2.4.2 Results 
 A 2 x (2 x 2) ANOVA with group as the between-groups factor and cueing 
(cued vs. miscued) and subsequence (XYZ vs. ZYZ) as the within-groups factors was 
performed on both RTs (Figure 2.5) and error data. For RTs, there was a main effect 
of subsequence, F(1,44) = 186.5, p < .001, ηp2  = .809, and cueing, F(1,44) = 136.7, p 
< .001, ηP2 = .757. These effects were also present in the error data, smallest F(1,44) 
= 14.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .252. These main effects indicate that cueing effects were 
present in both RTs and errors and that participants were both faster and made less 
errors on XYZ subsequences than ZYZ subsequences, replicating the second-order 
sequential effects found in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Cueing effect (RT for miscued – cued trials) for each group for XYZ and 
ZYZ subsequences across training quarters in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
While the group x cueing interaction was marginally non-significant in RTs, 
F(1,44) = 3.64, p = .063, ηp2 = .076, the 3-way interaction between group, cueing and 
subsequence was significant, F(1,44) = 4.57, p = .038,  ηp2 = .094, suggesting that the 
difference in the size of the cueing effect between XYZ and ZYZ subsequences 
differed between groups (Figure 2.5). This was confirmed by a significant group x 
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cueing interaction in XYZ RT, F(1,44) = 7.29, p = .010, ηp2 = .142, but not for ZYZ 
RT, F < 1. The 3-way interaction in errors did not reach significance, F < 1, nor did 
the group x cueing interaction, F < 1, however, there was a significant interaction of 
subsequence with cueing, F(1,44) = 15.69, p < .001,  ηp2 = .263, due to the ZYZ 
cueing effect being larger than the XYZ cueing effect overall. There was no overall 
effect of group in either RTs, F < 1, or errors, F < 1.  
 While the Hint group scored numerically higher than the No Hint group on the 
recognition test (63.9% vs. 55.2%), the group difference failed to reach significance, 
F(1,44) = 2.00, p = .164, η2 = .044 (see Figure 2.6). This pattern of results was 
mirrored on the prediction test, with the Hint group scoring 69.6% and the No Hint 
group scoring 59.4%, but again there was no significant group difference, F(1,44) = 
1.07, p = .306, η2 = .024 (Figure 2.6). However, the Hint group performed 
significantly higher than chance on both the recognition, t(22) = 2.91, SEM = .047, p 
= .008, and prediction tests, t(22) = 2.83, SEM = .208, p = .010, while the No Hint 
group were not significantly different from chance performance on both tests, largest 
t(22) = 1.36, SEM = .208, p = .188.  
 
 
Figure 2.6. Performance on the recognition and prediction tests in Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
Participants were both faster and more accurate at responding on XYZ than 
ZYZ subsequences (as in Experiments 1-2), and also on cued than miscued trials (i.e. 
there was an overall cueing effect). It is clear that the 3-way interaction can be 
explained by the presence of a group difference in the size of the XYZ cueing effect, 
but no group difference in the size of the ZYZ cueing effect. The hint was therefore 
successful in increasing the amount of cueing for XYZ subsequences, but not ZYZ 
subsequences. Surprisingly, the hint was not successful in increasing the amount of 
explicit knowledge expressed on a recognition and prediction test relative to the group 
that did not receive a hint. The group differences in training can be explained if we 
consider that the hint may have resulted in increased attention to the general direction 
of the target as participants tried to use the hint, and since a continuous direction of 
motion is only present on XYZ trials, perhaps this meant that these were the only 
trials on which participants were able to use the hint. Alternatively, perhaps 
participants in the Hint group found ZYZ trials difficult to express their knowledge 
due to the target alternating direction on successive trials. The sequential effects in 
Experiments 1-2 demonstrate that the alternation of target direction disrupted 
performance in general in comparison to instances when the target direction repeated. 
This may indicate a lower level of control over performance on ZYZ subsequences, 
which may in turn have made it difficult to express sequence knowledge on these 
trials.  
In either case, it is clear that the Hint group displayed greater cueing only for 
XYZ subsequences even though the hint was equally valid for both XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences. Thus it appears that whether or not knowledge of a relational rule 
impacts sequence learning depends more on the ease with which that knowledge can 
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be applied, rather than whether the sequence is deterministic or probabilistic, as 
suggested by Stefaniak et al. (2008) and Cleeremans and Jiménez (1998). However, 
since there were no group differences in the explicit knowledge tests, it is hard to 
know how the Hint group interpreted the hint or what additional knowledge they 
possessed compared to the No Hint group.  While it is possible that both recognition 
and prediction tests were simply not sensitive, a likely reason for the lack of group 
differences in the prediction test may be that the recognition test was quite long and 
exposed participants to sequences moving in the clockwise and anticlockwise 
directions. This may have made the recognition test itself somewhat confusing and 
reduced the sensitivity of any ensuing tests of explicit knowledge. Consequently, in 
Experiment 4 the recognition test was omitted, and the prediction test immediately 
followed the SRT task, and a simple forced-choice question that asked participants 
whether the target was mostly travelling clockwise or anticlockwise was presented at 
the very end of the experiment.  
 
2.5 Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4, the recognition test was omitted to increase the chances of 
obtaining a group difference in the prediction test. Experiment 4 also tested whether 
the knowledge acquired by the Hint group would transfer to an additional phase 
where the target locations were changed to the left, right and bottom of the screen. 
This transfer phase allows separation of the abstract relation (direction of motion) 
from the other task properties with which it was correlated during training. For 
instance, if participants learnt that the target was usually moving in a clockwise 
direction (e.g. left – top – right), they should be able to use this knowledge despite the 
new target locations, as a clockwise direction of motion would still be apparent (e.g. 
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right – bottom – left). However, since the ‘top’ target location was removed, most of 
the relevant contingencies between perceptual elements of the task (associations 
between left and top and associations between top and right) would be removed in the 
transfer test.  
Furthermore, since participants still used the same finger to respond to the 
bottom target location as they had to respond to the top location in training, this meant 
that the new target locations required participants to reverse the motor sequence they 
had previously used when the target was travelling in the cued direction (i.e. left-top-
right is the same direction as right-bottom-left, but requires the finger motor sequence 
2-3-4 and 4-3-2 respectively). This test was intended to assess whether the cueing 
effect in each group could be attributed more to simple motor learning, or relational 
rule learning, which would predict cueing effects in opposite directions. The 
contingencies were removed in the test phase so that there was an equal opportunity 
to show a bias in either direction.  
Since the explicit hint emphasized the direction of rotation of the target, it was 
hypothesized that the Hint group would still show a cueing effect consistent with the 
prevailing direction during training despite perceptual and motor changes that 
conflicted with that direction of motion. The No Hint group might instead be expected 
to show a cueing effect in the opposite direction to the prevailing rotation of the target 
instead if what they had learned concerned the contingencies between motor actions 
(i.e. the sequence of key presses). However, the expression of implicit learning may 
rely on the reinstatement of similar conditions under which learning occurred, while 
explicit learning might be more flexible and thus less dependent on superficial task 
changes (Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006). Therefore, it was assumed that 
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cueing would be less evident in the No Hint group irrespective of the direction of the 
cueing effect. 
 
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
Fifty University of Sydney students participated in this experiment in 
exchange for course credit (17 female, M age = 20.16, SD = 3.18) or payment (AUD 
$15/hour). Participants were randomly allocated to the Hint (n = 24) or No Hint (n = 
26) group. 
 
2.5.1.2 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 3 except for the following changes. 
After the training phase participants completed a short transfer phase (120 trials) 
where they were told that the target would now appear in the left, bottom, and right of 
the screen, and they were either informed to use the corresponding arrow keys 
(pressing the ‘down’ arrow key for the bottom target location), or the same keys they 
had been using previously (pressing the ‘up’ arrow key for the bottom target location). 
It was important to compare transfer using the same versus different response keys as 
there is evidence that changing the response keys impairs sequence learning 
(Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 2000) and it was unknown whether this would 
occur in the current task. In the latter condition the three arrow keys (left, up, and 
right) were marked with stickers and participants were told to only ever press those 
keys in both phases. The transfer phase did not contain any contingencies, such that 
there was no prevailing direction of motion.  
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After the transfer phase participants in both groups completed the prediction 
test, which was the same as Experiment 3 except that it was made clear that the 
predictions should be based on what was learnt in the first part of the experiment 
before the target locations changed (the training phase). Finally, participants were told 
that the target moved in one direction most of the time in the first part of the 
experiment, and were asked to indicate whether they thought the target moved in a 
predominantly clockwise or anticlockwise direction by pressing one of two keys.  
 
2.5.2 Results 
 A 2 x (2 x 2) ANOVA was run with group (hint vs. no hint) as the between-
groups factor, and subsequence (XYZ vs. ZYZ) and cueing (cued vs. miscued) as the 
within-groups factors on RTs (Figure 2.7) and errors in the training phase. Replicating 
Experiment 3, in RTs there was a significant main effect of subsequence, F(1,48) = 
203.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .809, and cueing, F(1,48) = 112.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .701. Thus 
there was a significant cueing effect and participants showed the same second-order 
sequential effects as the previous experiments, responding faster to XYZ 
subsequences. Replicating Experiment 3, there was a significant interaction between 
subsequence, cueing and group in RTs, F(1,48) = 6.19, p = .016, ηp2 = .114, indicating 
that the group difference in cueing differed between subsequences. Again, this three-
way interaction was explained by the fact that there was a significant cueing x group 
interaction for XYZ subsequences, F(1,48) = 6.94, p = .011, ηp2 = .126, but not for 
ZYZ subsequences, F < 1. There was also a marginally non-significant group x 
cueing interaction, F(1,48) = 3.38, p = .072, ηp2 = .066 (see Figure 2.7).  
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Figure 2.7. Cueing effect (RT for miscued – cued trials) for each group for XYZ and 
ZYZ subsequences across training and transfer phases in Experiment 4. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
In the error data there was a main effect of subsequence, F(1,48) = 80.87, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .628, and cueing, F(1,48) = 62.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .565, and also a 
significant interaction between subsequence and cueing, F(1,48) = 17.23, p < .001, ηp2 
= .264, but the 3-way interaction did not reach significance, F < 1, nor did the group x 
cueing interaction, F(1,48) = 2.90, p = .095, ηp2 = .057. There was no overall effect of 
group in either RTs or errors, largest F < 1. Therefore in errors, the same second-
order sequential effects and cueing effects were found as in RTs, but there did not 
appear to be an effect of the hint on overall errors or on the cueing effect. 
 For the transfer phase, a 2 (hint vs. no hint) x 2 (same vs. different response 
keys) x (2) (XYZ vs. ZYZ) x (2) (cued vs. miscued) ANOVA produced a main effect 
of subsequence in RTs, F(1,46) = 131.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .741, and errors, F(1,46) = 
45.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .499, but no other main effects nor interactions reached 
significance. Simple t-test comparisons revealed that none of the transfer cueing 
effects in either group (for either subsequence, in RTs or errors) were significantly 
greater than 0, all ts < 1, suggesting that there was no transfer of learning in any 
condition. 
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 Unlike Experiment 2, there was a significant group difference in accuracy for 
the prediction test, F(1,48) = 5.65, p = .021, η2 = .105 (see Figure 2.8). The Hint 
group scored 80.56% (SD = 23.9), which was significantly above chance, t(23) = 6.26, 
SEM = .049, p < .001, while the No Hint group scored 58.97% (SD = 38.1), which 
was not found to be significantly above chance, t(25) = 1.20, SEM = .075, p = .241. A 
chi-square analysis revealed that a higher proportion of participants in the Hint group 
chose the correct direction of motion (24/24) than the No Hint group (17/26), χ2(1, N 
= 50) = 10.13, p = .001, φ = .450 (see Figure 2.8).  
 
Figure 2.8. Performance on the prediction test and forced-choice question in 
Experiment 4. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
The results in the training phase replicate the group differences in Experiment 
3, in that participants were both faster and more accurate on XYZ than ZYZ 
subsequences, and also on cued than miscued trials. Participants in both groups 
produced a larger cueing effect on ZYZ subsequences in their errors and the 
difference in RT cueing for XYZ and ZYZ subsequences interacted with group. This 
3-way interaction is again due to the fact that the Hint group produced a larger XYZ 
cueing effect than the No Hint group, but there was no group difference for ZYZ 
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cueing. The significant group differences in the explicit knowledge tests confirm that 
the hint was successful in helping participants discover the direction of motion (all 
participants in the Hint group could correctly identify the direction of motion), and 
provided participants with a level of explicit knowledge that they otherwise would not 
have obtained in the absence of the hint. The results from Experiments 3 and 4 thus 
far suggest that cueing effects on XYZ subsequences are affected by relational 
sequence knowledge while cueing effects on ZYZ subsequences may not be 
susceptible to this same knowledge.   
It seemed that changing the target locations in the transfer phase greatly 
impaired the expression of any cueing effects, regardless of whether participants used 
the same or different response keys and regardless of whether they were given a hint 
to concentrate on the direction of the target. It is not surprising that the No Hint group 
did not show a cueing effect in the transfer phase given that implicit learning has been 
argued to be tied to the contextual features of the training conditions (Berry & Dienes, 
1993; Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006). However, it is surprising that 
participants in the Hint group also did not show any cueing effects in the transfer 
phase given that knowledge that the target mostly travels in a certain direction should 
still be relevant despite the change in target locations. It appears that the abstract 
knowledge acquired by the Hint group was not sufficient in overcoming the detriment 
in performance that occurred when the perceptual task features were changed. There 
is evidence of sequence learning surviving large superficial task changes (e.g. 
Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006), but only when learning was deemed to be 
explicit, and only when the target locations and motor responses remained unchanged. 
The present results suggest that the motor component as well as the perceptual 
features in the task constituted a large proportion of what participants learned. 
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Changing these features in the transfer phase eliminated cueing effects, even when 
participants had relational knowledge that was directly applicable. 
In the following experiment, a different transfer phase was used to test 
whether the hint would facilitate performance. There is evidence showing that 
sequence learning effects survive motoric changes such as switching from using three 
fingers to one (Experiment 2, Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Experiment 1, Keele, 
Jennings, Jones, Caulton, & Cohen, 1995), and even when switching hands 
completely (Deroost, Zeeuws, & Soetens, 2006; Grafton, Hazeltine, & Ivry, 2002; 
Japikse, Negash, Howard, Jr., & Howard, 2003). Thus, it is possible that changing the 
motor requirements while retaining the target locations (and hence the perceptual task 
features) will afford a better chance of observing transfer as well as any possible 
advantage that the Hint group may have.  
 
2.6 Experiment 5 
 The aim of Experiment 5 was to replicate Experiment 4 with a transfer phase 
where the target locations remained the same but participants switched hands to 
respond. Participants may show cueing effects because they have learned about the 
contingencies between the target locations on screen (e.g. left – top), but also if they 
have learned an association between particular motor responses (e.g. pressing the left 
key – pressing the up key with the right hand). Since there is evidence that perceptual 
features of the task are important in transfer (e.g. Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Keele 
et al., 1995), it was expected that participants in both groups would show a significant 
cueing effect in transfer. However, the Hint group should suffer less generalization 
decrement from switching hands since they possess explicit knowledge about the 
direction of motion, which is applicable no matter which hand is used for responding. 
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Therefore it was also hypothesized that the Hint group would show more cueing than 
the No Hint group in the transfer phase.  Following the results thus far, if responding 
on XYZ subsequences is under a greater amount of control, the Hint group should 
display a larger XYZ cueing effect, but there will be no group difference in ZYZ 
cueing at transfer. 
 
2.6.1 Method 
2.6.1.1 Participants  
 Seventy-six participants who were either University of Sydney students or 
respondents to an online ad took part in this experiment (54 female, M age = 22.24, 
SD = 7.23). Students received course credit and ad respondents received AUD 
$15/hour as compensation. Participants were randomly allocated to either the Hint 
group (n = 39) or the No Hint group (n = 37).  
 
2.6.1.2 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 4, except that before the transfer 
phase participants were told to switch to whatever hand they had not been using 
previously. The target locations and response keys remained the same (left, top, right), 
and there were no contingencies in the transfer phase. Due to the large proportion of 
participants in this experiment who were recruited from the general public (i.e. were 
not university students), the hint was read out to participants in this study, and extra 
clarification was given that there was a correct ‘answer’ for the target direction, and 
that it was either clockwise or anticlockwise. To foreshadow the results, this turned 
out to be critical in the ensuing group differences.  
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2.6.2 Results 
 A 2 x (2 x 2) ANOVA with group as the between-groups factor, and 
subsequence and cueing as the within-groups factors was run on RT and error data in 
training and transfer. The main effects of subsequence and cueing were again 
significant in both RTs and errors, smallest F(1,74) = 69.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .483, 
indicating an overall cueing effect and better performance on XYZ subsequences. 
There was a significant interaction between cueing and group in RTs with the Hint 
group producing a larger cueing effect overall, F(1,76) = 21.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .227, 
but unlike Experiments 3 and 4, this did not interact with subsequence, F < 1 (Figure 
2.9).  
 
 
Figure 2.9. Cueing effect (RT for miscued – cued trials) for each group for XYZ and 
ZYZ subsequences across training and transfer phases in Experiment 5. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
In the error data, there was a significant interaction between subsequence and 
cueing, F(1,74) = 26.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .265, as in Experiments 3 and 4, indicating 
that a larger cueing effect was obtained in both groups for ZYZ subsequences, and the 
cueing x group interaction was marginally non-significant, F(1,74) = 3.15, p = .080, 
ηp2 = .041, as well as the three-way interaction between subsequence, cueing and 
group, F(1,74) = 3.20, p = .078, ηp2 = .041. There was no main effect of group for 
RTs or errors, largest F(1,74) = 2.50, p = .118, η2 = .033.  
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 In the transfer test, there was an overall cueing effect in RTs, F(1,74) = 32.28, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .304, and errors, F(1,74) = 10.72, p = .002, ηp2 =.127, that did not 
interact with subsequence or group, largest F(1,74) = 1.81, p = .182, ηp2 = .024. On 
initial inspection it appeared that the results confirmed the hypothesis – the Hint 
group produced a larger XYZ cueing effect in the transfer phase, while both groups 
showed the same level of ZYZ cueing (Figure 2.9), but the 3-way interaction between 
group, subsequence and cueing did not reach significance in RTs, F(1,74) = 1.38, p 
= .243, ηp2 = .018, or errors, F < 1. A follow-up analysis revealed that there was no 
group difference in the size of the XYZ cueing effect in RTs in transfer, F(1,74) = 
2.78, p = .100, ηp2 = .03615.  
 There was a significant group difference in accuracy on the prediction test, 
F(1,74) = 5.42, p = .023, η2 = .068 (see Figure 2.10). The Hint group scored 77.8% 
(SD = 29.9%), which was found to be significantly above chance, t(38) = 5.79, SEM 
= .048, p < .001, and the No Hint group scored 61.2% (SD = 31.9%), which was also 
significantly above chance performance, t(36) = 2.15, SEM = .052, p = .039. A chi-
square analysis showed that a significantly larger proportion of participants chose the 
correct direction of motion in the Hint group (36/39) than in the No Hint group 
(23/37), χ2(1, N = 76) = 9.93, p = .002, φ = .362 (see Figure 2.10). 
                                                
15 See Appendix B for additional analyses. 
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Figure 2.10. Performance on the prediction test and forced-choice question in 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
2.6.3 Discussion 
Replicating Experiment 4, the hint was successful in increasing the amount of 
explicit sequence knowledge that participants displayed at the end of the experiment. 
The significant cueing effects seen in the transfer phase showed that the cueing effect 
persisted when the contingencies were removed and even when using a different hand 
to respond. This is consistent with previous studies demonstrating transfer of 
sequence learning between hands (Deroost, Zeeuws, & Soetens, 2006; Grafton, 
Hazeltine, & Ivry, 2002; Japikse et al., 2003), and along with Experiment 4, is 
consistent with studies concluding that sequence learning is not purely a series of 
motor responses (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Keele et al., 1995). Transfer was 
completely disrupted in Experiment 4 when the perceptual features of the task (target 
locations) were changed, and significant cueing effects were found to transfer across 
hands when the target locations remained the same in Experiment 5. Thus it appears 
that sequence learning in both the presence and absence of the hint is based primarily 
on perceptual features of the task and not just on simple motoric learning.  
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Despite the results being in the predicted direction, it seems that cueing 
persisted equally for XYZ and ZYZ in transfer, and this did not depend on whether 
participants received the hint. The effect of the hint was seemingly strongest in 
Experiment 5 compared to previous experiments, elevating cueing for both XYZ and 
ZYZ subsequences, and yet this advantage did not persist into the transfer phase for 
either subsequence. The fact that the explicit knowledge afforded by the hint makes 
little difference when the cueing effects were measured in the absence of 
contingencies may suggest that the Hint group were sensitive to the fact that the 
contingencies had been removed and this adversely affected their cueing effect. An 
alternative explanation is that the sequence knowledge in the No Hint group 
transferred effectively because participants were primarily learning about the 
perceptual features of the sequence. This would mean that sequence learning is more 
flexible than what some theorists have postulated (e.g. Berry & Dienes, 1993; 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998; Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006). However, since 
the performance of the No Hint group was significantly above chance in the 
prediction test in this experiment, it can be argued that this flexibility may have been 
due to a subset of participants acquiring some explicit knowledge in the absence of 
the hint.  
The surprising finding from Experiment 5 was the absence of the three-way 
interaction between group, subsequence, and cueing in training that was present in 
both Experiment 3 and 4. It appears that in this experiment, the hint increased cueing 
for both XYZ and ZYZ subsequences. One possible reason for this discrepancy 
between experiments is the method of hint delivery. A large proportion of the sample 
in Experiment 5 were members of the general public, whereas in Experiments 3 and 4 
all participants were university students. Previous experience with non-University 
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student samples led the experimenter to give these participants extra attention and 
explanation prior to the experiment, as they were generally not used to the types of 
computer-based tasks that are routinely completed by most undergraduate psychology 
students, and found it difficult to follow the on-screen instructions. Thus extra care 
was taken to explain the hint in Experiment 5 in that the hint was read out verbally to 
participants, and it was emphasized that there was a correct ‘answer’ that was either 
clockwise or anticlockwise. It is possible that this extra clarification enabled the Hint 
group to use their knowledge on ZYZ trials in addition to XYZ trials. Experiment 6 
aimed to test this speculation.  
 
2.7 Experiment 6 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to provide evidence that a more careful mode of 
delivering the hint could selectively increase the amount of cueing for ZYZ 
subsequences. To achieve this, Experiment 6 compared learning between two groups: 
a group that were simply given the hint to read as in Experiments 3-4 (Weak Hint 
group), and a group where the experimenter read out the hint and explained that there 
was a correct answer which would either be clockwise or anticlockwise (Strong Hint 
group). Based on the results of Experiments 3-5, it was hypothesized that the groups 
would differ in cueing for ZYZ subsequences, for which the weak version of the hint 
had little impact in Experiments 3 and 4, but would display equivalent and relatively 
strong cueing effects for XYZ subsequences, which appeared to benefit from both 
forms of the hint across Experiments 3-5.  
Thus far, no evidence has been found for an advantage of the Hint group in 
transfer when the contingencies are removed. As discussed above, one possibility is 
that the changes to the perceptual features (Experiment 4) or the response demands 
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(Experiment 5) in transfer may be especially disruptive when attempting to learn the 
sequence explicitly. If participants in the Hint group are constantly looking for the 
predominant direction of motion, when the contingencies are removed in the transfer 
phase this may disrupt performance in general, leading to smaller cueing effects that 
are equivalent in magnitude to the No Hint group. It is possible that a difference 
between the Weak and Strong Hint groups may emerge not just in training but also in 
transfer. To provide the best opportunity for observing a difference in transfer 
between Hint groups, Experiment 6 used the same transfer phase used in Experiment 
2: where participants used the same response keys and hand to respond, and the 
transition to the transfer phase was seamless (the start of the transfer phase was 
unmarked). Thus the only change during the transfer phase would be the removal of 
the contingencies. The hypothesis for the transfer phase was the same as in training: a 
larger ZYZ cueing effect but equivalent XYZ cueing effect for the Weak and Strong 
Hint groups.  
 
2.7.1. Method 
2.7.1.1 Participants 
Forty-three University of Sydney Psychology students (30 female, M age = 
19.6, SD = 3.13) participated in Experiment 6 in exchange for course credit. 
Participants were randomly allocated to either the Weak Hint group (n = 22) or the 
Strong Hint group (n = 21). 
 
2.7.1.2 Procedure 
 Experiment 6 consisted of a single training session where participants were 
told to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. After completing a short 
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practice phase (the same as the previous experiments), participants responded to 720 
trials where the target followed the .75 cued/.25 miscued contingencies (there was a 
prevailing direction of motion) and 360 trials where there were no contingencies 
(there was no prevailing direction of motion). Participants continued to use the same 
response keys and hand and there was no break between the training and transfer 
phase, such that there was nothing to mark the transition into a separate phase for 
participants. Participants in Experiment 6 received a written hint after the practice 
phase if they were in the Weak Hint group, which they were told to read before 
starting the main part of the experiment. Participants in the Strong Hint group were 
also given the written hint, but the experimenter read out the hint to the participants. 
The hint given was exactly the same in both groups except for the addition of the 
following sentence in the Strong Hint group: “Try and work out which direction it 
goes (the answer will EITHER be clockwise or anticlockwise).” There were no 
explicit knowledge tests in this experiment.  
 
2.7.2 Results and Discussion 
One participant from the Weak Hint group was excluded due to their cueing 
effect on both XYZ and ZYZ subsequences deviating more than 3 SDs from the mean, 
leaving 21 participants in each group. A 2 x (2 x 2) ANOVA with group as the 
between-groups factor, and subsequence (XYZ vs. ZYZ) and cueing (cued vs. 
miscued) as the within-groups factors was run on RTs and errors in the training and 
transfer phases. In both the training and transfer phases, there was a significant main 
effect of cueing and subsequence for both RTs and errors, smallest F(1,40) = 25.64, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .391, and a significant interaction between subsequence and cueing in 
errors, F(1,40) = 6.31, p = .016, ηp2 = .136. Cueing effects were therefore present in 
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both RTs and errors, and again participants found XYZ subsequences easier to 
respond to. As with previous experiments, participants produced a larger ZYZ cueing 
effect in errors only. The interaction of interest, between group, subsequence and 
cueing, was not significant in training in RTs, F < 1, however it was significant at 
transfer, F(1,40) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .226 (see Figure 2.11). Follow-up analyses 
revealed that this interaction was due to a group difference in ZYZ cueing, F(1,40) = 
6.69, p = .013, ηp2 = .143, and no group difference in XYZ cueing, F < 1, as 
hypothesized. The three-way interaction did not reach significance in errors in either 
training or transfer, largest F(1,40) = 2.90, p = .096, ηp2 = .068.  
 
 
Figure 2.11. Cueing effect (RT for miscued – cued trials) for each group for XYZ and 
ZYZ subsequences in Experiment 6. Blocks 1-4 are the training phase, blocks 5-6 are 
the transfer phase.  
 
While it should be acknowledged that this result would be most consistent 
with the previous experiments had it been found during training, to the extent that 
cueing effects in transfer can be interpreted as reflecting a genuine learning effect, it 
can still be concluded that there is a difference between the two modes of hint 
delivery. The interaction at transfer for RTs confirms the speculation that stressing to 
participants that the answer would either be clockwise or anticlockwise, as well as 
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delivering the hint verbally selectively increases ZYZ cueing effects.  It may be that 
the deliberate search for a pattern (motivated by any form of hint) was reduced to 
deciding on a direction of motion, substantially simplifying the task at hand and thus 
allowing the expression of explicit knowledge on both second-order level 
subsequences. Presumably, the hint in its original form directs participants to pay 
attention to the general direction of the target, but perhaps entertainment of more 
complex rules due to the probabilistic nature of the task meant that participants were 
still searching for patterns throughout the training and transfer phases. It should be 
emphasized that this explanation does not necessitate that the Strong Hint group 
possessed a greater degree of sequence knowledge, rather it suggests that the 
difference in hint delivery between the two groups in Experiment 6 made the task 
easier in the Strong Hint group which then changed the way they approached the task. 
In summary, the greater ZYZ cueing effect obtained by reading out the hint and 
emphasizing that there was a correct answer explains the failure to obtain the 3-way 
interaction in Experiment 5. In Experiment 5, both XYZ and ZYZ cueing benefitted 
from the strong version of the hint, producing a group difference in ZYZ cueing that 
was not obtained in Experiments 3 and 4.  
 
2.8 General Discussion 
 The current series of experiments explored whether a hint about a relational 
rule describing a set of simple contingencies could affect learning in a probabilistic 
three-choice SRT task. This was investigated by comparing a group given a hint about 
the existence of a prevailing direction of motion against a group who were not given 
this hint. This manipulation was novel in the sense that participants were aided in 
discovering a simple relational rule that could summarize all contingencies within the 
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task and was therefore equally applicable on every single trial. Experiments 1 and 2 
showed that the three-choice SRT task produced sequential effects in target direction, 
similar to the repetition and alternation effects found in 2-choice RT tasks with target 
location. Participants were generally much faster to respond on trials where there was 
a repetition of target direction (XYZ subsequences), compared to trials where the 
target direction alternated (ZYZ trials), but participants were also fast to respond 
when the target direction alternated a few times (ZYZYZ subsequences).  
Due to the magnitude of the second-order sequential effects (XYZ vs. ZYZ) in 
comparison to the higher-order sequential effects, cueing effects for each subsequence 
were analyzed separately to avoid artificially inflating the size of the overall cueing 
effect when the contingencies were added to the task. This separation turned out to be 
critical for the ensuing experiments. Experiments 3 and 4 showed a consistent pattern 
of results in training, with the Hint group producing a larger XYZ cueing effect but no 
group difference in the ZYZ cueing effect. Experiment 3 failed to produce group 
differences in performance on a recognition and prediction test, but Experiment 4 
found significantly better performance in the Hint group on the prediction test, and a 
significantly larger proportion of participants in the Hint group selected the correct 
direction of motion than the No Hint group.  
Experiment 4 also added a short transfer phase after the training phase to test 
whether the sequence knowledge in the Hint group was abstract and could be applied 
when the target locations were changed to the left, bottom, and right of the screen and 
the contingencies were removed. The test pitted motor and relational learning against 
each other such that a significant cueing effect in either direction (in the cued or 
miscued direction) would give some indication of whether the content of learning in 
each group was primarily motor or abstract. No cueing effects in the transfer phase 
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were found in either direction in either group, suggesting that perceptual information 
constituted a large portion of what participants in both groups had learnt, with the 
disruption of this aspect of the task eliminating cueing effects completely.  
Experiment 5 implemented a different transfer phase where participants 
simply switched hands to respond. This time, positive cueing effects in the cued 
direction of motion were found over both subsequences and these cueing effects did 
not differ between groups. However, the Hint group in Experiment 5 produced a 
larger cueing effect for both XYZ and ZYZ subsequences in training, in contrast to 
Experiments 3 and 4. Experiment 6 confirmed that the likely reason for this difference 
was the manner in which the hint was administered. Delivering the hint verbally with 
additional emphasis that there was a ‘correct’ prevailing direction (as was the case in 
Experiment 5) resulted in a larger ZYZ cueing effect in transfer but no change in the 
size of the XYZ cueing effect, in comparison to just giving participants the hint to 
read (as was the case in Experiments 3-4).   
 
2.8.1 Effects of Explicit Knowledge 
 This study suggests that the primary determinant for whether explicit 
knowledge will be used in an SRT task is how easy that knowledge is to apply to the 
task, not necessarily whether the sequence is probabilistic or deterministic, as 
suggested by previous studies. In particular, the Hint group found it easier to apply 
their knowledge on XYZ trials, perhaps due to the consistent direction of motion on 
two consecutive trials having a facilitating effect. One possibility for this facilitation 
is that responding on XYZ trials may just have been easier for both groups, making 
expression of the additional explicit knowledge in the Hint group more 
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straightforward. Certainly, the sequential effects in Experiments 1-2 suggest that 
responding is easier on XYZ trials compared to ZYZ trials.  
Previous studies demonstrating a lack of difference between a group given 
additional explicit sequence knowledge and a group who perform the task in the 
absence of this information can also be explained on the basis of the ease of 
application of that knowledge to the task. The sequence used in Jiménez, Méndez, and 
Cleeremans (1996) was probabilistic but also quite complex, generated according to a 
finite-state grammar (Figure 2.12). In Figure 2.12, the arrows represent possible or 
‘grammatical’ transitions and the letters represent different targets. One can imagine 
that learning this structure explicitly would be difficult, let alone attempting to apply 
that knowledge to the SRT task that requires fast responses.  
 
Figure 2.12. The finite-state grammar used to generate sequences in the study 
reported by Jiménez, Méndez, and Cleeremans (1996). Image from Jiménez, Méndez, 
and Cleeremans (1996).  
 
The results of another study can be explained on the basis of the utility of that 
knowledge to the task. A study by Sanchez and Reber (2013) showed that pretraining 
participants on a sequence did not aid performance despite participants being able to 
verbalize the sequence structure. This result was especially surprising because the 
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sequence was a 12-item deterministic (repeating) sequence. However, their task was 
quite different from traditional SRT tasks in that participants had to monitor a series 
of “falling” cues and press the corresponding key at the precise time when each cue 
reached the cue outline at the bottom of the screen (see Figure 2.13). Participants’ 
accuracy was recorded (hit or miss) in contrast to traditional SRT tasks that record 
reaction time. The task also differed in that participants were presented with multiple 
cues on screen at the same time and so could “see” the upcoming sequence of cues. 
Sanchez and Reber explained their results by claiming that explicit knowledge allows 
participants to predict future responses, but when the upcoming targets are on screen 
and therefore do not need to be predicted, the benefit of explicit knowledge 
disappears. They propose that while explicit knowledge may have a role in skill 
learning (which the SRT paradigm provides a means to test), it may have more of a 
‘scaffolding’ effect rather than representing a direct contribution (see Jiménez, 2003, 
for a similar conclusion). This means that explicit knowledge can help with planning 
movements or preventing inappropriate movements when initially learning a skill, but 
it is not responsible for improvements seen after practice (see Petersen, van Mier, 
Fiez, & Raichle, 1998).  
 
Figure 2.13. SRT task used in Sanchez and Reber (2013). Image from Sanchez and 
Reber (2013). 
with perceptual information, unlike most skill learning,
performance does not absolutely depend on initial
pre-training instruction. This makes it possible to contrast
implicit (I) learning with implicit plus explicit (I + E)
learning, because there is no need for explicit pre-instruc-
tion to guide initial performance, unlike many physical
skills (e.g., juggling). If the two memory systems operate
independently then no performance advantage will be
seen for the explicit pre-training instruction condition
(I + E) compared to an implicit learning condition (I) with-
out the additional explicit instruction. Under a single
memory system or tightly integrated systems model, the
addition of explicit memory should raise the total amount
of available information and produce an improvement in
performance.
To test whether explicit pre-training instruction leads
to enhanced learning and performance on an implicit skill
learning task, a group of participants were explicitly in-
structed on the embedded repeating sequence prior to SISL
practice. Based on preliminary data suggesting that explicit
knowledge can be difficult to retain over the course of
training, additional explicit instruction was also provided
halfway through practice. In contrast to traditional skill
instruction methods whereby the learner may be provided
with explicit rules or algorithms to guide performance, the
explicit instruction provided here was the specific se-
quence of repeating actions that were to be learned. Both
forms of instruction require explicit memory, but the
instruction used here was designed to provide exactly
the most relevant explicit knowledge for the task to best
see how it might affect implicit learning and performance.
Learning in this group of participants was compared to a
control group who learned under traditional incidental
learning conditions. In addition to comparing learning
across groups, explicit memory for the repeating sequence
was assessed after practice to verify that the pre-training
instruction manipulation produced high levels of explicit
sequence knowledge. If sequence knowledge relies on a
shared implicit and explicit (I + E) knowledge representa-
tion, or if the representations between memory systems
interact in a beneficial manner, participants in the explicit
condition should exhibit a benefit during the SISL training
and in the post-training test.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty-one undergraduate students at Northwestern
University received course credit for participation. Two
participants from each condition were removed from the
data due to cessation of responding leading to unusually
low performance during SISL test blocks, leaving 27 partic-
ipants in the final analysis (19 female, Mage = 18.48 years).
The SISL task is similar in format to popular rhythm music
games (e.g. Guitar Hero, Tap Tap Revenge), so participants’
video game experience was assessed. Participants were
familiar with popular video games of the same format
(i.e. rhythm games) and one participant reported regular
play.
3. Materials
3.1. The Serial Intercep ion Sequence Learning (SISL) task
Participants observed circular cues scrolling vertically
down a monitor in one of four horizontal locations towards
corresponding yellow target rings located near the bottom
of the screen (Fig. 1). Beneath each ring was a letter (D, F, J,
or K) indicating which keyboard button corresponded to
each of the locations. Participants were instructed to make
a keypress response when a cue overlapped a target ring.
R sponses were considered correct f the app opriate key
was pressed while the cue was within one cue-length of
the target ring (half a cue length on either side of the prop-
er target location), so that the initial window for a correct
response was approximately 140 ms. A response was con-
sidered incorrect if the key was pressed while the cue was
outside of the acceptable response window, if the wrong
key was pressed, or if more than one key ress was made
within a single target response window. For direct re-
sp nse feedback, incorr ct respons s caused the corre-
sponding target ring to flash red, and if a response was
correct, the target ring flashed green and the cue disap-
peared. A performance meter located on the left side of
the screen increased in size by about 1% for each correct re-
sponse and decreased in size for each incorrect response. A
numerical score box on the right side of the screen dis-
played a number that increased wi h each correct r -
sponse. The performance meter and score were indicative
of performance, providing participants with constant
feedback.
The cues moved down the screen with an initial velocity
of 12.6!/s, reaching the target zone 850 ms after appearing
on the screen (time-to-target). To maintain a reasonable
level of task difficulty and reduce ceiling effects, the per-
centage of correct responses was assessed after every 30
Fig. 1. The Serial Interception Sequence Learning (SISL) task. Circular cues
scroll down the computer scree toward target rings at the bott .
Participants attempt to intercept circles as they cross the target rings by
pressing the corresponding keyboard button. For example, this partici-
pant just responded with an F keypress, and would be readying responses
for D, then K, then F. The colored bar within the performance meter
increases for every correct response and decreases for every incorrect
response and the score increases based on the accuracy of correct
responses.
344 D.J. Sanchez, P.J. Reber / Cognition 126 (2013) 341–351
  
91 
 An alternative explanation of the effect of the hint in Experiments 3 and 4 is 
that the hint engages explicit learning processes, which selectively benefit the most 
salient subsequences (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Jones and McLaren (2009) found that 
when participants were told to predict the location of the target, they showed the best 
evidence of learning for subsequences that ended in a repetition (e.g. XXX), since 
runs of repetitions constitute the most salient subsequences. This idea is consistent 
with the current results if we assume that one effect of the hint was to draw 
participants’ attention to the direction of the target, which is more salient, or more 
easily encoded, on XYZ trials. Assuming that the hint made discovering the 
predominant direction of motion relatively easy (supported by the results of the 
explicit knowledge tests in Experiments 4 and 5), this selective effect of the hint 
would appear to be a performance effect, rather than a failure of learning that the hint 
applies to ZYZ trials. Participants in the Hint group may have known that the target 
was mostly travelling in one direction, but perhaps they found it difficult to express 
their knowledge when the target location alternated because it violated their 
expectations and was thus surprising. Alternatively, it may be that the probabilistic 
nature of the task makes it difficult for participants to be sure of the correct direction 
of motion throughout the task. Thus, when the target direction alternates, it is not only 
surprising because of the inconsistency with the previous trial, but it may also violate 
the current beliefs of the participant that the target is travelling in their chosen 
direction. This may make the participant entertain more complex hypotheses such as 
the possibility that the target direction may switch, or that the sequence is much more 
complex than the hint suggests. Indeed, when the hint was clarified to participants in 
Experiment 5 so that the task for the Hint group was reduced to deciding on a 
predominant direction of motion from two possibilities, participants were able to use 
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this information to produce a larger cueing effect on both XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences.  
As discussed, it is unlikely that the difference between the weak and strong 
versions of the hint is in the quality or amount of resulting explicit knowledge, since 
performance in the explicit sequence knowledge tests in Experiments 4 and 5 were 
very similar. Rather, the effect of clarification in the Strong Hint group may have 
reduced uncertainty and the overall cognitive load of the hint during training, as 
participants no longer had to search for more complex rules, resulting in the Hint 
group being able to more easily apply their knowledge to ZYZ trials. Note that this 
explanation implies that explicit processes actually hampered the expression of 
learning on ZYZ trials in the Hint groups in Experiments 3-4, and would suggest that 
simply adding the intention to learn does not necessarily make the task easier if the 
sequence is probabilistic.  
The additional care in emphasizing and explaining the hint in order for 
participants to successfully utilize that knowledge on both XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences might suggest that the hint was not clear enough and participants may 
have misinterpreted it. Although this is a possibility, performance in the prediction 
test and forced-choice question was good after the weak version of the hint was given 
in Experiment 4, so any potential misinterpretation of the hint cannot have been 
particularly detrimental to discovering the prevailing direction of motion. While the 
performance of the Hint group in Experiment 3 was comparatively poor, this may 
well have been because the recognition test presented prior adversely affected the 
prediction test, since the recognition test involved participants responding to 
sequences biased in both the cued and miscued direction. This additional exposure to 
contingencies in the reversed direction may have degraded any existing sequence 
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knowledge that participants possessed, or made them unsure of the predominant 
direction of motion that they had worked out during training.  
 
2.8.2 Limits of Explicit Knowledge 
A surprising finding from the current experiments was that the hint produced 
limited enhancement of the cueing effect in the transfer phases. While the training 
data seem to suggest that the hint had a large impact on SRT performance, the failure 
to find the same differences in the transfer phases in Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that 
the knowledge afforded by the hint was less flexible than expected. The Hint groups 
in both Experiments 4 and 5 failed to exhibit greater transfer of cueing effects than the 
No Hint groups, with both groups displaying no cueing effects in Experiment 4, and 
equivalent cueing effects in Experiment 5. The lack of transfer for either group in 
Experiment 4 was explained through changes to the perceptual features of the task 
being sufficient to disrupt transfer completely. Clearly, a large part of what is learned 
in this SRT task is the sequence of target locations on screen, rather than a series of 
motor actions, and this was the same regardless of the hint. In Experiment 5, sequence 
knowledge in both groups transferred across hands, further suggesting that whatever 
is learned is not restricted to specific motor actions and is primarily perceptual. These 
results accord with other studies that have found transfer of sequence learning 
between hands and fingers (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Deroost, Zeeuws, & Soetens, 
2006; Grafton, Hazeltine, & Ivry, 2002; Japikse et al., 2003; Keele et al., 1995), and 
studies that show that retaining the perceptual aspects of the task is more important 
than retaining the motor aspects in demonstrating transfer (e.g. Stadler, 1989). 
The lack of group differences for either subsequence in the transfer phase in 
Experiment 5 is surprising given that there should be limited generalization decrement 
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in the explicit knowledge possessed by the Hint group. In other words, switching 
hands to respond should have little bearing on both the quality of the explicit 
knowledge, and the application of that knowledge in the transfer phase. One reason 
for this, and the lack of transfer in Experiment 3, may be that participants in the Hint 
group were more aware of the apparent direction of motion. This may have meant that 
they were more sensitive to the removal of the contingencies in the transfer phase, and 
this sensitivity reduced the size of their displayed cueing effect. This is consistent 
with the results of Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez (2006), who found more decrement 
in responding in an intentional group in transfer blocks (where the contingencies were 
removed) than an incidental group. They explained this counterintuitive result by 
claiming that participants who learn about a sequence explicitly may notice a change 
in the sequence and actively try to suppress their previous knowledge to learn about 
the novel sequence. While better transfer was not obtained in the No Hint group than 
in the Hint group, a similar case can be made for why a benefit in transfer cueing was 
not found for the Hint group. Giving participants explicit sequence knowledge 
seemed to have little effect in transfer, and highlights again that specific direction and 
obvious applicability need to be present before explicit knowledge can benefit 
sequence learning. While it can be concluded that probabilistic sequence learning 
does not seem to be independent of explicit knowledge or the intention to learn, it 
does appear that encouraging participants to use this knowledge effectively is 
surprisingly difficult, in contrast to the robust cueing effects obtained (in both training 
and transfer) under incidental conditions. In this way, sequence learning may 
represent an example of a task where explicit knowledge is able to affect learning, but 
only to a limited degree.  
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2.8.3 Implicit Learning? 
It should be noted that while explicit knowledge had an effect on cueing in 
these experiments, this does not rule out the possibility that under incidental 
conditions, implicit learning occurs. Reed and Johnston (1994) have argued that the 
mere presence of explicit learning (defined in terms of participants' awareness) in one 
sequence structure does not imply that all sequences will be learned explicitly and 
does not contradict evidence for implicit or automatic learning processes derived from 
another sequence structure. Indeed, the robust cueing effects obtained in the absence 
of the hint may indicate the operation of an automatic implicit learning process that 
contributes to the cueing effect in both groups. Interpreting the group differences as 
due to the addition of explicit knowledge or learning in fact assumes this already. The 
results do not imply that all probabilistic sequences would be affected by explicit 
knowledge, and does not weaken the existing evidence that learning of complex 
probabilistic sequences is implicit in some sense.  
What the current results do suggest is that there is no general divide between 
deterministic and probabilistic sequences in the sense that the former are sensitive to 
explicit knowledge whereas the latter are resistant to this knowledge. Instead, they 
suggest that tasks in which there is a practical advantage in using the explicit 
knowledge are likely to show sensitivity to such knowledge. Situations in which 
explicit knowledge conveys little practical advantage will not show that sensitivity. 
That practical advantage may be a function of several factors including the general 
reliability of the given rule, which is inherently weaker in probabilistic compared to 
deterministic sequence structures, but also the participant's ability to implement the 
rule while concurrently performing the task. This conclusion assumes that rule use is 
effortful and requires drawing from a limited pool of cognitive resources. Thus, 
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studies that attempt to make theoretical conclusions on the basis of the cognitive 
penetrability of sequence learning need to consider both the nature of the knowledge 
supplied to participants, and its utility to the particular sequence to be learned in order 
to predict the effect of additional explicit knowledge.  
 
2.8.4 Future Directions 
The current set of results and previous literature show that there are situations 
in which sequence learning is both susceptible, and resistant to explicit knowledge. 
Therefore, perhaps the best avenue for future research is to investigate the parameters 
that predict whether explicit knowledge will impact on sequence learning. A 
comparison of learning under incidental and intentional conditions using a variety of 
sequences will be more informative in investigating whether there are any differences 
between implicit and explicit learning. This stance allows one to maintain the 
assumption that implicit learning is an automatic process that operates differently to 
explicit processes in important ways. For instance, even if implicit and explicit 
processes are not fully independent of one another (in the sense that what is learned 
implicitly can still be affected by explicit processes and/or become available to 
conscious awareness), a subset of processes might still be isolable because they 
continue to operate effectively in situations where explicit mechanisms cannot (see 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998 for a similar argument). This would entail that the 
specific requirements of the task will dictate whether learning will proceed implicitly 
or explicitly, with learning in most situations perhaps being a mixture of both (Reed 
& Johnson, 1994).  
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2.8.5 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, consistent evidence of SRT performance advantages was found 
for participants given relational knowledge about a simple probabilistic sequence, and 
robust cueing effects in the absence of this knowledge were also found. Probabilistic 
sequence learning as measured in this task was not found to be resistant to explicit 
knowledge, but also seems to proceed in the absence of explicit knowledge or 
intention to learn. Learning of these probabilistic sequences, just like deterministic 
sequences, is affected by explicit information given at the start of learning, with the 
findings contradicting the notion of sequence learning being implicit in the sense of 
being independent from volitional control. On the other hand, substantial effort was 
needed to ensure that a general performance benefit (i.e. one affecting all 
subsequences) was gained from this knowledge, and transfer to similar tasks with the 
same relational structure was seemingly no stronger than that shown by participants 
not given the hint. This was despite the relational knowledge being abstract from the 
outset and therefore directly applicable to all subsequences and both transfer tasks. It 
seems that the benefits of explicit relational knowledge in the SRT task are very 
sensitive to the precise nature of the knowledge given, and rely on their applicability 
to the task at hand being made obvious. A fruitful endeavor for future research may 
be to characterize the conditions under which explicit knowledge will aid sequence 
learning, and look for qualitative differences in the particular subsequences that 
benefit from this explicit learning, rather than attempting to show that there are 
conditions under which explicit knowledge has no effect.   
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Chapter 3: The Prototype Distortion Task 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A key debate within the category learning literature pertains to whether some 
kinds of category structures can be learned implicitly and whether they recruit 
independent neural structures to explicit learning (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & 
Waldron, 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; 2011; Poldrack & Foerde, 2008; Smith & 
Grossman, 2008). One paradigm that is central to the debate is the A/not A prototype 
distortion task. In this task, participants are exposed to a set of exemplars that are 
generated by distorting a prototype, creating a category of stimuli that are physically 
similar to each other and whose average is the prototype. Learning about the category 
(A) is evident if participants can subsequently distinguish between novel exemplars 
and foils (make accurate A/not A judgements), or if the prototype is given the highest 
category endorsement on test (e.g. Posner & Keele, 1968). Alternatively, learning 
may be evident if, when judging novel exemplars of varying distortion levels, 
category endorsements or recognition judgements vary as a function of the similarity 
of the exemplars to the category prototype. This pattern of generalization, referred to 
as a prototypicality gradient, is present when the highest category endorsement or 
recognition is given for low distortions of the prototype, and lowest endorsement or 
recognition is given for high distortions of the prototype. These effects (collectively 
referred to as prototype effects) can all be taken as evidence that participants have 
learnt something about the similarity structure of the category. Learning in the 
prototype distortion task has been labeled as implicit due to seemingly intact 
categorization performance in amnesic patients, coupled with the incidental nature of 
the exposure conditions, each of which will now be reviewed.  
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3.1.1 Intact Category Learning in Memory-Impaired Patients 
Prototype effects are often regarded as implicit due to several striking studies 
that have reported intact categorization in memory-impaired patients (Bozoki, 
Grossman, & Smith, 2006; Kéri et al., 1999; 2001; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Reed, 
Squire, Patalano, Smith, & Jonides, 1999). The earliest study demonstrating this was 
by Knowlton and Squire (1993), who measured categorization and recognition 
performance in amnesic patients and healthy controls after being exposed to a series 
of dot patterns centered around a prototype (for a description of these stimuli, see 
Posner, Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967; Posner & Keele, 1968). Amnesic and control 
participants were asked to point to the dot closest to the middle of each stimulus and 
were then told to use any knowledge they had acquired in a subsequent categorization 
and recognition test. While control participants were able to discriminate between 
category exemplars that they had previously seen, and category exemplars that were 
novel on test, amnesic patients were impaired at discriminating between new and old 
exemplars and yet still displayed categorization performance equivalent to the normal 
controls (see also Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996, for a similar finding in 
probabilistic category learning; Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992, for a similar 
finding in artificial grammar learning; and Squire & Knowlton, 1995, for a related 
case study). A similar result was found by Kéri et al. (2001, see also Kéri et al., 1999) 
using the same dot pattern stimuli, with impaired explicit recognition but equivalent 
A/not A categorization performance in patients with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s 
Disease relative to a control group. These studies (see also Bozoki et al., 2006; Reed 
et al., 1999, for similar results with different stimuli) seem to provide evidence for a 
dissociation between categorization and recognition memory, suggesting the existence 
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of a separate system that can learn about categories in the absence of declarative 
knowledge. 
 However, there are some issues with these studies that limit their 
interpretation. The original demonstration by Knowlton and Squire (1993), while 
compelling, has been criticized on the basis of using stimuli that generate a ‘false’ 
prototype effect, where a prototypicality gradient can result even in the absence of 
exposure (Nosofsky, Denton, Zaki, Murphy-Knudsen, & Unverzagt, 2012; Palmeri & 
Flanery, 1999; Zaki & Nosofsky, 2004). These studies suggest that participants are 
relying on working memory and learning about the category on test in an explicit 
fashion (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). This learning-at-test effect may be especially 
pronounced if the test phase contains a large proportion of low distortion exemplars 
and foils which make the contrast between categorical and non-categorical stimuli 
obvious (Nosofsky et al., 2012), or if the test phase contains a large number of low 
distortion exemplars and prototype presentations which could highlight the 
prototypical features of the category (Zaki & Nosofsky, 2004). 
Another issue concerns the small sample sizes that these studies typically use 
(e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Reed et al., 1999). Since the dissociation requires a 
null effect, that performance on categorization is equivalent between amnesic and 
control groups, a small sample size means that there will be less power to detect a 
possible group difference if one exists. However, a large difference in recognition 
accuracy that naturally results from comparing memory-impaired participants with 
healthy participants might still be detected. Zaki (2004) confirmed this hypothesis in a 
meta-analysis on 12 studies that compared memory-impaired participants against 
controls on performance in various category learning tasks, a subset of which were 
prototype distortion tasks. Contrary to the suggestions of the studies mentioned above, 
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it was concluded that there was indeed an overall impairment in categorization 
performance in amnesic patients, consistent with the idea that prototype effects are 
dependent on declarative memory and underpinned by a single memory system.  
Assuming that the intact prototype effects in amnesic patients are in fact due 
to exposure, Nosofsky and colleagues (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Zaki, Nosofsky, 
Jessup, & Unverzagt, 2003) propose that the dissociations discussed above can still be 
explained using a single system of memory. Dissociation can be predicted even if a 
common ability (e.g. sensitivity in discriminating between distinct exemplars in 
memory) underlies both categorization and recognition tasks if we assume that this 
ability is deficient in amnesic patients, and that this affects recognition judgements 
more than categorization judgements. In other words, there is a parameter difference 
between tasks responsible for the observed dissociations whereby changes in memory 
sensitivity between groups results in a large impairment in recognition and a small 
impairment in categorization (see Berry, Henson, & Shanks, 2006 for a related single-
system view). This idea has been supported by the finding that after a delay of one 
week between exposure and test, participants’ ability to discriminate between new 
and old exemplars was impaired while categorization accuracy was unaffected 
(Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). This dissociation in healthy participants supports the idea 
that, even when assuming a single memory system, changes on one measure do not 
necessarily entail changes on the other. In summary, while the studies with amnesic 
populations are striking, the methodological issues concerning the stimuli and the 
ability of single-system theories to explain dissociations undermine the conclusion 
that learning in the prototype distortion task is implicit.  
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3.1.2 Emergence under Incidental Learning Conditions 
A less-cited reason that prototype effects can be considered implicit is that 
experiments demonstrating this effect have tended to expose participants to category 
exemplars under conditions where they are not encouraged to deliberately encode the 
stimuli. Most studies require participants to view the stimuli passively, such as 
thinking about their appearance (Bozoki, Grossman, & Smith, 2006), or perform a 
task that incidentally exposes them to the stimuli such as pointing to the dot closest to 
the center of each stimulus (Knowlton & Squire, 1993). It is often assumed that 
because these conditions do not explicitly mention the existence of a category that any 
learning that occurs must be incidental. However, these passive viewing situations do 
not preclude the possibility that participants are intentionally encoding the stimuli in 
some way during this initial phase assuming (correctly) that they will later be useful. 
Classifying these exposure conditions as incidental would be more convincing if it 
could be ensured that participants’ explicit cognitive functions were more fully 
engaged by performing a more difficult task during the exposure phase. A 
prototypicality gradient under these conditions would suggest that participants can 
learn about categories of stimuli that are physically similar to one another in an 
automatic or incidental fashion, satisfying one of the defining characteristics of 
implicit learning (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 1998; Frensch, 1998; Stadler & Frensch, 
1994). One way in which to achieve incidental exposure is suggested by another 
implicit learning paradigm, namely contextual cueing in visual search. 
In a contextual cueing task (Chun & Jiang, 1998), participants search through 
a configuration of distractors (usually rotated letter L’s) for a target (usually a rotated 
letter T). Unbeknownst to participants, certain configurations appear multiple times 
throughout the experiment. Participants show reliable reductions in reaction time in 
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response to repeatedly presented (old) configurations when compared to novel 
configurations during training, yet sometimes fail to explicitly recognize old 
configurations in a subsequent test, or accurately generate the correct location of the 
target when presented with the old distractor contexts (Chun & Jiang, 1998; 2003). 
While explicit knowledge is sometimes present (e.g. Smyth & Shanks, 2008), and 
several studies can be criticized on the basis of lacking sensitivity in the recognition 
test in comparison to the large number of trials involved in training (Vadillo, 
Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016), several researchers have concluded that learning via 
visual search in this paradigm is implicit and independent of explicit knowledge (e.g. 
Chun & Jiang, 2003; Goujon, Didierjean, & Thorpe, 2015). Contextual cueing effects 
may reflect cueing of the target location by the surrounding visual context (Chun & 
Jiang, 1998), or facilitation in detection or responding due to learning associations 
between distractors for repeated stimuli (Beesley, Vadillo, Pearson, & Shanks, 2015; 
Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2007). While there is ongoing debate about the 
mechanisms responsible for contextual cueing effects as well as the role of awareness, 
it is clear that the learning that occurs is incidental to the task being performed. Thus, 
employing a visual search task that requires a correct response should sufficiently 
engage participants such that any learning that does occur can be confidently deemed 
to be incidental, in contrast to a task such as pointing to the middle dot where it is 
usually difficult to assess whether participants are performing the task properly.  
Despite the theoretical significance of incidental learning conditions in 
establishing prototype effects as implicit, there have been few attempts to compare 
different methods of exposure in the prototype distortion task. One notable exception 
is a study by Gureckis, James, and Nosofsky (2011, see also Reber, Gitelman, Parrish, 
& Mesulam, 2003), who compared implicit and explicit learning conditions as well as 
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an intentional encoding strategy against an incidental encoding strategy in a 2x2 
between-subjects design. Participants were either aware (explicit group) or unaware 
(implicit group) of the existence of a category, and were either asked to study the 
stimulus as a configural whole (configural group) or imagine pointing to the center 
dot (dot group). At test, they found differential activation (comparing exemplars and 
foils) in the posterior occipital cortex as a function of encoding strategy (configural vs. 
dot). Meanwhile, telling participants about the existence of a category (implicit vs. 
explicit) had no consistent effect. They concluded that differential brain activation 
found in studies comparing implicit and explicit learning orientations (e.g. Reber et al., 
2003) were better explained through different encoding strategies, rather than the 
implicit status of the learner or awareness of impending tests.  
While this is an appropriate conclusion from Gureckis et al.’s (2011) results, it 
should be noted that all four groups produced an equivalent level of categorization 
accuracy (there were no significant main effects nor interactions), suggesting that 
while the encoding manipulation was successful in encouraging participants to adopt 
different strategies, there was no evidence that this made a difference to actual test 
performance. Thus, while their study suggests that participants were obeying 
instructions to perform the pointing task when asked to, the issues of whether 
intentional encoding conditions have an advantage over incidental encoding 
conditions, and whether other incidental encoding conditions are conducive to 
prototype effects, remain unresolved.  
 
3.1.3 General Aims and Methodology 
The aims of the current experiments were twofold. The first was to assess the 
implicit status of learning in the A/not A version of the prototype distortion task by 
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testing whether a prototypicality gradient could result when participants performed a 
visual search task with the category exemplars. Appropriating a visual search 
paradigm similar to that used in contextual cueing allows for this often-assumed 
implicit property of prototype effects to be tested in a novel way. The second aim was 
to directly compare two methods of exposure: intentional memorization of a set of 
prototype-centered stimuli for a subsequent memory test (Group Memorize), and a 
visual search task using the same stimuli (Group Search). This comparison is 
important since different studies use different methods of passive exposure, with the 
assumption that because participants are not informed about the existence of a 
category, then any learning that occurs must be incidental and in some sense 
equivalent across passive exposure conditions. Comparing a visual search group to a 
group who are given direct instructions to memorize the stimuli allows the best 
chance of detecting potential differences between incidental and intentional encoding 
conditions, if they exist.  
A novel aspect of the methodology in this chapter was that instead of 
measuring categorization and recognition in separate tests, a single continuous 
measure (familiarity ratings) was chosen to assess both. Learning about the category 
would thus be evident if participants show a generalization gradient (i.e. a 
prototypicality gradient), and recognition inferred if participants are able to 
discriminate between new and old test items at matched levels of distortion in their 
familiarity ratings. While this is a departure from the majority of studies on the 
prototype distortion task, it was motivated by the desire to test whether dissociations 
between generalization and recognition performance were still possible when the 
conditions of the two key comparisons were fully equated for possible transfer 
deficits caused by the change in context moving from exposure to test, as well as any 
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forgetting caused by delay or interference from testing itself. Using the same measure 
should reduce the amount of task-specific variance and might therefore result in 
similar group differences in generalization and recognition rather than a dissociation 
(see Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). 
For the following experiments two novel sets of stimuli were constructed to 
mimic the statistical properties of the dot patterns with the aim of minimizing 
potential learning-at-test effects. While the dot patterns are well-established in the 
prototype distortion literature in terms of their known statistical properties and ability 
to produce prototypicality gradients, testing a novel set of stimuli may provide insight 
into whether learning-at-test effects are primarily due to the demands of the task, or 
the dot patterns themselves. Experiment 1 produced similar generalization gradients 
between participants who received a categorization test and participants who received 
a familiarity test, justifying the use of familiarity ratings only for the subsequent 
experiments. Experiment 1 also compared generalization gradients between groups 
who were not exposed to the stimuli (but led to believe that they were) against groups 
who did observe the stimuli. The magnitude of any prototypicality gradients exhibited 
after no exposure would indicate the degree of learning-at-test effects, which would 
then serve as a point of comparison to determine whether participants in subsequent 
experiments learned anything during visual search (see Smith, 2008, for a discussion 
of this subtraction logic). Experiments 2 and 3 compared prototypicality gradients for 
new and old test stimuli in a subsequent familiarity test. Experiment 3 doubled the 
length of exposure from Experiment 2 and added an additional visual search group 
where the stimulus exposure terminated after the response was made to ensure that 
participants had no residual exposure time to study the stimulus.  
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3.2 Experiment 1 
 The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to test for any potential learning-at-test 
effects with the two novel stimulus sets to use as a basis for comparison for the 
subsequent experiments. Previous studies have demonstrated that the dot pattern 
stimuli that are typically used generate ‘false’ prototype effects in normal participants 
who do not see the stimuli prior to the test phase (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999; Zaki & 
Nosofsky, 2004). Participants in these studies undergo a mock-subliminal procedure, 
where they are led to believe that stimuli are being presented to them subliminally but 
in fact never see any stimuli. Despite the stimuli being novel on test, they 
subsequently show a prototypicality gradient in their categorization judgements when 
presented with high and low distortion exemplars. One way that participants can show 
false prototype effects is by learning about the category during the test phase, since 
this usually involves informing participants about the existence of a category, and 
then exposing them to more category exemplars, as well as the prototype. The degree 
of learning-at-test effects is especially pronounced if the test phase were to present a 
large number of low-distortion exemplars and foils on test, highlighting the contrast 
between categorical and non-categorical stimuli (Nosofsky et al., 2012), or when the 
prototype and low-distortion exemplars are presented multiple times during test which 
would result in high repetition of prototypical features (Zaki & Nosofsky, 2004). For 
this reason, to minimize potential learning-at-test effects new and old exemplars were 
tested at matched levels of distortion with no foils, and the mock-subliminal 
procedure was used to test whether participants produced prototypicality gradients in 
the absence of exposure.  
A potential explanation for the observed dissociations in amnesic patients 
discussed above is that categorization and recognition tests have different task-
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specific variance (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). Usually, categorization accuracy is 
assessed by asking participants to make an A/not A category endorsement, and 
recognition is assessed by asking participants to make an old/new judgement about 
whether they have seen a particular stimulus before. Participants may have different 
response thresholds for categorization and recognition judgments, making an 
equivalent comparison between the two difficult. For example, participants may be 
more willing to classify a test stimulus as part of the seen category than to say that 
they recognize the stimulus based on the same level of uncertainty, or adopt a more 
stringent criterion for endorsing recognition since an exact match is required 
(Nosofsky, Little, & James, 2012). An equivalent comparison between recognition 
and categorization tasks is made more difficult when we consider that previous 
studies have typically measured the prototype effect using categorization judgements, 
and separately measured recognition in a completely different phase using different 
stimuli (e.g. Bozoki et al., 2006; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Reber & Squire, 1999). 
For this reason, it was important to test whether a dissociation could still occur when 
the stimuli were equated between groups, and also the test measure. Thus another aim 
of Experiment 1 was to assess category learning (as indexed by prototypicality 
gradients) and recognition (as indexed by discrimination between new and old 
exemplars) using both categorization and familiarity tests and to show that they were 
equivalent between test measures.  
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3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Ninety-two (M age = 19.97, SD = 3.38, 70 female) University of Sydney 
students participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit16. 
Participants were randomly allocated to either a mock ‘subliminal’ (NoEx) or passive 
exposure (Ex) phase, and either a familiarity (Fam) or categorization (Cat) test phase 
(n = 23 in each of the four groups).  
 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus 
All experiments were programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997) and run on Apple Mac Mini desktop computers connected to 17 
inch CRT monitors, refreshed at a rate of 85 Hz. A standard Apple keyboard and 
mouse were used, and testing was conducted in individual cubicles in groups of up to 
five. The apparatus was the same for all subsequent experiments. 
 
3.2.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli were constructed to be complex and have multiple dimensions so 
that focus on a particular feature or an attempt to derive a verbalizable rule to describe 
the category would be difficult and less useful than memorizing the whole pattern. 
There were two sets of stimuli constructed for these experiments, each containing 10 
features (circles or lines). For the circle stimuli, there were 10 colored circles on a 600 
x 600 pixel black square. Each circle had the following variable properties: hue 
(saturation and brightness were held constant at their maximum respective values), 
location (x and y coordinates) within the black square, line thickness, and size (see 
                                                
16 The target sample sizes for this, and subsequent experiments was 25 per group. This was based on 
pilot experiments conducted to test the general paradigm. The final sample size was affected by 
availability of participants. 
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Figure 3.1). For the line stimuli, there were 10 white lines (5 oriented horizontally and 
5 vertically) on a black square of the same size (see Figure 3.1). Each line was 
defined by its starting and ending location on the border of the square, as well as line 
thickness. Maximum and minimum values were chosen for each property to constrain 
the possible exemplars that could be created and to avoid placing the circles and lines 
outside the stimulus boundary (see Table 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. Examples of exemplars from each stimulus set (upper panels: circle 
stimuli; lower panels: line stimuli) used throughout all experiments. From left to right: 
prototype (0 distortion), a low distortion exemplar (0.1 distortion), a medium 
distortion exemplar (0.5 distortion), and a high distortion exemplar (1.0 distortion). 
 
 
Table 3.1. Minimum and maximum values and multiplier for each stimulus feature 
dimension.  
Dimension Min Value Max Value Multiplier Dist to prototype 
Circle location (x) 60 pixels 540 pixels 40	 20	
Circle location (y) 
Circle hue 
Circle radius 
60 pixels	
None	
5 pixels	
540 pixels	
None	
50 pixels	
40	
.05	
10	
20	
.1	
5	
Line start (x) 
Line start (y) 
Line end (x) 
Line end (y) 
50	
50	
50	
50	
550	
550	
550	
550	
50	
50	
50	
50	
20	
20	
20	
20	
Note. Location values could range from 0 to 600, and the saturation and brightness were always set at 1 
and 255 respectively. For vertical lines, only the x values were varied (y values were held constant at 0 
and 600) and for horizontal lines, only the y values were varied (x values were held constant at 0 and 
600). Hue values wrapped around 0-1 since the scale was continuous. For each dimension of each 
feature, if the average of the exposed exemplars was not within the specified maximum distance to the 
prototype, all exemplar values were created again until this condition was met. 
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 All variable feature properties listed above were varied from exemplar to 
exemplar except for line thickness, which was held constant at 3 pixels in both 
stimulus sets. Arbitrary distortion levels were chosen ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 in 
increments of 0.1, with the smaller levels of distortion indicating exemplars that were 
similar to the prototype and higher levels indicating category exemplars that were 
dissimilar to the prototype. While the distortion level numbers are arbitrary, they 
represent a ratio scale with, for example, a distortion level of 0.1 being 10% of the 
distortion level of 1.0. Appropriate dimension multipliers were chosen for each 
feature dimension which would create a dissimilar stimulus when multiplied by the 
higher distortion levels but a highly similar stimulus when multiplied by the lowest 
distortion level (see Figure 3.1 for examples).  
A different circle and line prototype stimulus was randomly generated 
according to a seed number, which was different for each participant number. Thus, 
participants with the same participant number were exposed to exactly the same 
stimuli throughout the experiment. Each category exemplar was created by distorting 
the relevant prototype stimulus on a feature-by-feature basis.  This meant that the 
feature multiplier (see Table 3.1) was multiplied by the distortion level (e.g. 0.1) for 
each of the 10 features (circles or lines) separately. The direction of change (positive 
or negative) was determined randomly and independently for each dimension of each 
feature. For example, to create a circle exemplar at 0.1 distortion, the size multiplier 
was multiplied by 0.1, and then either added or subtracted (randomly chosen for each 
feature) to the prototype values of the first circle, with this process repeating for the 
remaining circles, and this process repeating again for each of the circle features 
(location, hue etc.). If any feature values extended beyond the minimum or maximum 
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values they were simply changed to either the minimum or maximum value they 
crossed (see Table 3.1).  
Twenty circle exemplars and twenty line exemplars were shown during the 
initial exposure phase (2 unique exemplars at each of 10 levels of distortion for each 
set). A further twenty novel circle exemplars and twenty novel line exemplars were 
also shown during the test phase (again with 2 exemplars at each level of distortion). 
To ensure that participants could not rely on occasional salient features (e.g. 
clustering of circles in a fashion that leads to occlusion by overlapping circles) within 
the stimulus to aid memory, additional checks were implemented to ensure that there 
would be minimal overlap between the circles (at least 50 pixels between the center of 
all circles). If this check failed then all circle locations were randomized until this 
condition had been met. Note that overlap and occlusion was a regular feature of the 
line patterns and thus this check was not implemented for these stimuli since it would 
be difficult to use a specific conjunction to aid memory for a specific stimulus. In 
addition, to ensure that the average of the exposed exemplars was indeed the 
prototype, the average value of the 20 exemplars was computed for each feature 
dimension (e.g. x coordinate, size, starting position of lines etc.). If the average was 
not within a pre-determined maximum distance from the prototype, all stimulus 
values were randomized again until they were sufficiently close (see Table 3.1 for the 
maximum distance allowed for each feature dimension). 
 
3.2.1.4 Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with exposure (exposure 
vs. no exposure) and test (categorization vs. familiarity) as the independent variables. 
Participants allocated to the exposure phase saw 20 unique exemplars from each of 
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the circle and line categories 4 times each, with presentation randomized within each 
block of 40 trials (4 blocks, 160 trials in total). Participants allocated to the subliminal 
exposure phase were told that they would be presented with some subliminal stimuli, 
which would be quickly masked by a black square. They were told that because the 
presentation was so brief, all they might see is the screen flash before the mask 
covered the stimulus. In the (sham) exposure phase that followed, no stimuli were 
presented, but on each trial, the screen would flash from white to black and after 
10msecs return to white, along with the black stimulus background (i.e. the ‘mask’) 
presented for the same time (2 seconds) as in the actual exposure phase. In the two 
exposure groups, the stimuli appeared on screen for 2 seconds before disappearing. 
The inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) was a blank white screen, and was 2 seconds in both 
exposure conditions.  
After the exposure phase participants either completed a familiarity or 
categorization test. Participants allocated to the familiarity test were told that they 
would be presented with more stimuli, where some of the stimuli would be familiar 
(i.e. they had seen them before in the first phase) and others novel (they had not seen 
them in the first phase). They were then asked to rate their level of familiarity towards 
84 new exemplars (for each category: the prototype presented twice, 20 old and 20 
new exemplars) using a visual analogue scale that ranged from “Definitely NOT 
familiar” to “Definitely familiar”. If participants were allocated to the categorization 
test, they were told that all of the stimuli they had seen formed part of a category and 
that they would be presented with more stimuli that may or may not be part of the 
same category. For each stimulus, participants were asked “Is this stimulus part of the 
circle category you saw before?” or “Is this stimulus part of the line category you saw 
before?” It was made clear that participants should only consider the circle category 
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when presented with a circle stimulus and similarly for the line category. Participants 
made their rating on a visual analogue scale that ranged from “Definitely NO” to 
Definitely YES”.  
In both tests each stimulus was presented for 2 seconds and then disappeared. 
After 500msecs a rating scale would appear along with the appropriate test question. 
Participants made their rating by clicking a point on the scale with the mouse and had 
unlimited time to make and change their rating. It was made clear that all questions 
referred to stimuli they had seen in the first part of the experiment. The midpoint of 
the scale and both endpoints were marked with ticks, and all ratings were transformed 
to range from 0-100. The familiarity and categorization tests ran the same way no 
matter what exposure phase participants were allocated to. For this, and all 
subsequent experiments, the same set of seed numbers for the random number 
generator were used in each group, such that the stimuli seen and tested were 
randomized but matched between groups of participants. This also meant that old and 
new test stimuli were dummy coded for the no-exposure groups. There was no 
feedback during the test phase. 
 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 For all subsequent analyses Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to p-values are 
reported for violations of sphericity, and the results reported combine both circle and 
line stimulus sets17. To analyze whether the prototype effect, and recognition, were 
dependent on exposure and varied with test question, a 2 (exposure group: exposure 
vs. no exposure) x 2 (test group: categorization vs. familiarity) x (2) (novelty: new vs. 
old) x (10) (distortion level) ANOVA was performed on the exemplar ratings 
                                                
17 Analyses on the familiarity ratings were also performed on the circle and line stimulus sets 
separately, and produced similar results for the critical findings. Instances where the results differed 
between stimulus sets have been noted. 
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(excluding the prototype) in the test phase. Figure 3.2 shows the mean ratings for the 
test stimuli in each of the four groups.  
 
Figure 3.2. Category endorsement (upper panels) and familiarity ratings (lower 
panels) for new and old test stimuli for groups of participants who were either 
exposed to the stimuli (left panels) or were not exposed to the stimuli (right panels) in 
Experiment 1.  
 
There was a main effect of novelty, F(1,88) = 18.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .176, 
which did not interact with test group, F < 1, indicating that overall, participants rated 
old test stimuli higher on category endorsement and familiarity than new test stimuli. 
Unsurprisingly, novelty interacted with exposure group, F(1,88) = 17.97, p < .001, ηp2 
= .170, such that participants who had been exposed to the exemplars could 
discriminate between new and old test items (Figure 3.2, left panels), but participants 
who had not seen the stimuli could not (Figure 3.2, right panels). This was confirmed 
in a set of separate analyses where there were significantly higher familiarity ratings, 
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F(1,22) = 10.18, p = .004, ηp2 = .316, and category endorsements, F(1,22) = 15.24, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .409, for old exemplars in the two exposure groups, and no differences 
between new and old exemplars in the two no-exposure groups, largest F < 1.  
There was a significant main effect and linear trend for distortion level, 
smallest F(9,792) = 45.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .342, since overall ratings declined as the 
level of distortion increased, indicating the presence of a prototypicality gradient. The 
main effect and linear trend of distortion interacted with exposure group, smallest 
F(9,792) = 13.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .131, but not test group, largest F(9,792) = 1.93, p 
= .090, ηp2 = .021, nor novelty, largest F(1,88) = 3.58, p = .062, ηp2 = .039. Thus it 
appears that the prototypicality gradient was stronger (i.e. there was a steeper 
gradient) when participants were exposed to the stimuli, but did not vary according to 
the type of test conducted, nor between new and old exemplars.  
None of the 3-way interactions nor the 4-way interaction were significant, 
largest F(9,792) = 1.79, p = .079, ηp2 = .020. There was a significant main effect of 
exposure group, F(1,88) = 20.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .188, and test group, F(1,88) = 5.13, 
p = .026, ηp2 = .055, since overall ratings were higher for participants who had been 
exposed to the exemplars, and ratings for the categorization test were generally higher 
than for the familiarity test. This may have been due to the fact that a few participants 
in the no-exposure group rated all test stimuli as 0 on familiarity (Definitely not 
familiar), while an equivalent number of participants in the categorization test rated 
all stimuli as 50, indicating a noncommittal response. Ratings for the category 
prototype were significantly higher for the exposure groups than no-exposure groups, 
F(1,88) = 35.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .287, but did not differ according to test, F(1,88) = 
2.22, p = .140, ηp2 = 025. There was also no significant interaction between exposure 
group and test group, F < 1.  
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In summary, it appears that overall, participants were able to discriminate 
between new and old exemplars, and produce prototypicality gradients, and these 
effects depended on whether participants underwent the mock-subliminal or exposure 
phase, while there seemed to be no effect of test question. To further explore what 
participants in the no-exposure groups learnt and whether equivalent prototypicality 
gradients were obtained for categorization and recognition tests, the two no-exposure 
groups were analyzed separately to the two exposure groups in two 2 (test group: 
categorization vs. familiarity) x (2) (novelty) x (10) (distortion level) ANOVAs. 
 
3.2.2.1 Exposure Groups 
For the two groups who were exposed to the exemplars (Ex-Fam and Ex-Cat), 
there was a significant main effect of novelty, F(1,44) = 25.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .363, 
and significant main effect and linear trend for distortion level, smallest F(9,396) = 
46.00 p < .001, ηp2 = .511. None of these effects interacted with test group, largest 
F(9,396) = 1.53, p = .179, ηp2 = .033, and there was no main effect of test group, F < 
1, and no 3-way interaction, F < 1. There was, however, a significant interaction 
between novelty and distortion, F(9,396) = 2.14, p = .042, ηp2 = .046, but since 
novelty did not interact with the linear trend for distortion, F(1,44) = 1.89, p = .176, 
ηp2 = .041, this result is difficult to interpret. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that 
equivalent prototypicality gradients were found for both familiarity and categorization 
tests, and participants were equally able to discriminate between new and old 
exemplars, giving higher familiarity ratings and category endorsements to old 
exemplars (Figure 3.2, left panels). The high level of similarity in prototypicality 
gradients for the categorization and familiarity tests suggests that using familiarity 
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ratings to assess the prototypicality gradient is appropriate for the subsequent 
experiments.  
 
3.2.2.2 No-Exposure Groups 
A similar analysis was performed on the ratings for the two no-exposure 
groups. There was a significant main effect and linear trend for distortion level, 
smallest F(9,396) = 6.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .133, and a significant main effect of test 
group, F(1,44) = 5.34, p = .026, ηp2 = .108.  Importantly, the linear trend for distortion 
did not interact with test group, F(1,44) = 2.90, p = .095, ηp2 = .062. To quantify the 
magnitude of this important null result, as suggested by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, and Iverson (2009), a Bayes Factor (BF) was calculated from the results of a 
t-test using a JZS prior for the alternative hypothesis, which assumes a Cauchy 
distribution of effect sizes. This distribution assumes a high likelihood of smaller 
effect sizes but a larger likelihood of medium-to-large effect sizes than a normal 
distribution. A BF01 of 3 is usually considered the threshold for concluding moderate 
evidence in favor of the null over the alternative hypothesis (that the means are 
different). Using this technique, a BF of 4.02 in favor of the null was obtained, 
indicating moderate evidence that similar prototypicality gradients were obtained 
between categorization and familiarity tests.  
All other main effects and interactions were not significant, largest F(9,396) = 
1.99, p = .107, ηp2 = .043. It appears that the mock subliminal procedure produced a 
false prototypicality gradient in familiarity ratings and category endorsement, similar 
to previous studies (e.g. Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). Since an effort was made to ensure 
that no intrinsic features within the stimuli would enable participants to discriminate 
between low and high distortion exemplars, the most likely explanation was that 
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participants were able to learn about the category on test18. Participants may have 
either deliberately based their judgements on stimuli seen during the test phase in 
order to have some basis for varying their responses, or found it difficult to discount 
the stimuli they had seen throughout the test phase. 
The mock subliminal procedure appears to have been quite convincing. When 
asked at the end of the experiment, participants allocated to the categorization test 
claimed to have seen, on average, 12.04% of the stimuli (SD = 23.93, min = 0, max = 
99.2) during the mock subliminal phase, and participants allocated to the familiarity 
test claimed to have seen 15.00% of the stimuli on average (SD = 29.87, min = 0, max 
= 99.60). While it is possible that a small number of participants misinterpreted the 
question, the manipulation check indicates that on the whole, participants were 
convinced that stimuli had been presented to them in the first phase and this should 
have provided sufficient motivation to make a serious attempt at judging the stimuli 
presented in the test phase.  
In summary, the categorization and familiarity tests produced very similar 
prototypicality gradients and differences between ratings for old and new exemplars. 
Thus, the following experiments used familiarity ratings only to assess both of these 
effects. The familiarity test was chosen over the categorization test to more closely 
approximate other implicit learning paradigms that use recognition to assess explicit 
awareness of the learned material, and because the test was directly related to the 
instructions given to the Memorize group (see Appendix C). Using a familiarity test 
means that any difference in ratings between new and old stimuli is directly 
interpretable as recognition, allowing a test of whether it is possible to obtain a 
                                                
18 The false prototypicality gradient was present in the first quarter, and increased from the first to the 
second quarter when collapsed over groups, F > 10. Therefore, learning-at-test effects appeared quite 
early. 
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prototypicality gradient in the absence of recognition (as demonstrated in amnesic 
patients, e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993).  
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 compared prototypicality gradients in familiarity ratings 
between intentional exposure conditions where participants were told to memorize a 
set of stimuli for a subsequent test (Group Memorize), and incidental exposure 
conditions where participants performed a visual search task using the same stimuli 
(Group Search). Participants were required to search for a singleton target, which was 
defined by line width (see Figure 3.3 for examples). To ensure that participants were 
attending to the stimuli in the Search group, they were required to respond according 
to the identity of the line width of the singleton (i.e. was the ‘odd one out’ thicker or 
thinner than the others?).  
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Figure 3.3. Examples of circle and line stimuli seen during the visual search task. 
Stimuli on the left contain a circle/line randomly chosen to have a thinner line width, 
stimuli on the right contain a circle/line randomly chosen to have a thicker line width. 
Participants responded according to the identity of the singleton (whether it was 
thicker or thinner).  
 
 
Experiment 2 tested whether the prototypicality gradient would result under 
more cognitively engaging incidental exposure conditions. If the reason why 
prototypicality gradients were obtained in healthy participants in previous studies was 
because of an opportunity for explicit encoding, then we may not expect to see any 
evidence of learning using a visual search task. Further, comparing Group Search to 
Group Memorize tests whether altering the exposure conditions makes any difference 
to the prototypicality gradient and ability to discriminate between new and old 
exemplars. As mentioned previously, the choice of an intentional memorization group 
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was to maximize any potential group differences that may exist since the available 
evidence (Gureckis, James, & Nosofsky, 2011) suggests that manipulating encoding 
strategies in the prototype distortion task does not lead to differences in test 
performance.   
 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Fifty participants (40 female, M age = 19.58, SD = 5.14) took part in 
Experiment 2 in exchange for partial course credit. All participants were first year 
Psychology students at the University of Sydney. Participants were randomly 
allocated to group Memorize (n = 25) or group Search (n = 25). 
 
3.3.1.2 Procedure 
 The stimuli during exposure and test were generated in the same way as in 
Experiment 1.  
 Exposure Phase. If participants were allocated to the Search group, the task 
was framed as a visual cognition task (see Appendix C for exact instructions). Their 
task was to search for an ‘odd one out’ on each trial, which was defined using line 
thickness for both the circle and line stimuli. The singleton was created by either 
adding or subtracting from the line width of a randomly chosen feature in each 
stimulus, and participants had to respond by saying whether the odd one out was 
thicker or thinner than the other circles/lines by pressing either A (thicker) or L 
(thinner) on the keyboard as quickly as possible (see Figure 3.3 for examples of the 
singleton). Participants were also given a sheet with a visual example using squares 
where one square was thicker and another was thinner to refer to. It was verbally 
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emphasized that it did not matter where the odd one out was located within the 
stimulus, and only the identity of the odd one out mattered for their response. There 
was no feedback given as to the accuracy of each response to equate the exposure 
conditions between groups as much as possible. However, participants were given 
feedback (‘Too slow’) if they failed to respond in the given timeframe (3 seconds 
from stimulus onset) on each trial, and they were told that they could still respond 
after the stimulus had disappeared. If participants were allocated to the Memorize 
group, they were told to memorize the stimuli as a whole for a subsequent memory 
test, and the task was framed as a visual memorization task (see Appendix C for exact 
instructions). Note that since participants in the Memorize group would also see a 
singleton on each trial, the instructions explicitly discouraged participants from 
attending to specific features. Participants in both groups saw each stimulus for 2 
seconds, after which there was a blank ISI of 2 seconds. As in Experiment 1, within 
each stimulus set there were 4 repetitions of each of the 20 unique exemplars that 
amounted to 160 trials in total. The identity of the singleton was not consistent across 
the repeat presentations of each exemplar such that its location could not be predicted. 
The entire exposure phase was presented in one continuous block with no breaks.   
 Familiarity Ratings Test. The test phase was the same as for the Familiarity 
condition in Experiment 1 except that participants in the Search group were warned 
that the “odd one out” would no longer be present and that they should not look for it 
to aid their judgements. Participants in the Memorize group were not given any 
instructions about the ‘odd one out’ since participants’ responses on a post-
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experimental questionnaire in a pilot experiment did not suggest that participants 
noticed the singleton during exposure19. 
 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 Overall, participants were quite good at the visual search task, performing at 
88.8% accuracy (SD = 6.82, min = 75.0%, max = 99.4%). The test data were analyzed 
in the same way as in Experiment 1, with the presence of a prototypicality gradient 
inferred by the presence of a significant linear trend in the familiarity ratings, and 
recognition evident if the familiarity ratings for old exemplars were significantly 
higher than that for new exemplars. There was a significant main effect and linear 
trend for distortion, smallest F(9,432) = 45.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .488, indicating an 
overall prototypicality gradient (see Figure 3.4). The main effect and linear trend of 
distortion both interacted with group, smallest F(9,432) = 8.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .149, 
and novelty, smallest F(9,432) = 2.05, p = .045, ηp2 = .041. This was due to the 
steeper overall generalization gradient in the Memorize group than the Search group, 
and also the steeper overall gradient for new exemplars than old exemplars (see 
Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4. Familiarity ratings in the Memorize and Search groups for new and old 
test stimuli in Experiment 2.  
                                                
19 In a pilot experiment, 1 participant out of 14 in the Memorize group reported noticing a singleton in 
response to the question “Did you notice anything peculiar about the stimuli?” 
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 There was an overall main effect of novelty, with significantly higher ratings 
for old over new exemplars, F(1,48) = 25.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .349, but no significant 
interaction with group, F(1,48) = 3.21, p = .079, ηp2 = .063. Analyses within each 
group revealed that both groups were able to distinguish between new and old 
exemplars in their familiarity ratings, smallest F(1,24) = 5.95, p = .022, ηp2 = .199. 
The three-way interaction between group, novelty and distortion level was not 
significant, F < 1, and the Memorize group also rated the prototype as significantly 
more familiar than the Search group, F(1,48) = 12.47, p = .001, η2 = .206. The 
Memorize group also produced higher overall familiarity ratings than the Search 
group, F(1,48) = 5.47, p = .024, ηp2 = .102. 
It appears that memorizing the stimuli had a more reliable effect on improving 
the prototypicality gradient (i.e. increased the slope of the generalization gradient) 
than improving recognition. However, because a visual analogue scale was used, the 
range that participants used to make their familiarity ratings could have affected the 
strength of their prototypicality gradient. To illustrate this point, consider a participant 
from the Memorize group and a participant from the Search group who have 
equivalent category knowledge. It is possible that despite both participants showing a 
significant prototypicality gradient, a participant who had been intentionally 
memorizing the stimuli may rate low distortion exemplars higher on familiarity, and 
high distortion exemplars lower on familiarity, than their counterpart in the Search 
group due to higher confidence in their knowledge and therefore greater willingness 
to use the full range of the scale. The two participants would show the same degree of 
differentiation between low and high distortion exemplars, but the slope of their 
generalization gradient would differ. Thus, to test whether the two groups differed on 
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their sensitivity in distinguishing high and low distortion exemplars, a signal detection 
analysis was conducted.  
 
3.3.2.1 Signal Detection Analysis 
The distribution of responses for each participant was split into sextiles, 
creating five thresholds. For the prototypicality index, for each threshold, higher 
ratings for low distortion exemplars (distortion level <= 0.5) counted as a hit, whereas 
higher ratings for high distortion exemplars (distortion level >= 0.6) counted as a false 
alarm (old and new exemplars were collapsed). Figure 3.5 shows the receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve for this analysis, and the resulting sensitivity 
index (dA) calculated from the linear transformation of the curve (see Simpson & 
Fitter, 1973). The index of sensitivity in discriminating between high and low 
distortion exemplars was .859 (SD = .436) in the Memorize group, and .419 (SD 
= .369) in the Search group, with significantly higher sensitivity in the Memorize 
group, F(1,48) = 14.84, p < .001, η2 = .236.  
A similar analysis was performed (counting higher ratings for old stimuli as 
hits, and higher ratings for new stimuli as false alarms, levels) on discrimination 
between new and old exemplars, collapsing over all distortion levels (see Figure 3.5). 
The Memorize group (dA = .232, SD = .239) was not found to show significantly 
better recognition than the Search group (dA = .096, SD = .269), F(1,48) = 3.55, p 
= .065, η2 = .069. The results of the signal detection analysis confirm the results 
reported above, and suggest that memorization enhances the prototypicality gradient 
but had no or at least much weaker impact on ability to discriminate between new and 
old exemplars. 
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Figure 3.5. Results from the signal detection analysis in Experiment 2. Upper panels 
show ROC curves for discrimination between new and old exemplars (recognition, 
top left) and discrimination between low and high distortion level exemplars 
(category learning, top right), with the dotted diagonal line indicating zero sensitivity. 
Lower panels show dA (sensitivity) measures for recognition (bottom left) and 
category learning (bottom right) calculated from a linear transformation of the ROC 
curve, with error bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3.2.2 Comparison to Experiment 1 
To test whether the prototypicality gradient observed in the Search group was 
significantly larger than would be expected on the basis of learning at test alone, the 
Search group was compared to the NoEx-Fam group in Experiment 1. Although this 
is a between-experiment comparison, the two experiments were run at the same time 
on the same participant pool. There were significantly higher familiarity ratings 
overall in the Search group, F(1,46) = 7.51, p = .009, ηp2 = .140, significantly higher 
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familiarity ratings overall for old exemplars20, F(1,46) = 4.38, p = .042, ηp2 = .087, 
and a significant interaction between novelty and group21, F(1,46) = 4.23, p = .045, 
ηp2 = .084, since only participants in the Search group were able to discriminate 
between new and old exemplars (see Figure 3.6a). Importantly, while the main effect 
and linear trend for distortion level was significant, smallest F(9,414) = 15.19, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .248, neither interacted with group, largest F < 1. There was a significant 
interaction between novelty and the linear trend in distortion, F(1,46) = 5.24, p = .027, 
ηp2 = .102, such that the slope of the generalization gradient was steeper for new 
exemplars. All other interactions were not significant, largest F(9,414) = 1.91, p 
= .075, ηp2 =  .040. There was also no difference in sensitivity in detecting low and 
high distortion exemplars between the Search group (dA = .419, SD = 369) and the 
no-exposure group from Experiment 1 (dA = .528, SD = 1.26), F < 1 (see b).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Familiarity ratings for new and old test stimuli in group NoEx-Fam in 
Experiment 1 and group Search in Experiment 2 (a). dA measures for group NoEx-
Fam and group Search (b).  
 
                                                
20 This analysis was significant for the circle stimuli only but did not differ according to stimulus set, F 
< 1. 
21 This analysis was significant for the circle stimuli only, but there was no interaction with stimulus 
set, F(1,46) = 2.492, p = .121, ηp2 = .051. 
  
130 
To provide stronger evidence for the equivalence of the prototypicality 
gradients between the Search group and the No-Ex-Fam group in Experiment 1, a 
Bayes Factor (BF) test was conducted comparing the slopes and sensitivity index 
between the two groups. Using the technique suggested by Rouder et al. (2009), a 
Bayes Factor of 4.1 was found when comparing the slopes, and a Bayes Factor of 4.3 
when comparing the sensitivity index (dA). Thus, the null hypothesis was over 4 times 
more likely than the alternative, suggesting that the magnitude of the prototypicality 
gradients was the same for participants who searched through the stimuli, and 
participants who produced a false prototypicality gradient after no exposure to the 
stimuli.  
While it is possible that the prototypicality gradient in the Search group in 
Experiment 2 resulted for different reasons than in the mock-subliminal condition in 
Experiment 1, the magnitude of the prototypicality gradient (ignoring the overall 
higher ratings in Experiment 2) is indistinguishable from the prototypicality gradient 
that emerges in the absence of any exposure, and therefore could be entirely attributed 
to learning-at-test effects. Nevertheless, it is possible that rather than there being a 
qualitative difference between exposure conditions, the difference might be 
quantitative, and the Search group simply learned less about the stimuli than the 
Memorize group. Therefore Experiment 3 doubled the number of trials in the 
exposure phase to increase the opportunity for incidental category learning.  
Interestingly, participants were still able to discriminate between new and old 
exemplars even after incidental exposure to the stimuli through visual search. One 
potential explanation is that the visual search task was too easy and participants were 
able to encode the stimuli in an explicit way during the exposure phase. In addition to 
the high levels of accuracy, participants took, on average, 1.47 seconds to respond 
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(SD = 0.188, min = 1.16, max = 1.85) in the visual search task, meaning that they 
could have been using the residual exposure time to study the stimulus. Accordingly, 
Experiment 3 aimed to replicate Experiment 2 with double the number of exposure 
trials and ensure that any effects obtained in the Search group were actually incidental, 
by adding an additional group where the stimulus disappeared as soon as a response 
was made in the visual search task.  
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 2 where the length of the 
exposure phase was doubled. Since the prototypicality gradients in Experiment 2 in 
the Search group were found to be no different to those displayed after no exposure in 
Experiment 1, increasing exposure to the stimuli may also increase the magnitude of 
the prototypicality gradient, if it can indeed result from incidental learning conditions. 
Furthermore, although Experiment 2 found no significant difference between 
Memorize and Search groups in terms of their ability to distinguish new from old 
exemplars, small numerical differences in the predicted direction were apparent (e.g. 
in Figure 3.5, bottom left panel). Thus differential recognition between groups may 
become clearer with greater exposure to the exemplars.  
Experiment 3 also sought stronger evidence that learning in the Search group 
was actually due to incidental exposure conditions. Because it was necessary to 
equate the exposure time per trial between the Search and Memorize groups, it is 
possible that participants in the Search group were not searching through the stimulus 
for the entirety of the 2 sec exposure duration. In Experiment 3, a second Search 
group was added (Search-Terminate) where the stimulus exposure terminated after a 
response was made, ensuring that participants would only be exposed to the stimuli 
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while searching for and responding to the target. While the total exposure time 
between the two Search groups would not be equated, a comparison between the two 
groups would determine whether the residual post-response time makes any 
difference to test performance.  
 
3.4.1. Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Fifty-seven University of Sydney first-year psychology students (M age = 
19.61, SD = 3.06, 38 female) participated in this experiment in exchange for partial 
course credit. Participants were randomly allocated to the Memorize group (n = 20), 
Search group (same as the Search group from Experiment 2, n = 19) or Search-
Terminate group (n = 18). 
 
3.4.1.2 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 except for the following changes. 
The number of trials in the exposure phase was doubled to 320 trials (8 presentations 
of each individual exemplar, for both circle and line stimulus sets). Participants in the 
Search-Terminate group were given identical instructions to the Search group except 
they were told that the stimulus would disappear once their response was made. If a 
response was not made within 2 seconds, then the stimulus disappeared regardless. 
Since the total trial time remained the same between the two Search groups (4 
seconds), the blank ISI could range from 2-4 seconds and depended on how long 
participants took on each trial to make a response. As in the previous experiments, the 
test phase consisted of 84 trials that included the 20 old exemplars, 20 new exemplars, 
and the prototype presented twice for each stimulus set.  
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3.4.2 Results and Discussion 
 After excluding one participant from group Search for poor performance 
(45.0% accuracy), the average accuracy in group Search was 92.3% (SD = 5.06, min 
= 79.4, max = 94.7), which was significantly higher than in group Search-Terminate 
(M = 83.9%, SD = 8.82, min = 61.2, max = 94.7), t(34) = 3.51, p = .001, SED = .024. 
The average reaction time (RT) in the visual search task in group Search was 1.42 
seconds (SD = .227, min = 0.89, max = 1.75), which was significantly slower than in 
group Search-Terminate, (M = 1.25 seconds, SD = .153, min = 0.91, max = 1.54), 
t(34) = 2.55, p = .016, SED = .064. Thus it appears that making the stimulus disappear 
after participants responded resulted in poorer accuracy but faster RTs.  
 
3.4.2.1 Memorize vs. Search 
 Since there were three groups in Experiment 3, two separate ANOVAs were 
run in a similar manner to Experiment 2, one comparing the Memorize group to the 
two Search groups, and another comparing the two Search groups to each other.  For 
the comparison between group Memorize against the two Search groups, there was a 
significant main effect of novelty22, F(1,54) = 33.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .382, which did 
not interact with group, F < 1. This indicates that there was an overall ability to 
discriminate between new and old exemplars that did not vary according to exposure 
condition, similar to Experiment 2 (see Figure 3.7). There was an overall main effect 
and linear trend for distortion, smallest F(9,486) = 42.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .440, but 
neither interacted with novelty, largest F < 1, suggesting an overall prototypicality 
gradient that was equivalent for new and old exemplars. Critically, the linear trend for 
distortion interacted with group, F(1,54) = 5.21, p = .026, ηp2 = .088, replicating 
                                                
22 This result was significant for the line stimuli only, but did not differ according to stimulus set, F < 
1. 
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Experiment 2, but the main effect of distortion did not, F(9,486) = 2.07, p = .060, ηp2 
= .037. The 3-way interaction was not significant, F < 1, and the main effect of group 
was also not significant, F < 1. Familiarity ratings for the prototype also did not differ 
according to group, F < 1. Therefore, similarly to Experiment 2, the prototypicality 
gradient was stronger overall in the Memorize group than the two Search groups, but 
again there seemed to be no evidence of an advantage in recognition for the 
Memorize group despite the extension of the exposure phase.      
 
Figure 3.7. Familiarity ratings in group Memorize, Search and Search-Terminate for 
new and old test stimuli in Experiment 3. 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Search vs. Search-Terminate 
 Comparing the two Search groups to each other, there was again a significant 
main effect of novelty, F(1,34) = 17.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .339, that did not interact with 
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group, F < 1. There was a significant main effect and linear trend for distortion, 
smallest F(9,306) = 20.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .371, but neither interacted with novelty, 
largest F < 1, nor group, largest F < 1. The 3-way interaction was not significant, F < 
1, and the main effect of group was also not significant, F < 1. Thus, there was no 
evidence to suggest that the residual exposure time in group Search benefitted overall 
recognition or the prototypicality gradient compared to group Search-Terminate when 
the stimulus disappeared after a response was made. Ratings for the prototype alone 
also did not differ between the two Search groups, F(1,34) = 3.15, p = .085, η2 = .085.  
 
3.4.2.3 Signal Detection Analysis 
 A signal detection analysis was conducted in a similar manner to Experiment 
2, comparing the Memorize group against the two Search groups and then the two 
Search groups to each other (Figure 3.8). For recognition, there was no difference in 
sensitivity (dA) comparing the Memorize group with the two Search groups, F < 1, 
nor when comparing the two Search groups to each other, F < 1. The Memorize group 
did have an advantage in discriminating high and low distortion exemplars when 
compared to the two Search groups, F(1,54) = 6.05, p = .017, η2 = .101, but there was 
no difference in sensitivity between the two Search groups, F < 1 (see Figure 3.8). 
Therefore it can concluded that the advantage in the prototypicality gradient for the 
Memorize group was not due to participants using the scale differently to the other 
groups.  
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Figure 3.8. Results from the signal detection analysis in Experiment 3. Upper panels 
show ROC curves for discrimination between new and old exemplars (recognition, 
top left) and discrimination between low and high distortion level exemplars 
(category learning, top right), with the dotted diagonal line indicating zero sensitivity. 
Lower panels show dA (sensitivity) measures for recognition (bottom left) and 
category learning (bottom right) calculated from a linear transformation of the ROC 
curve, with error bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.4.2.4 Comparison to Experiment 1 
 To test whether the increased exposure resulted in a prototypicality gradient 
that was greater than a learning-at-test effect, the two Search groups in this 
experiment were combined and compared to the NoEx-Fam group in Experiment 1. 
As in Experiment 2, there was an overall ability to discriminate between new and old 
exemplars23, F(1,57) = 8.99, p = .005, ηp2 = .133, and this interacted with group, 
F(1,57) = 8.74, p = .004, ηp2 = .141, since participants in Experiment 1 did not see any 
stimuli and thus could not recognize them in the subsequent test phase. The main 
effect and linear trend for distortion was significant, smallest F(9,513) = 20.95, p 
                                                
23 This result was significant for the line stimuli only, but did not differ according to stimulus set, F < 
1. 
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< .001, ηp2 = .269, but again, importantly, the linear trend did not interact with group, 
F(1,57) = 1.70, p = .198, ηp2 = .029. The signal detection analysis comparing dA 
between experiments was also not significant, F < 1, with similar levels of sensitivity 
in the two Search groups in this Experiment (dA = .482, SD = .330) and the no-
exposure group in Experiment 1 (dA = .528, SD = .126). While it should be 
acknowledged that this is a between-experiments comparison, the results are 
consistent with Experiment 2, and between two methods of analysis. To provide 
stronger evidence for the null hypothesis, a Bayes Factor test was conducted in a 
similar manner to Experiment 2 following Rouder et al.’s (2009) technique. This 
resulted in a Bayes Factor of 2.04 for the comparison of the gradient slopes, and a 
Bayes Factor of 4.9 for the comparison of the sensitivity index (dA) between groups, 
both in favor of the null. While the BF for the slopes cannot be considered good 
evidence in favor of the null, the BF for the sensitivity index suggests that, consistent 
with Experiment 2, participants in the Search groups discriminated between high-
distortion and low-distortion exemplars to an equivalent extent as those in the no-
exposure group.  
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that doubling the number of exposure 
trials did not exacerbate any potential group differences in recognition ability 
suggested in Experiment 2, but the advantage for the Memorization group for the 
prototypicality gradient remained. Increasing exposure still did not result in a 
prototypicality gradient greater in magnitude than that expected on the basis of 
learning-at-test alone in the Search groups, implying that the prototypicality gradient 
is not implicit in the sense of resulting automatically from incidental exposure. On the 
other hand, the lack of any group differences between the two Search groups suggests 
that the ability of participants to recognize old exemplars at test does arise from 
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incidental exposure, and not from using the residual exposure time after responding to 
explicitly encode the stimuli. 
 
3.5 General Discussion 
 The current study tested the implicit status of learning in the prototype 
distortion task by introducing a visual search task as a means of incidental exposure, 
and tested the effect of manipulating encoding conditions by comparing a visual 
search group to a group who were simply asked to memorize the stimuli. The 
methodology was novel in the sense that the same measure (familiarity ratings) and 
the same test stimuli were used to assess both the prototypicality gradient and ability 
to discriminate between new and old exemplars. Surprisingly, there was no evidence 
that participants learned about the similarity structure of the stimuli during visual 
search, and a dissociation of the opposite nature to those commonly reported in 
amnesia studies (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993) and healthy participants (Nosofsky & 
Zaki, 1998) was found, with intentional memorization improving prototypicality 
gradients but not participants’ ability to discriminate between new and old exemplars.  
Experiment 1 showed that the magnitude of the prototypicality gradients and 
discrimination between old and new exemplars were equivalent for categorization and 
familiarity tests for participants who were exposed to the stimuli, justifying the use of 
familiarity ratings for the subsequent experiments to assess the prototypicality 
gradient. It can be argued that in the decision to use a single measure in Experiments 
2 and 3, there was no direct test of participants’ ability to categorize the stimuli. 
While familiarity judgements and category endorsements are potentially different in 
terms of the decision rules they engage (Nosofsky, 1988), and the responses they can 
produce (Squire & Knowlton, 1995), it is clear that the category structure was 
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reflected in the prototypicality gradients for familiarity ratings, and these 
prototypicality gradients were sensitive to the group manipulations. It remains to be 
seen whether these results replicate using a categorization test in place of the 
familiarity test. Presumably, in this particular task where participants are exposed to a 
single category, visual similarity would be the primary determinant of both category 
endorsements and familiarity ratings since the categories are not defined using 
concepts or rules. 
Experiment 1 also addressed an issue brought up by previous studies, that 
prototypicality gradients can result in the absence of exposure. By comparing 
generalization gradients between a group of participants who were misled into 
believing that they had been shown the stimuli in a mock-subliminal procedure 
(Palmeri & Flanery, 1999), against a group of participants who actually were exposed 
to the stimuli, ‘false’ prototypicality gradients were found, implying that participants 
were learning about the category on test. This result, along with the false 
prototypicality gradients displayed in other studies (e.g. Palmeri & Flanery, 1999; 
Zaki & Nosofsky, 2004), exemplifies a general problem with assessing A/not A 
category learning in the prototype distortion task. It is difficult to ensure that effects 
displayed on test are due to exposure alone, and participants who have not learned 
anything during the initial exposure phase may feel that they need to provide some 
variation in their responses and thus seek out information to enable them to do so on 
test. If this is indeed an unavoidable problem with any stimulus set, a similar 
procedure to that of Experiment 1 should be employed in future studies before 
claiming that a prototypicality gradient exists.  
Experiments 2 and 3 compared ability to discriminate between new and old 
exemplars and prototypicality gradients using familiarity ratings between a group who 
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searched through the category exemplars for a singleton, and a group who attempted 
to memorize the exemplars for a subsequent familiarity test. Experiments 2 and 3 
showed that the Memorize groups produced steeper prototypicality gradients than the 
Search groups, while there was little evidence for a similar advantage in 
discriminating new and old exemplars. While the Search groups in Experiments 2 and 
3 displayed an ability to discriminate between new and old exemplars that was above 
chance, the prototypicality gradient (i.e. generalization gradient) displayed after 
performing the visual search task was found to be no different to the false 
prototypicality gradient displayed in Experiment 1 after no exposure. Doubling the 
length of exposure from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3 did not have any effect on the 
general pattern of results and if anything, weakened the (non-significant) advantage 
for the Memorize group in recognition in Experiment 2. Further, Experiment 3 
showed that there were no differences between a visual search group who were 
exposed to the stimuli for the set duration (2 seconds), and a visual search group for 
whom the stimulus disappeared after a response was made. This leads to the 
conclusion that the ability to recognize old exemplars in the Search group was in fact 
due to learning that occurred during visual search, and not due to deliberate encoding 
that may have occurred after a response was made.  
 
3.5.1 Learning during Visual Search 
 Contrary to claims in the literature (e.g. Smith, 2008; Smith & Grossman, 
2008), the current study found no support for the idea that learning in the prototype 
distortion task is implicit in the sense of resulting from an automatic learning process. 
If this were the case then the prototypicality gradient should have resulted as a 
consequence of exposure to the stimuli during the visual search task, despite learning 
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about the stimuli being incidental to the requirements of the task (searching for, and 
responding to the identity of the singleton). Since the magnitude of the prototypicality 
gradient displayed in the Search groups across Experiments 2 and 3 was not found to 
be greater than the false prototypicality gradient displayed in Experiment 1, there is 
no strong evidence of learning on the basis of the presence of a prototypicality 
gradient. While this conclusion rests on a null result, the sample sizes used in these 
experiments were sufficient to detect significant group differences in prototypicality 
gradients, and the Memorize groups in Experiments 2 and 3 consistently showed 
prototypicality gradients that were substantially larger in magnitude than those 
displayed in Experiment 1. Bayes Factor analyses also support the null hypothesis 
when comparing the slope of the prototypicality gradient, as well as the sensitivity 
index between groups.  
The failure to find prototypicality gradients after visual search may seem 
surprising given that there is evidence from other paradigms such as contextual 
cueing that learning reliably occurs as a consequence of repeated exposures in visual 
search (e.g. Chun & Jiang, 1998, 2003; Colagiuri & Livesey, 2016). There are, 
however, several notable differences between the two paradigms. For instance, in 
contextual cueing, the incidental learning that takes place is still relevant to the task 
being performed during learning and the repeated presentations contain information 
about where the target is located (which is one of the explanations for contextual 
cueing effects). The effect is gauged by an improvement in visual search, which is the 
task that the participant is practicing throughout training, and performance on that 
task benefits from consistent task-relevant information about the target itself. In the 
current visual search task, while features of the category were certainly repeated 
throughout the exposure phase, and each unique exemplar was repeated a number of 
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times, the stimulus configurations did not predict the location of the singleton, and the 
assessment of learning took place after the exposure phase, meaning that it may have 
been harder to detect incidental learning in general.  
Another reason why only a weak prototypicality gradient was observed (i.e. 
equivalent to no exposure) could be that the Search groups focused their attention on 
finding a singleton during the exposure phase, which was subsequently removed in 
the test phase. While the exposure and test stimuli were equated between groups, and 
the Search groups were explicitly instructed not to look for the singleton on test, it is 
possible that the Search groups were affected more than the Memorize groups by this 
small change between the exposure and test stimuli. If there was indeed greater 
generalization decrement in the Search group, this should have lowered familiarity 
ratings for the old stimuli more than the new stimuli, weakening the level of 
discrimination between old and new stimuli. The interaction between group and 
novelty was not significant in Experiment 2 or Experiment 3, suggesting that 
familiarity ratings were lower in the Search group by an equivalent magnitude for old 
and new stimuli. Also, since the Search groups were able to discriminate between old 
and new exemplars on test, it appears that any generalization decrement suffered by 
the Search group was minimal.  
 The failure to find a prototypicality gradient in the Search group is more 
puzzling since participants were able to give higher familiarity ratings to old stimuli, 
demonstrating that they had learned something about the stimuli. One way to explain 
these results is that the prototypicality gradient displayed after the mock-subliminal 
procedure in Experiment 1 and the prototypicality gradient displayed after visual 
search were not the consequence of the same learning process despite being of 
comparable magnitude (see Smith, 2008). In other words, perhaps the latter was a 
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genuine consequence of learning during training and was not further influenced by 
learning on test. If the visual search task forces participants to encode the features of 
the stimuli serially, on test when participants are asked to judge familiarity of the 
stimuli as a whole, the Search group may resort to searching through the stimuli for 
specific features that they recognize. This technique might be sufficient to allow a 
prototypicality gradient to emerge, but one that is not larger in magnitude to that in 
Experiment 1. Participants who underwent the mock-subliminal procedure in contrast, 
can utilize the whole stimulus at test to make their categorization or familiarity 
judgements. However, because they have not been exposed to any stimuli in the 
exposure phase, what they can learn on test is obviously limited, and thus their 
prototypicality gradient is similarly small in magnitude to the Search groups. 
Unfortunately, these experiments provide no means to determine whether this account 
of the failure to obtain prototypicality gradients after visual search is true.  Clearly, 
further studies are needed to clarify whether incidental learning is conducive to 
producing prototypicality gradients under different encoding conditions (e.g. serial vs. 
configural feature encoding). 
If we assume that the prototypicality gradients obtained after visual search 
were due to incidental learning, another way in which the prototypicality gradient can 
be interpreted as implicit is if it results in the absence of explicit recognition, 
consistent with the suggestion that prototype effects are not dependent on declarative 
memory (Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Reber & Squire, 1999). Again, this was not 
supported by the data, with the Search groups in Experiments 2 and 3 showing higher 
familiarity ratings for old exemplars, consistent with contextual cueing studies that 
have found above-chance recognition (e.g. Colagiuri & Livesey, 2016; Smyth & 
Shanks, 2008).  
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3.5.2 The Effect of Encoding Conditions 
 Importantly, Experiments 2 and 3 found that varying the nature of the 
exposure conditions does affect the ability of participants to show a prototypicality 
gradient, with participants in the Memorize groups consistently showing an advantage 
over the Search groups. The results in this chapter stand in contrast to those of 
Gureckis et al. (2011), who found no differences in test performance between groups 
of participants who were asked to memorize the stimuli as a configural whole, and 
participants who were asked to imagine pointing to the center dot. As mentioned 
previously, one explanation for their results is that their incidental task was not 
cognitively demanding and thus participants may have been able to explicitly encode 
the stimuli while performing the task. An alternative explanation is that the task itself 
(pointing to the middle dot) might result in a similar deployment of visual attention as 
the memorization task. To speculate, pointing to the middle dot might also involve 
configural processing of the stimuli as participants would have to encode spatial 
relations between the features (in effect processing the stimulus as a whole) in order 
to determine where the center of the pattern was located, thus making the two 
encoding strategies similar in terms of what participants attend to. This would mean 
that the reason that strong prototypicality gradients have been obtained in the past 
under incidental exposure conditions is largely due to the nature of the encoding 
conditions facilitating later performance, rather than incidental learning. 
In contrast, in this chapter, a more cognitively engaging visual search task was 
utilized, demonstrating that test performance can vary between different exposure 
conditions. However, visual search tasks require participants to search through 
individual features of the stimuli in order to find the target, and thus differs both in 
terms of the requirements of the task and what features (configural vs. specific) of the 
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stimuli participants focus on. As mentioned above, it is possible that the Search group 
did learn incidentally but only about the specific features of the stimuli. The 
Memorize groups on the other hand, were told to memorize the stimuli as a whole and 
thus were encouraged to encode the configural as well as specific features of the 
stimuli. A prediction concerning the impact of these encoding strategies on test can be 
derived by considering how these changes in encoding may affect generalization to 
previously unseen high- and low-distortion exemplars. 
Generalization increases as the similarity between the test stimulus and the 
seen exemplars increases24. The low distortion exemplars are very similar to the 
prototype, and therefore also very similar to each other, whereas the high distortion 
exemplars are relatively dissimilar to each other. Thus, the prototypicality gradient in 
the old test stimuli can be seen to result in the following way: generalization is high 
(and therefore high familiarity ratings are given) for low-distortion exemplars because 
of a high degree of similarity to other seen low-distortion exemplars. In contrast, 
generalization is reduced for high distortion exemplars since these exemplars are not 
as similar to the seen exemplars (whether they be high- or low-distortion). If we 
assume that the Memorize group are better able to detect similarity (for example, due 
to encoding of configural features of the stimuli), then generalization will be higher in 
this group for the low distortion exemplars and thus produce a steeper prototypicality 
gradient. In contrast, the Search group may have more difficulty detecting similarity 
between stimuli (for instance, because they have only encoded the specific features of 
the stimuli in a serial fashion, and the exemplars are created by distorting each feature 
individually). As mentioned above, if the Search group were to adopt the strategy at 
test of searching for individual features that they recognize, this might allow them to 
                                                
24 This explanation can also be framed in terms of generalization from an extracted prototype. 
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discriminate between old and new exemplars to the same degree as the Memorize 
group, but would not enable them to produce as strong a prototypicality gradient. 
Thus, a speculative conclusion is that the visual search task may have resulted in 
incidental learning, but through a manner of encoding that was very different to the 
Memorize group.  
An alternative way to explain the group differences in Experiments 2 and 3 is 
through awareness of the subsequent familiarity test, since this was necessarily part of 
the encoding instructions in the Memorize group. While it is certainly possible that 
any group differences observed could be attributed to this awareness and not the 
difference in encoding conditions, the results of Gureckis et al. (2011) and Reber et al. 
(2003) do not support this idea. Both studies failed to find a difference in 
categorization performance when comparing groups that were aware of the existence 
of a category against a group who were unaware of the category. This suggests that 
awareness of a category either does not lead participants to look for similarities 
between stimuli to aid them in their category judgements, or that the nature of the 
stimuli makes this difficult. While this study utilizes a familiarity test rather than a 
categorization test, participants in Group Memorize knew that they would be tested on 
their memory and yet in both Experiments 2 and 3 there was little evidence that this 
facilitated their performance in discriminating between new and old exemplars. Thus 
if anything, we would need to conclude counter-intuitively that awareness of a 
subsequent memory test facilitates prototypicality gradients, but not recognition 
ability. It seems that what matters for learning in the prototype distortion task is not 
whether participants are aware of the existence of a category or an impending 
memory test, but what demands the particular encoding conditions make on the 
participant. 
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3.5.3 The Dissociation between Categorization and Recognition 
 Finally, the manipulation of encoding conditions in Experiments 2 and 3 
increased the magnitude of the prototypicality gradient, but did not improve 
discrimination between new and old exemplars. This is the opposite of what has been 
found when comparing amnesic patients to healthy controls where there is usually a 
discrepancy in recognition but similar categorization performance (e.g. Knowlton & 
Squire, 1993). If we assume, as single-system theories do, that the two indices of 
learning should be related, the results in this chapter might be surprising given that the 
use of a single measure should have eliminated potential differences in response 
thresholds, and other task-specific variance such as forgetting and interference 
between tests. Nevertheless, the fact that dissociation is still observed should be 
interpreted with caution. While the test measures have been equated, there is still a 
difference in the statistical measures used for the prototypicality gradient (linear trend 
in ratings) and recognition (difference in ratings between old and new stimuli). Thus, 
there is still a parameter difference between these chosen indices. For example, it may 
be that they are not equally easy effects to obtain, or that discriminating between high 
and low distortion stimuli and new and old stimuli are differentially impacted by 
encoding conditions. 
It is also worth emphasizing that if participants are learning about the category 
on test, as Experiment 1 suggests, then discriminating new from old stimuli may 
become more difficult, since participants would be explicitly encoding both old and 
new exemplars on test. This would presumably strengthen, or make no difference to 
the prototypicality gradient but may contribute to a weaker level of recognition. This 
potential problem also applies to most of the prototype effect literature because test 
stimuli are typically a combination of old and new stimuli and usually many (if not 
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all) are structured around the prototype to some extent. Thus, for the same reasons, 
their presentation on test should strengthen the prototypicality gradient but weaken 
participants’ ability to recognize exemplars they have seen. Ensuring that difficulty 
level is equated across assessment of the prototypicality gradient and recognition is 
thus important for interpretation of dissociations but also difficult to implement.  
 While the results show a clear advantage for intentional memorization in the 
slope of the prototypicality gradient, the use of a single-category paradigm means that 
there was no assessment of the ability of participants to accurately sort stimuli into 
categories, which is what categorization is typically thought to entail (Homa, Hout, 
Milliken, & Milliken, 2011). However, a descending gradient in familiarity ratings or 
category endorsement can be seen to represent knowledge of category structure, 
which in prototype distortion tasks is defined by stimulus similarity. Single-category 
paradigms, or A/not A paradigms, are also the paradigms that have traditionally been 
used in amnesia research (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993), have been singled out as 
implicit (Smith, 2008), and therefore it is the status of learning in these types of 
procedures in particular to which these results are most relevant. Nevertheless, further 
studies may provide insight into whether different encoding conditions affect 
prototypicality gradients and categorization into multiple categories in the same way. 
To summarize, the experiments in this chapter call into question the logic of 
interpreting single dissociations as evidence for implicit category learning due to the 
inherent difficulty in ensuring a ‘fair’ comparison between tests of categorization and 
recognition. Since a pattern of results that is the reverse of the majority of studies 
comparing amnesics to controls was found (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993), it seems 
that the way in which the prototype effect and recognition are assessed has a large 
influence on the pattern of results obtained, and even when attempts are made to 
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minimize differences between tasks by using the same test stimuli and test measure, 
dissociations are still possible.  
 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the experiments in this chapter do not support the 
characterization of learning in the prototype distortion task as implicit in the sense of 
resulting automatically from incidental exposure during visual search, and found a 
dissociation opposite to that commonly reported in the literature when the same test 
measure was used to assess prototypicality gradients and recognition. These findings 
highlight the need to test for potential learning-at-test effects before claiming that 
learning exists, and to exercise caution in interpreting dissociations between 
categorization and recognition due to the difficulty in eliminating potential parameter 
differences that can cause dissociations. Most importantly, Experiments 2 and 3 found 
a difference between explicit memorization and incidental learning during visual 
search, emphasizing the importance of studying the encoding strategies and exposure 
conditions that are required for so-called implicit learning effects. 
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Chapter 4: Post-Discrimination Generalization 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Generalization concerns the transfer of learning from one stimulus to another, 
and is an important aspect of behavior since each encounter with a stimulus is 
arguably different in some form (Shepard, 1987). Generalization was explored in 
Chapter 3 where participants were exposed to exemplars from a single prototype-
centered category. Unlike Chapter 3, in this chapter, participants learned to 
discriminate between slight variants of two category prototypes rather than being 
exposed to a single category, and generalization will be tested to stimuli further along 
the relevant dimension. This type of category learning task is more similar to intra-
dimensional discrimination procedures where animals are rewarded for responding to 
one stimulus and not rewarded for responding to another stimulus lying on the same 
dimension (see Honig & Urcioli, 1981, for other ways in which generalization has 
been explored).  
A wide range of studies using these simple discrimination tasks suggest that 
humans are capable of generalizing on the basis of similarity to the physical features 
of the stimuli (as seen in Chapter 2) but, importantly, also on the basis of the abstract 
relationships between the to-be-discriminated stimuli (e.g. Mackintosh, 2000; Penn, 
Holyoak, & Povenelli, 2008). In contrast, there is still debate about the presence of 
even simple forms of relational generalization in infrahuman animals (Penn, Holyoak, 
& Povenelli, 2008). Relational and feature-based generalization appear to capture 
learning that is qualitatively different in content, but whether they represent the 
operation of separate learning processes is more difficult to determine empirically. If 
however, there are two learning processes that govern generalization according to 
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similarity or relational rules, specifying the conditions under which participants 
generalize will have implications for characterizing the nature of interaction between 
those processes. 
In animal learning experiments, generalization is often examined by rewarding 
subjects for responding to a single stimulus (S+), for example, a light of a particular 
wavelength or a tone of a particular frequency, and then assessing responding to 
stimuli with varying values along that same dimension of interest (e.g. Guttman & 
Kalish, 1956; Pavlov, 1927). Such studies in animals typically produce a peaked 
generalization gradient, with the highest rates of responding at the trained S+, and 
responding decreasing as a function of the degree of similarity between the test 
stimulus and the S+ (see Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2003, for a review). These peaked 
generalization gradients can be explained by assuming that behavior towards a 
stimulus is governed by the degree of similarity or shared features between the novel 
instance and the past instance that has already been encountered. This assumption is a 
fundamental tenet of many associative learning theories (Blough, 1975; Estes, 1955; 
McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000, 2002; Pearce, 1987; Shepard, 1987; Spence, 1937). 
If instead of training responses to a single stimulus, animals are trained using 
differential reinforcement to discriminate between an S+ and S- that lie close together 
on the relevant dimension, a phenomenon called peak shift often occurs (Hanson, 
1959). Peak shift describes the situation in which the peak of the generalization 
gradient shifts from the location of the S+ in the direction away from the S- (see 
Figure 4.1 for an example). This effect is well accounted for by associative models 
that employ elemental representation, and conceive of the S+ and S- as a series of 
overlapping elements on a continuum (Blough, 1975; Ghirlanda & Enquist, 1998). 
Peak shift can be predicted if it is assumed that S+ and S- activate elements on the 
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continuum in a graded (Gaussian) manner during discrimination training. If the S+ 
and S- contain a large number of common elements, a large proportion of elements on 
the dimension will be activated by both stimuli and accrue weak associative strength 
due to their excitatory association with the S+ and inhibitory association with the S-. 
Elements that are maximally activated by S+ and minimally activated by S- will 
accrue the strongest associative strength. Thus elemental theories predict that a 
stimulus slightly removed from the S+ in the direction away from the S- should 
accrue the most associative strength.  
 
Figure 4.1. Simulation of generalization results based on rules and similarity. 
Generalization on the basis of rules produces a monotonically increasing gradient 
while generalization on the basis of similarity produces a peaked gradient. The ‘Near’ 
stimuli represent stimuli along the dimension that are very similar to the training 
stimuli (‘Train’), while the ‘Far’ stimuli represent stimuli that are very dissimilar to 
the training stimuli.  
 
 
A similar analysis can be applied for a discrimination task with two stimuli (i.e. 
S1 and S2) with competing responses (i.e. R1 and R2). These responses would 
presumably have an inhibitory association with each other, meaning that S1 serves as 
a S- to S2, and vice versa (see Blough, 1973). Assuming that the probability of 
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choosing the associated response is a function of the activation of that response 
relative to activation of the alternative response, the highest rates of R1 will be to a 
stimulus slightly removed from S1 in the direction away from S2, and vice versa for 
S2.  
In animal learning, even when a shift in the peak of responding occurs, a decline 
in responding is usually observed for extreme stimuli that are sufficiently different 
from those used in training (e.g. Hanson, 1959, see Figure 4.1). This suggests that 
generalization still occurs on the basis of physical similarity, albeit with a learned bias 
towards exaggerated versions of the S+. Thus, a generalization gradient with a 
localized peak of responding is generally interpreted as evidence of generalization 
based on the number of shared features between the test and training stimulus, 
consistent with an associative analysis. 
While peak shift is readily found in animal studies given appropriate parameters 
(see Purtle, 1973), its elusiveness in human studies suggests there may be other 
important factors that dictate the manner of generalization. Analogous procedures in 
humans, particularly those involving simple forms of category learning, often result in 
a different pattern of generalization – a monotonically increasing gradient with the 
highest levels of responding or accuracy at the extreme ends of the dimension, where 
the stimuli are the most dissimilar from the training stimuli (e.g. LaBerge, 1961; 
Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Thomas, Lusky, & Morrison, 1992; Wills & Mackintosh, 
1998, see Figure 4.1). A monotonic gradient implies that participants have learnt 
about the relationships between the features of the stimuli rather than just their 
physical features. If participants have formed a simple relational rule (e.g. concerning 
brightness: “category 1 is darker than category 2”), accuracy should be greatest at the 
extreme ends of the dimension (e.g. the lightest and darkest stimuli) since a relational 
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rule is presumably easiest to apply at these test stimuli. Forming a relational rule 
requires abstract representations of the difference between the stimuli and thus the 
manner in which they are related to one another. Higher-order cognitive processes 
such as hypothesis-testing and symbolic representation are thought to be critical in the 
successful use of such rules (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; Penn, Holyoak, 
& Povenelli, 2008). Therefore, both the content of learning and the underlying 
mechanisms in rule-based generalization may be qualitatively different to the 
processes that support feature-based generalization in other animals.  
There are, however, a few instances of peak shift reported in the human 
generalization literature that are suggestive of a common mechanism of generalization 
between humans and animals (Mackintosh, 1997). Most of these demonstrations of 
peak shift arise from situations in which formation of a relational rule is difficult. For 
example, peak shift can be found when relational rule learning of the form just 
described is difficult due to the complexity of the stimuli (Wills & Mackintosh, 1998). 
Participants in Wills and Mackintosh (1998; Experiment 2), categorized complex 
stimuli lying on an artificial dimension that was created by varying the number of 
icons in each stimulus (see Table 4.1). On test, participants performed most accurately 
on ‘Near’ stimuli, which contained a larger number of prototypical icons than the 
training stimuli, but performance declined for the ‘Far’ stimuli, which contained 
fewer prototypical icons than the training stimuli.  
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Table 4.1.  
Average number of icons (letters) present in each test stimulus along the artificial 
dimension (A-L, adapted from Wills & Mackintosh, 1998). S+ is the reinforced 
stimulus and S- is the non-reinforced stimulus presented during training. Near stimuli 
are similar to the training stimuli, distant stimuli are dissimilar to the training stimuli 
and represent the extreme ends of the artificial dimension. 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Distant+ 0.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 0.7        
Near+   0.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 0.7      
S+    0.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 0.7     
S-     0.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 0.7    
Near-      0.7 2.9 4.7 2.9 0.7   
Distant-        0.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 0.7 
Note: The letters A-L represent different visual icons.  
 
 
Another way to obtain peak shift is by having participants make speeded 
responses to a target with the stimuli presented as incidental cues (Aitken, 1996). 
Aitken found that participants were able to learn the predictive relationships between 
the cues and the target location by showing faster reaction times to the targets in the 
presence of the predictive cues compared with unpredictive filler cues. Interestingly, 
they appeared to learn these relationships incidentally and were not able to explicitly 
verbalise the relationship between the cues and the targets. Most importantly, when 
tested with stimuli along the dimension, participants showed a peak shift, making 
fewer correct responses to stimuli at the extreme ends of the dimension. While this 
task is quite different from that used in Wills and Mackintosh (1998), the two 
paradigms are similar in that they both restrict the formation of relational rules, which 
perhaps allows responding to novel stimuli to be governed by the degree of similarity 
to the training stimuli.  Other demonstrations of peak shift in category learning rely on 
reducing the amount of training (Jones & McLaren, 1999), degrading the contingency 
between the training stimuli and the correct response (Jones & McLaren, 1999), or 
interleaving two qualitatively distinct sets of stimuli to decrease the opportunity for 
stimulus comparison between trials (Livesey & McLaren, 2009). Taken together, 
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these demonstrations suggest that when the training stimuli and procedures minimize 
the opportunity to form a relational rule, humans generalize on the basis of physical 
stimulus features, and in a manner that produces the peak shift phenomenon. 
Since the literature demonstrates that humans can generalize in different ways, 
the question remains as to what determines the basis (relational rules or similarity) of 
generalization after simple discrimination learning. An obvious answer, and one that 
is consistent with the studies discussed above, is that rule-based generalization 
depends on the conditions of learning being conducive to participants forming a 
relational rule. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of this comes from a study by 
Livesey and McLaren (2009). In their study, they trained participants to discriminate 
between two shades of green differing only in their hue. In two experiments, a peak-
shifted gradient was found in the initial phase of testing which gradually became 
monotonic throughout testing. In Experiment 2, this change in generalization was 
only found for participants who had failed to notice the difference between the stimuli 
during training as assessed by a post-experiment interview (those who reported 
noticing the relation in training produced monotonic gradients from the outset). 
Presumably, these participants were able to use what they had learned during training 
to derive the appropriate rule on test. Their within-subjects demonstration of both a 
monotonic and peak-shifted generalization gradient shows that in the absence of a 
relational rule, participants generalize according to the physical features of the stimuli. 
Assuming that the peak shift was the result of associative learning, Livesey and 
McLaren went on to speculate that while their results demonstrate that associative 
learning can be overridden at test by higher-order rule-learning processes, they are 
also consistent with the idea that in humans, associative learning provides input into 
higher-order cognitive processes such that the two processes are effectively integrated 
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into category judgements (see Natal, McLaren, & Livesey, 2013, for a similar 
argument).  
However, the experimental evidence suggests that the integration of associative 
and relational information is probably not equal. The fact that peak shift is so elusive 
suggests that humans predominantly use explicit rules when confronted with 
discrimination tasks, and if present, this relational rule dominates responding at test. 
This dominance of rule-based responding may be due to the fact that the majority of 
human discrimination studies reporting rule-based generalization have used stimuli 
that are relatively simple with only one relevant dimension (e.g. colored squares, 
Livesey & McLaren, 2009). Although the discriminations are usually difficult enough 
to ensure that deriving a rule is not easy, once it has been derived the application of 
that rule on test is certainly straightforward, given that participants can identify the 
rule-relevant difference between the stimuli or categories of stimuli. While there have 
been studies on peak shift and rule-governed responding that have attempted to 
disrupt rule formation (for instance, by reducing the contingency between the stimuli 
and correct response during training, Jones & McLaren, 1999), most have focused on 
preventing the formation of the rule in the first place and not on disrupting its 
subsequent use on test. To date, none of the post-discrimination generalization studies 
of this nature have observed disruption of the application of rules on test once that 
rule has been learned. It may be that associative and rule-based processes interact in a 
more complex way once both types of learning are acquired, such that other 
unexplored factors determine the degree to which rules govern generalization.      
To summarize, previous findings suggest that knowledge of a relational rule 
dictates the manner in which participants generalize (e.g. Livesey & McLaren, 2009). 
However, more evidence is needed to determine whether the basis of generalization 
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can change qualitatively between physical similarity and relational rules and, if so, 
how similarity- and rule-based generalization interact to determine responding when 
such a shift occurs. The current set of experiments approached these questions in a 
different way to previous studies. Rather than restricting the acquisition of relational 
rules during training, as has been done in the past, conditions were provided to 
encourage the use of a relational rule and then its applicability on test (that is, the ease 
with which the rule can be applied) was manipulated. The hypothesis was that 
evidence of feature- or similarity-based generalization (i.e. peak shift) would emerge 
when the applicability of a rule was reduced at test. The results of Livesey and 
McLaren (2009) show that participants’ generalization gradients progress from being 
peak-shifted towards being monotonic through the course of testing only if 
participants derive a rule at test and not training, suggesting that in the absence of a 
relational rule, participants learn about the physical features of the stimuli. Thus, if 
knowledge of relational rules and stimulus features are stored concurrently and 
expression of rule-based generalization dominates under situations where the rule is 
easy to apply, then reducing the applicability of a rule on test may result in 
participants reverting to generalizing on the basis of similarity to stimulus features.     
The aim of the experiments in this chapter was to see whether reducing the 
applicability of a relational rule on test could disrupt the application of that rule on 
trials where the rule should be easy to apply. To reduce the applicability of the rule on 
test, a situation was provided where a rule was easily applicable, or useful in 
determining category membership on 50% of test trials but not easily applicable (and 
potentially not useful at all) in determining category membership on the other 50% of 
test trials. In order to prevent participants from simply discounting the trials where the 
rule was difficult to use as completely irrelevant, the test stimuli were created to be 
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perceptually similar to the training stimuli so that participants would assume that their 
rule would continue to be valid throughout test. A set of stimuli was constructed that 
had two relevant category dimensions and therefore two possible relational rules that 
participants could form. This allowed for disruption of rule use by making one 
dimension (and rule) relevant on half of the test trials, and the other dimension (and 
rule) relevant on the other half of test trials. The stimuli were complex with multiple 
features (9 colored circles on a black background, see Figure 4.2), making rule 
application on test more difficult than previous studies, and the hue (blue vs. green) 
and size of the circles (small vs. large) chosen as the diagnostic category dimensions.  
 
  
Figure 4.2. Examples of stimuli used in the training phase in Experiments 1 and 2. In 
this example, the ‘Left’ category has smaller and greener circles while the ‘Right’ 
category has larger and bluer circles.  
 
 
 
These dimensions were correlated during training, meaning that for example, 
one category had bluer and larger circles and the other had greener and smaller circles 
(see ‘Train’ stimuli in the Consistent Group in Figure 4.3). This meant that 
participants could successfully discriminate between the categories using either 
category dimension. In order to provide the best opportunity to obtain peak shift, the 
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stimuli were made to be perceptually similar and included a large amount of noise 
such that relational differences for any given circle were less reliable than the average 
of all the circles. This added noise makes the discrimination more difficult but also 
discourages participants from attending to a single circle, which might have made rule 
application straightforward and undermined the effect of the test manipulation. Note 
that making the stimuli noisy and complex might more closely approximate how 
animals experience stimuli that are perceived as simple to humans (e.g. keylights), 
and thus be more amenable to producing a peak shift effect. 
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Figure 4.3. Schematic diagram of the test stimuli in a two-dimensional space for the 
Consistent and Inconsistent groups for Experiment 1 and 2A. Variations on the 
attended dimension are on the horizontal axis and variations on the unattended 
dimension are on the vertical axis. “T” represents the ‘Train’ test stimulus and ‘F’ 
represents the Far test stimulus. Note that for group Consistent, the ‘Train’ test stimuli 
for each dimension were exactly the same, hence they are only displayed once. ‘Near’ 
stimuli not shown for clarity. The white dotted line represents the category boundary. 
Diagnostic information was always present on both dimensions in the Consistent 
group, but only present on one dimension for any given test stimulus in the 
Inconsistent group. Experiment 2A differed from Experiment 1 in that one of the 
dimensions was attended and the other unattended whereas in Experiment 1 the more 
attended and less attended dimensions were determined post-hoc. In the Consistent 
group, the Train test stimuli (T) were also the category prototypes. 
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 To create the test stimuli, the dimensions were varied one at a time such that 
when one dimension was being varied, the other stayed constant. Whether the 
information on this non-varied dimension was diagnostic of category membership (i.e. 
varied reliably between categories) was manipulated between groups. When a 
dimension (e.g. color) was varied in Group Consistent, the other dimension (e.g. size) 
was set at the same values used for the training stimuli such that size was still 
diagnostic of category membership (Figure 4.3), but in group Inconsistent, size was 
set at a value roughly in the middle of the two categories, making it non-diagnostic of 
category membership (Figure 4.3). This effectively meant that although the test trials 
for the two groups looked very similar, on any given test trial, either rule could be 
used in Group Consistent, but one of the two rules was much more difficult to use in 
Group Inconsistent. If participants derived a rule using one of the two dimensions, 
this rule would either be easy to apply on 100% (Group Consistent) or 50% of test 
trials (Group Inconsistent). Thus, Group Inconsistent would experience a sequence of 
test trials where their rule was easy to apply on some trials, and very difficult to apply 
on the other trials, making application of a rule inconsistent. The question of interest 
was whether manipulating the consistency of rule application on test in this way 
would affect application of the rule on the test trials where the rule was clearly valid 
and should thus be easy to apply.  
Another aim of the experimenters in this chapter was to provide stronger 
evidence for rule use by including an additional measure of stimulus similarity. 
Livesey and McLaren (2009) found a strong concordance between monotonicity in 
generalization gradients and verbal description of the relevant stimulus relation. 
Evidence of rule use at test corresponded with participants reporting that they had 
noticed the relevant dimension during training. However, this type of analysis 
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inevitably requires post-hoc comparisons from which the relationship between 
patterns of generalization and articulated knowledge is never completely clear. 
Furthermore, associative models (e.g. Ghirlanda & Enquist, 1998) can also explain 
monotonic gradients of generalization through similarity-based processes, by 
assuming very broad underlying generalization functions. Under these parameters, the 
hypothetical peak of the gradient lies close to or beyond the bounds of the test range 
and thus declining response accuracy may not be observed (Livesey & McLaren, 
2009). This explanation implies that a monotonic gradient results because participants 
are over-generalizing to stimuli that they perceive to be physically similar. This stands 
in contrast to rule use, in which a major advantage is that it allows for the 
extrapolation of learning to novel situations that have similar structural or relational 
features but are potentially dissimilar in their surface features (Penn, Holyoak, & 
Povinelli, 2008; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992).  
A simple way to demonstrate that monotonic generalization is based on 
stimulus properties other than mere physical similarity is to have participants 
simultaneously acknowledge that the stimuli at the extreme ends of the dimension 
(which should show the highest levels of accuracy) are the least similar to the stimuli 
they have seen during training. Therefore, in addition to category judgements on test, 
participants were also asked to give typicality ratings as a measure of perceptual 
similarity. If indeed the presence of a monotonic gradient were due to over-
generalization and under-assessment of the full range of the dimension, then one 
would expect categorization accuracy and typicality ratings to closely mirror each 
other. On the other hand, if participants are using a relational rule, then categorization 
accuracy and ratings of typicality should diverge as the test stimuli become less 
similar to the trained stimuli.  
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While an effect of the test manipulation relies on participants learning at least 
one of the two relational rules, Experiment 1 presented training in the absence of any 
instructions about the relevant dimensions to explore whether participants would self-
generate a relational rule concerning one of the dimensions during the course of 
discrimination learning. To foreshadow the results, Experiment 1 yielded evidence of 
rule use but little effect of the test manipulation. In order to increase reliance on a rule 
at training, and therefore increase the probability of observing an effect of reducing 
rule applicability at test, in Experiments 2A and 2B, participants were explicitly 
directed to attend to one of the two dimensions, creating an attended and an 
unattended dimension (either the color or size of the circles served as the attended 
dimension, counterbalanced across participants). The focus was on how participants 
generalized on the attended dimension since this was the dimension where rule use 
was most likely to occur, and therefore the dimension on which rule disruption was 
likely to occur. However, generalization along the unattended dimension was also 
assessed to see whether any learning occurred in the absence of directed attention.  
Experiments 1 and 2A contained test trials where diagnostic information was 
always present on both dimensions in the Consistent group, while information from 
only one dimension was present for any given test stimulus in the Inconsistent group 
(see Figure 4.3). Experiment 2B equated the critical test trials where the attended 
dimension was varied across groups (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2) while maintaining 
rule applicability at 100% and 50% across the two groups (the same as Experiments 1 
and 2A) in order to rule out the possibility of rule-based generalization in the 
Consistent group being due to additional information present on the unattended 
dimension (for an illustration of this, compare variations on dimension 1 in the 
Consistent group in Figure 4.3 and on the attended dimension in the Consistent group 
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in Figure 4.4). Typicality ratings were also included as a measure of stimulus 
similarity in addition to category judgements in all experiments to provide further 
evidence for relational rule use in addition to the post-experimental questionnaire. 
 
Table 4.2.   
Distortion values from the base prototype (represented as 0,0) for any given stimulus 
circle in the test stimuli. 
 
Group  LEFT CATEGORY RIGHT CATEGORY  Far Near3 Near2 Near1 Prot Prot Near1 Near2 Near3 Far 
Exp 1&2A: 
Group 
Consistent 
Att -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Unatt* -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Unatt -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Att* -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Exp 1&2A: 
Group 
Inconsistent 
Att -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Unatt* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unatt -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Att* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exp 2B: 
Group 
Consistent 
Att -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Unatt* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unatt -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Att* -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Exp 2B: 
Group 
Inconsistent 
Att -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Unatt* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unatt -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Att* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note. Whole numbers shown for clarity. The actual distance between the two 
category prototypes was larger than the distance between test exemplars. The non-
varied dimension is marked with an asterisk. The attended dimension was chosen 
post-hoc in Experiment 1 but explicitly manipulated through instructions in 
Experiments 2A and 2B and could be either color or size. Negative numbers indicate 
that the stimulus belongs to the left category and positive numbers indicate that the 
stimulus belongs to the right category. The key difference between Experiment 2A 
and 2B was that the critical test stimuli varying the attended dimension were equated 
between Consistent and Inconsistent groups in Experiment 2B (same values on 
attended and unattended dimensions). 
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Figure 4.4. Schematic diagram of the test stimuli in a two-dimensional space for the 
Consistent and Inconsistent groups for Experiment 2B. Variations on the attended 
dimension are on the horizontal axis and variations on the unattended dimension are 
on the vertical axis. “T” represents the ‘Train’ test stimulus and ‘F’ represents the Far 
test stimulus. Note that the training stimuli for group Consistent always contained 
diagnostic information on both dimension, but the training stimuli for group 
Inconsistent only contained diagnostic information on a single dimension. ‘Near’ 
stimuli not shown for clarity. The white dotted line represents the category boundary. 
Diagnostic information was always present on the attended dimension (horizontal 
axis) in the Consistent group, but was only present on half of the test trials in the 
Inconsistent group. Compare variations on the attended dimension in the Consistent 
group to variations on Dimension 1 in the Consistent group in Figure 4.3.  
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4.2 Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether reducing the validity of a rule on 
test would disrupt its application on trials where it should be easy to apply. The 
experiment used a between-subjects design in which the key group difference was a 
manipulation of consistency in rule application at test, with participants randomly 
allocated to a Consistent or Inconsistent group. For the Consistent group, participants 
were always provided with diagnostic information from both the color and size 
dimensions on test, which meant that provided the participant formed at least one rule 
based on either circle color or size, they could continue to use that rule consistently on 
test. Figure 4.3 shows how the groups differed in terms of information on the non-
varied dimension for the average of the 9 circles within a test stimulus.  
For Group Consistent in Experiment 1, for any given test stimulus, when color 
was varied to create the Near (intermediate) and Far stimuli, the size values were set 
at their respective category values seen during training, allowing participants to 
accurately categorize the stimuli using either dimension (see Figure 4.3). In contrast, 
in group Inconsistent, when color was varied, the size values were set at a value 
approximately in the middle of the two categories, meaning that any rule formed on 
circle size would be very difficult to use, since the value for each of the 9 circles 
would be at, or very close to the category boundary (see Figure 4.3). Therefore, for 
stimuli where color was varied, only color was informative for categorization, and 
vice versa for size. Figure 4.5 shows an example of test stimuli seen by the 
Inconsistent group. Notice that when size was varied (top row), the color values do 
not change between categories and when color was varied (bottom row), the size 
values of the circles do not change (but the location of the circles change randomly, 
providing some noise in the stimuli). This means that if participants were to derive a 
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rule using color, for example, this rule would be difficult to use on test trials when 
size is varied (Figure 4.5, top row), and is thus only useful on the half of test trials 
where color is being varied (Figure 4.5, bottom row).  
 
Figure 4.5. Example of test stimuli seen by the Inconsistent group varying size (top 
row) and color (bottom row). Note how the values of the non-varied dimension (color 
in the top row and size in the bottom row) do not change between categories. The 
values of the non-varied dimension were set at a value roughly in the middle of the 
two categories, making it non-diagnostic of category membership in the Inconsistent 
group. The Consistent group had diagnostic information from the non-varied 
dimension, such that there would be a small difference between categories in terms of 
color in the top row (the same difference present between the Train stimuli in the 
bottom row), and a small difference between categories in terms of size in the bottom 
row (the same difference present between the Train stimuli in the top row). 
 
Experiment 1 was exploratory since it was unknown whether participants would 
easily form relational rules on both dimensions, on one of the dimensions, or neither 
dimension. Verbal reports and questionnaires have been extremely useful in previous 
studies in distinguishing between rule users and non-rule users and explaining 
differences in generalization that might otherwise be obscured by looking at data 
averaged over test phases or participants (e.g. Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Natal, 
McLaren, & Livesey, 2013). Therefore, a detailed questionnaire was included at the 
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end of the experiment to assess which dimensions participants found useful and 
whether they could readily identify differences between the categories in terms of 
color and size. It was hypothesized that, amongst those participants who were able to 
form at least one relational rule, participants who could apply their rule consistently 
throughout test (group Consistent) would show a monotonic gradient of 
generalization when their rule-relevant dimension was varied, consistent with 
previous studies demonstrating rule-based generalization in humans (e.g. Livesey & 
McLaren, 2009; Wills & Mackintosh, 1998). For participants in group Inconsistent, 
for whom the rule is no longer fully applicable on test, it was hypothesized that rule 
use would be disrupted such that overall test accuracy would be lower and 
participants would revert to generalizing on the basis of similarity to physical features.  
 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty-three University of Sydney students (M age = 20.6, SD 
= 4.52, 105 females) participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course 
credit or payment (AUD$15/hour)25. Participants were randomly allocated to the 
Consistent (n = 68) or Inconsistent group (n = 65). Participants who indicated that 
they were colorblind were excluded from the analyses (6 participants). 
 
4.2.1.2 Apparatus 
The experiment was programmed using Matlab software and PsychToolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Each setup consisted of an Apple Mac Mini desktop 
computer connected to a 27 inch Dell monitor, with a standard Apple keyboard and 
                                                
25 Target sample sizes for this, and subsequent experiments were 70 per group based on exclusion rates 
from a pilot experiment. The final sample size was affected by availability of participants. 
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mouse. Testing was conducted in groups of up to 4 and participants were asked to 
wear headphones to block out sound. The apparatus was the same for all subsequent 
experiments. 
 
4.2.1.3 Stimuli 
Each stimulus presented in training and test consisted of 9 circles on a black 
600x600 pixel square background. The stimulus background was divided into a 3x3 
grid, with each circle confined to a 200x200 pixel cell so that there was no overlap 
between circles. The location of the circles within each cell varied randomly such that 
circle location was not predictive of category membership. The critical dimensions 
that were varied between categories were the color and size of the circles. The 
minimum and maximum size values (circle radii) were 15 and 50 pixels respectively, 
and the minimum and maximum color values (hue) were .403 and .555, with 
saturation and brightness set to 100% and 75% respectively (see Table 4.3). The test 
stimuli varied between this full range, but the training stimuli were restricted to 
varying in a mid-range band that included the middle 52% of values. This was done to 
ensure that the test stimuli were more extreme than the training stimuli to allow an 
adequate assessment of generalization along each dimension. An example of how 
stimuli varied along each dimension can be seen in Figure 4.5.  
 
Table 4.3.  
Min and max values for the whole dimension (Min, Max) and restricted (middle 52%) 
dimension (rMin, rMax).  
 
 Min Max rMin rMax Multiplier 
Hue .403 .555 .443 .515 .025 
Size 15 50 24.2 40.8 6 
 
Note. All training stimuli values were set between the restricted minimum and 
maximum values while all test stimuli were allowed to vary between the extended 
minimum and maximum values.  
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 For each participant, a ‘base’ prototype was first created which contained 
randomly chosen hue and size values for each of the 9 circles (in Figure 4.3, the base 
prototype would be at the intersection of the two dimensions). The color and size 
values for the base prototype could be any value within the respective ranges. The 
category prototypes used to create the training stimuli (T in Figure 4.3) were then 
constructed from the base prototype. For each participant, one category (left/right) 
was randomly chosen to have larger and the other smaller circles, and one category 
was chosen to have bluer and the other greener circles. From the base prototype, the 
color and size values of each circle were distorted in opposing directions to the same 
degree, such that the size value for any given circle in one category were larger than 
those of the corresponding circle in the other category, and the hue value for a given 
circle in one category were larger than the hue values for the corresponding circle in 
the other category. The exact degree of distortion was determined by multiplying the 
distortion level (arbitrary level of 0.8) by the feature multiplier (see Table 4.3) and 
then adding or subtracting these values from the base prototype values to form the 
category prototypes.  
These category prototypes then formed the basis for creating the 120 training 
stimuli, which all contained the same color and size values but different (randomized) 
location coordinates within its cell in the stimulus grid. Thus all the category 
exemplars were unique but similar to each other in terms of the relevant dimensions. 
To make the training phase more difficult so that participants would not immediately 
work out a rule on both dimensions, each training stimulus had 2/9 of its color values 
and 2/9 of its size values (randomly and independently selected for each stimulus) 
swapped with its respective value in the other category prototype. This effectively 
meant that the category exemplars seen during training were more similar to each 
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other than the ‘Train’ stimuli seen on test. Randomizing the locations of the circles 
and swapping the color and size values served to discourage participants from 
focusing on a single circle in discrimination, and also added some noise to make the 
initial discrimination harder.  
The test stimuli (Train, Near1, Near2, Near3 and Far, see Figure 4.5 for 
examples) were spaced at regular intervals (arbitrary distortion level of 0.6) and were 
created by distorting the category prototype. The test stimuli were created in the same 
way as the training stimuli (varying hue and size of each of the 9 circles), except there 
was no swapping of values for the other prototype and only one dimension was varied 
at a time. This meant that there were 20 different test stimuli (5 per dimension varied, 
for each of the two categories). Four sets of the 20 test stimuli were created, each with 
randomized location values amounting to 80 test stimuli in total. For the Consistent 
group, when one dimension was varied, the other dimension was set at the values of 
the category prototype. For the Inconsistent group, the non-varied dimension was set 
at the values of the base prototype (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2). Since the base 
prototype was the starting point to create the two category prototypes, the base 
prototype values were effectively at the midpoint of both categories, and therefore its 
values were non-diagnostic of category membership.  
 
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three phases, an initial training phase, a 
categorization test, and a short questionnaire. All instructions were presented within 
the computer program.  
Training Phase. For each participant, the size and color of the categories were 
randomized independently such that one category would have greener and the other 
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bluer circles, and one category would have larger and the other smaller circles. 
Participants first read a cover story explaining that they would see various artworks 
that belonged to different artists (Evan and Justin), and their task was to work out 
which artworks belonged to which artist through trial and error. They were warned 
that the artworks were very similar and thus they might find the task difficult at first, 
but they would be able to learn about the artworks with feedback.  
Before training started, a message appeared for 3 seconds that told participants 
to get ready for the task by placing their fingers on the left and right shift keys. On 
each trial, participants were presented with an artwork in the middle of the screen and 
the names of the artists appeared on the sides of the screen (“Evan” on the left and 
“Justin” on the right). Participants made a categorization response by pressing the left 
or right shift key, and had 4 seconds to respond before they were timed out. Once a 
response was made or the timeout was reached, the stimulus disappeared, and 
feedback (either “correct” in black, “wrong” in red, or “too slow” in red) was shown 
in the center of the screen, along with the choice of artist they had made on that trial. 
Feedback was shown for 500ms and 1000ms later the next trial would begin. There 
were 120 trials in total (with 120 unique stimuli), and the training phase progressed in 
exactly the same way for both groups. 
 Categorization Test. The instructions for the test phase emphasized that 
participants would now be shown more artworks that belonged to the same artists, and 
that they should choose which artist the artwork belonged to by again pressing the left 
and right shift keys, and then make a typicality rating on a scale using the mouse. 
They were also told that some of the artworks might look like the artworks seen 
previously, while others would not. It was emphasized in the instructions that the 
category judgements and typicality ratings were separate judgements, by telling 
  
175 
participants that it was possible to know the correct category due to high similarity 
between a test stimulus and the trained stimuli (i.e. high typicality), or despite a lack 
of similarity between the test stimulus and training stimuli (i.e. low typicality).  
 The test stimuli consisted of the training stimulus (Train), and transfer stimuli 
that were more extreme along the dimension (Near1, Near2, Near3 and Far stimuli) 
for each of the two categories, and for each of the two dimensions. The 20 test stimuli 
were presented 4 times each, with the location of the circles randomized each time, 
such that each instantiation of each stimulus was unique (but the critical color and 
size values were the same). The increment in similarity between all transfer stimuli 
was the same such that the test stimuli for each category were regularly spaced along 
the dimension (see Figure 4.5 for examples of Near and Far test stimuli). 
 On each test trial a stimulus was presented along with the question “Who does 
this artwork belong to?” appearing underneath. Participants had unlimited time to 
respond and pressed the left or right shift key to make their decision. Once they had 
made their choice a new question replaced the previous one asking “How typical of 
[chosen artist]’s art collection is this artwork?” and a rating scale appeared underneath 
the question, ranging from “NOT typical” to “VERY typical”. Participants were free 
to alter their category choice and typicality rating until they were satisfied with both 
(they could change their categorization judgement even after making their typicality 
rating), after which they could press spacebar to progress to the next trial. There was a 
blank inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000ms.  
 Questionnaire. Participants answered a series of questions following the 
categorization test. The first question asked participants how useful they found 
various dimensions (brightness, size, color, location) of the circles. Four visual 
analogue scales appeared on the same page (one for each dimension) and participants 
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made a rating on each scale ranging from “Not useful” to “Very useful”. They could 
make their four ratings in any order and could only progress to the next question once 
all ratings had been made. They were then asked to answer a three-alternative forced-
choice question (3AFC) and then a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) question 
about one of the two relevant category dimensions, and then the other dimension 
(with the order of dimensions randomized).  
The first 3AFC question read: 
“You may have noticed a difference between the left (Evan) and right (Justin) 
categories in terms of the [COLOUR/SIZE] of the circles. If you did notice a 
difference, when did you notice it?” 
1) During the FIRST phase of the experiment (where there was feedback) 
2) During the SECOND phase of the experiment (where there was no feedback, 
and you had to give typicality ratings) 
3) I did not notice a difference 
The second 2AFC question read: 
“One of the categories had mostly [BLUER/LARGER] circles, while the other 
category had mostly [GREENER/SMALLER] circles. Which of the following do you 
think is correct?” 
1) LEFT category (Evan) had mostly [GREENER/LARGER] circles, RIGHT 
category (Justin) had mostly [BLUER/SMALLER] circles. 
2) LEFT category (Evan) had mostly [BLUER/SMALLER] circles, RIGHT category 
(Justin) had mostly [GREENER/LARGER] circles 
Both the 3AFC self-report question and the 2AFC rule-identification question 
were answered by pressing the corresponding number key on the keyboard. 
Participants also made a confidence rating for the 2AFC rule-identification question 
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on a scale ranging from “I’m guessing” to “100% confident”. All scale ratings were 
transformed to a scale from 0-100. Lastly, participants were asked to indicate whether 
they suffered from any form of color-blindness. 
 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
4.2.2.1 Data Analysis 
For each set of analyses for the categorization and typicality data, a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted using the 5 test stimuli 
(Train, Near1, Near2, Near3, Far). Since the pattern of generalization across test 
stimuli was the primary focus, the following analyses will focus on the repeated-
measures trends and related interactions. In particular, in the categorization data, the 
presence of linear and quadratic trends was tested across the dimension since these 
trends capture linearity and curvature suggestive of monotonic and peak-shifted 
gradients respectively. However, to show convincingly that a peak shift is present in 
the Inconsistent group, a stronger test is needed to show that the gradient is non-
monotonic. Therefore, the point with the highest accuracy out of the Near1, Near2, 
and Near3 test stimuli was chosen and t-tests conducted to test whether there was a 
significant rise in accuracy from the Train stimulus to this peak, and a significant fall 
in accuracy from the peak to the Far stimulus. These t-tests were one-tailed since they 
necessarily entail a comparison between the highest point and the extreme end points 
on the dimension. To maintain the Type I error rate at .05, the critical alpha value was 
Bonferroni-corrected. Thus, if both t-tests are significant at the .017 level, then we can 
infer that the generalization gradient demonstrates a peak-shift effect (similar to 
Livesey & McLaren, 2009). To determine whether a monotonic gradient of 
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generalization was present in the Consistent group, a linear trend analysis was 
conducted using the five test stimuli. 
 
4.2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria  
To ensure that the data analysis included only participants who learned 
something about the categories, similar to Livesey and McLaren (2009), participants 
who scored less than 55% in the last half of training were excluded (32 participants, 
25.2% of the sample). After applying this criterion, a total of 95 participants remained 
(52 in the Consistent and 43 in the Inconsistent group).  
 
4.2.2.3 Questionnaire 
Figure 4.6 shows the results of the 3AFC self-report question asking 
participants if and when they noticed a difference between the categories. Participants 
seemed to have found differences in color more noticeable than differences in the size 
of the circles, with a larger number noticing color during training and few failing to 
notice the difference at all, compared to size. Table 4.4 shows the number of 
participants who noticed vs. did not notice differences in each dimension during 
training. Participants who claimed to have noticed differences in test were grouped 
with those who did not notice differences at all since the effect of the test 
manipulation specifically required participants to form a relational rule during 
training (as has been found to be critical in Livesey & McLaren, 2009, and Natal, 
McLaren, & Livesey, 2013). It can be seen from Table 4.4 that the majority of 
participants noticed differences in only one dimension during training, and that the 
probability of noticing each dimension was lower if participants had also noticed a 
difference in the other dimension. This suggests that in the absence of any instructions, 
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participants were more likely to notice differences in a single dimension, rather than 
both dimensions. Looking at the results from the 2AFC rule identification  
question (Figure 4.7), participants remaining after the exclusion criteria were applied 
tended to perform equally well at identifying the category difference in terms of color 
and size. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion of participants who selected each option for the 3AFC self-
report question (after exclusions) for each dimension (left panels: color, right panels: 
size) in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Table 4.4.  
Number of participants who reported noticing a difference in each dimension during 
training vs. during test/not at all after exclusions. 
 
  Size TOTAL 
  Noticed in Training 
Did not notice 
in training  
Color 
Noticed in 
Training 20 42 62 
Did not notice 
in training 23 10 33 
TOTAL  43 52 95 
probability (noticing size) = .453 (43/95) 
probability (noticing size | noticing color) = .323 (20/62) 
probability (noticing color) = .653 (62/95) 
probability (noticing color | noticing size) = .465 (20/43) 
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Figure 4.7. Accuracy in selecting the correct category difference for each dimension 
in Experiment 1.  
 
 
4.2.2.4 Training 
 The training data were analyzed in a 2x(4) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with test group (Consistent vs. Inconsistent) as the between-subjects factor and 
training quarter (1-4) as the within-subjects factor. Training accuracy increased over 
the four training quarters as shown by a significant linear trend, F(1,93) = 80.4, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .464. This linear trend did not interact with test group, F < 1, and there 
was no overall difference in accuracy between groups, F < 1. This analysis was also 
repeated with the full sample and produced the same results. 
  
4.2.2.5 Category Judgements 
The hypothesis concerning the effect of disrupting rule application on test 
requires participants to form at least one relational rule using one of the dimensions. 
Thus, for the following analyses participants were divided into 2 subgroups: those 
who reported noticing differences in at least one dimension (n = 48 in the Consistent 
group, n = 37 in the Inconsistent group), and those who reported noticing neither 
dimension (n = 4 in the Consistent group, n = 6 in the Inconsistent group) during 
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training. These subgroups were not directly compared due to unequal and low n for 
those who failed to notice any differences during training. Since the hypothesis for 
this experiment applies specifically to the dimension on which rule-based 
generalization was most likely to occur in the Consistent group (and therefore the 
dimension on which rule disruption was most likely to occur in the Inconsistent 
group), generalization along the dimension that participants were attending to more 
was of particular interest. The ‘more attended’ dimension for each participant was 
classified as the dimension that participants claimed to have noticed a difference in 
during training. If participants had noticed both or neither dimension during training, 
whichever dimension participants rated as being more useful was then chosen as the 
more attended dimension.  
Figure 4.8 illustrates the generalization gradients for the more attended 
dimension, split according to whether participants noticed at least one relevant 
difference during training. Note that the dimensions have been folded such that the 
point labeled “Far”, for example, incorporates the Far stimulus from both categories 
(see Appendix D for the full unfolded dimension). In other words, if the relevant 
dimension is color, the “Far” point represents the stimuli that have the greenest and 
the bluest circles. Generalization along each dimension was assessed by a 2x(5) 
ANOVA with test group (Consistent vs. Inconsistent) as the between-subjects factor 
and test stimulus (Train, Near1, Near2, Near3, Far) as the within-subjects factor.  
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Figure 4.8. Categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for variations on the ‘more 
attended’ dimension in Experiment 1. Participants were split into 2 subgroups for the 
analyses: those who noticed a difference in at least one dimension during training (n = 
48 in the Consistent group, n = 37 in the Inconsistent group), and those who did not 
notice differences in either dimension during training (n = 4 in the Consistent group, n 
= 6 in the Inconsistent group). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
Note the different scales used in the left panels. 
 
‘More attended’ dimension. For participants who noticed at least one 
dimension (Figure 4.8a), there was an overall linear trend, F(1,83) = 4.16, p = .044, 
ηp2 = .048, and a significant quadratic trend, F(1,83) = 13.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .140. 
Neither of these trends interacted with group, largest F < 1, and there was also no 
main effect of group, F(1,83) = 2.24, p = .138, ηp2 = .026. For participants who 
claimed to have noticed neither dimension during training (Figure 4.8c), no 
significant trends nor interactions were found, Fs < 1, and there was also no main 
effect of group, F < 1. There was a significant linear trend in the Consistent group for 
the subgroup that noticed at least one dimension, F(1,47) = 24.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .347, 
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but not for the subgroup that did not notice either dimension, F(1,3) = 3.61, p = .153, 
ηp2 = .546. There was no significant quadratic trend in either subgroup, largest F < 1.  
For the Inconsistent group, there was a significant rise in accuracy using the 
Near1 point in the subgroup that noticed at least one dimension during training, t(36) 
= 3.89, p < .001, d = .697, but no significant fall in accuracy to the Far point, t(36) 
= .947, p = .175, d = .159. There was no evidence of peak shift in the Inconsistent 
group in the subgroup that failed to notice either dimension, largest t(5) = .674, p 
= .530, d = .303. The subgroup who noticed at least one dimension during training 
also showed a significant linear trend in their generalization gradient, F(1,36) = 6.59, 
p = .015, ηp2 = .155, but no other linear or quadratic trends were significant in either 
subgroup, largest F(1,5) = 4.37, p = .091, ηp2 = .466. It seems that both the Consistent 
and the Inconsistent groups generalized on the basis of a relational rule, but only if 
they noticed differences between the categories in at least one dimension. The test 
manipulation did not seem to have an effect on the pattern of generalization nor on 
overall accuracy, although participants in the Consistent group did perform at a 
numerically higher level of accuracy overall than the Inconsistent group.  
‘Less attended’ dimension. For the dimension that participants did not notice 
in training or rated as being less useful (Figure 4.9a and 4.9c), there was no overall 
linear or quadratic trend, nor interactions with group, in either subgroup, largest 
F(1,83) = 3.78, p = .055, ηp2 = .044. There was a significant overall group difference 
in accuracy for participants who noticed at least one dimension (Figure 4.9a), F(1,83) 
= 94.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .531, but not for those who noticed neither dimension (Figure 
4.9c), F(1,8) = 1.27, p = .292, ηp2 = .137. The high level of accuracy attained by the 
Consistent group can be explained by the fact that on these trials, information on the 
other (more attended) dimension was present, and participants must have relied on 
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this dimension for their category judgements. The Inconsistent group on the other 
hand, did not have information on the other (attended) dimension and accuracy is 
therefore around chance26. The flat generalization gradients in each group and 
subgroup indicate that despite a number of participants self-reporting noticing both 
dimensions (n = 20) or neither dimension (n = 10) during training, generalization on 
test was dominated by the use of a single dimension such that there was no stimulus 
control by the less attended dimension. There were no significant linear or quadratic 
trends in any subgroup, largest F(1,5) = 5.62, p = .064, ηp2 =.529. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for variations on the ‘less 
attended’ dimension in Experiment 1. Participants were split into 2 subgroups for the 
analyses: those who noticed a difference in at least one dimension during training (n = 
48 in the Consistent group, n = 37 in the Inconsistent group), and those who did not 
notice differences in either dimension during training (n = 4 in the Consistent group, n 
= 6 in the Inconsistent group). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
                                                
26 Note that overall, categorization accuracy for test stimuli that varied on the unattended dimension 
was actually significantly greater than chance in the Inconsistent group, t(42) = 1.94, p = .030 (one-
tailed). 
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4.2.2.6 Typicality Ratings 
 ‘More attended’ dimension. The typicality ratings are shown in Figure 4.8 and 
4.9 (right panels), and were analyzed in a similar manner as the categorization data 
but only testing for linear trends. For the more attended dimension, for the subgroup 
that noticed at least one dimension (Figure 4.8b), there was a significant overall linear 
trend, smallest F(1,83) = 27.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .250, that did not interact with group, 
largest F(1,83) = 2.62, p = .109, ηp2 = .031, and there was no overall group difference, 
F < 1. For the subgroup that did not notice either dimension during training (Figure 
4.8d), there was no overall linear trend, F(1,8) = 4.23, p = .074, ηp2 = .346, no 
interaction with group, F < 1, and no overall group difference, F < 1.  
‘Less attended’ dimension. There was an overall linear trend in the subgroup 
of participants that noticed at least one dimension (Figure 4.9b), F(1,83) = 31.71, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .276, but not in those who did not notice either dimension (Figure 4.9d), 
F(1,8) = 2.34, p = .165, ηp2 = .226. Neither subgroup’s linear trend interacted with 
group, largest F(1,8) = 1.53, p = .251, ηp2 = .161. There was no overall group 
difference in either subgroup, largest F(1,83) = 3.06, p = .084, ηp2 = .036. Participants 
in both Consistent and Inconsistent groups rated more extreme stimuli along both 
dimensions as less typical of the categories seen during training, and the Train 
stimulus as the most typical, but only when they noticed differences in at least one 
dimension during training.  
 
4.2.2.7 Summary 
 In summary, participants who were able to notice differences in the categories 
in at least one dimension showed a linearly increasing gradient in their categorization 
accuracy on the dimension that they were deemed to be attending to most. They also 
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produced linearly descending typicality ratings along this dimension. In contrast, the 
small number of participants who did not notice differences in either dimension did 
not show either of these trends in categorization or typicality. Although in the 
predicted direction, the Inconsistent group did not show a lower level of 
categorization accuracy for variations on the attended dimension, and there was no 
effect of the test manipulation on the pattern of generalization or typicality ratings. 
One potential explanation is that although the lack of stimulus control by the ‘less 
attended’ dimension implies that participants were primarily using one dimension on 
test, a substantial number of participants (n = 20) also claimed to have noticed 
differences in both dimensions during training. Thus, their attention may have been 
divided over these two dimensions during training and therefore learning (and rule 
formation) for either dimension may have been poorer than those who focused on one. 
Since the 3AFC self-report question does not indicate whether participants noticed 
differences at the beginning or end of training, it may be that a large proportion of 
participants only formed a rule at the end of training. While this may be sufficient to 
show a linear gradient on test, it may be that the test manipulation requires reliance on 
a rule throughout the entirety of training in order for use of that rule to be disrupted by 
subsequently reducing its applicability. To speculate, perhaps a strongly-formed rule 
and directed attention to the relevant dimension are needed in order for the 
Inconsistent group to notice that there are test trials in which their rule is not 
applicable, or alternatively to make the contrast in rule applicability between training 
and test more pronounced and lead to the desired degree of uncertainty in their rule. 
Thus, in Experiment 2 explicit instructions were provided to attend to a particular 
dimension in order to encourage rule formation and reliance on that rule from the 
beginning of training.  
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4.3 Experiment 2 
Participants in Experiment 2 were either told to attend to the color (Attend 
Color group) or the size (Attend Size group) of the circles to increase the reliance on a 
relational rule, and therefore increase the effect of the test manipulation. Previous 
studies have shown that verbal instructions can determine the dimension along which 
participants subsequently generalize for simple stimuli with both shape and color 
dimensions (Vervliet, Kindt, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 2010), and therefore it 
seemed reasonable that directing participants to attend to a particular dimension 
would allow participants to derive a rule on one dimension but not the other. 
Participants were again allocated to a Consistent or Inconsistent test group, making 
the experiment a 2x2 between-subjects design. It was expected that providing a hint to 
attend to one of the dimensions would increase the reliance on a rule during training 
and therefore a reduction of rule applicability on test would have a more substantial 
impact on the Inconsistent group relative to Experiment 1. Thus, regarding 
generalization along the dimension that participants were instructed to attend to, the 
predictions were that a monotonic gradient of generalization would result in the 
Consistent Group consistent with rule-based generalization, and there would be lower 
accuracy and similarity-based generalization in the Inconsistent Group.  
Experiment 2 also sought to rule out an alternative explanation for increased 
rule-based generalization observed in the Consistent group relative to the Inconsistent 
group. The Consistent and Inconsistent groups differ not just in the ease of application 
of rules on test, but also in the physical characteristics of the test stimuli. As depicted 
in Figure 4.3, the Consistent group always has diagnostic information present on both 
dimensions while the Inconsistent group only has diagnostic information from a 
single dimension. Thus, considering the critical ‘attended dimension’ trials, the 
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Consistent group has ‘extra’ diagnostic information on test, which may have aided 
rule use27. Having diagnostic information available during test also makes the testing 
context more similar to the training context than in the Inconsistent group. This is 
particularly important because despite the proposal that rule use should not be 
affected by the similarity between training and target domains (Smith, Langston, & 
Nisbett, 1992), research in different paradigms has shown that in practice, rule use is 
affected by the similarity between the training and test stimuli even when the rule is 
perfectly valid (e.g. Allen & Brooks, 1991; Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin, 1989; Hahn, 
Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 2010) and even when using similarity is detrimental to 
performance (Hahn et al., 2010). Consequently, to rule out this alternative explanation 
for any potential group differences, two experiments (Experiment 2A and 2B) were 
run that were identical except for a minor procedural manipulation to test whether the 
presence of information on the unattended dimension affected generalization on the 
attended dimension.  
Experiment 2A was similar to Experiment 1 where the critical test trials 
varying the attended dimension were not equated between groups (see Figure 4.3). In 
Experiment 2B, the critical ‘attended dimension’ test trials were equated such that 
neither group had information on the unattended dimension when the attended 
dimension was varied (see Figure 4.4). Note that this does not change the fact that in 
both Experiments 2A and 2B, the Consistent group would be able to use a relational 
rule on their attended dimension on all test trials while the Inconsistent group would 
only be able to use a rule on their attended dimension on half of the test trials. In 
addition to showing that any monotonic gradients in the Consistent group are not due 
to having extra diagnostic information, equating the test trials also provides stronger 
                                                
27 Note that this is highly unlikely due to Experiment 1 showing little evidence of learning about the 
unattended dimension. Still, it was important to account for this confound in the design.  
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evidence that any observed group differences are attributable to the reduction of rule 
applicability.  
 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty-nine (M age = 20.88, SD = 6.22, 96 females) and one 
hundred and forty (M age = 19.48, SD = 3.17, 92 females) University of Sydney first-
year Psychology students participated in Experiment 2A and 2B respectively in 
exchange for partial course credit or payment (AUD$15/hour). Participants were 
again randomly allocated to either the Consistent (n = 134) or Inconsistent (n = 145) 
group. Similarly to Experiment 1, participants who indicated that they were colorblind 
were excluded (6 participants).  
 
4.3.1.2 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that participants were 
randomly allocated to attend to either the color or size of the circles (Attend Color vs. 
Attend Size). The instructional manipulation was presented on a separate screen after 
the training instructions and read:  
“You should try to use as much information about the circles to categorize the 
stimuli. However, the [COLOUR/SIZE] of the circles may be most helpful in 
distinguishing Evan’s and Justin’s artworks. Try and attend to the [COLOUR/SIZE] 
of the circles when learning the categories.” 
The experiment was thus a 2x2x2 between-subjects design with attention 
group (Attend Color or Attend Size), test group (Consistent vs. Inconsistent), and 
experiment (2A vs. 2B) as the independent variables. A manipulation check was 
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added to the end of the questionnaire phase asking participants “Which dimension 
were you asked to attend to? Press 1 for colour or 2 for size”. Participants were still 
asked the same 3AFC self-report and 2AFC rule-identification questions concerning 
whether/when they noticed a difference in each dimension, and identifying the 
difference between the categories, but they were always asked about their attended 
dimension before their unattended dimension.  
 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
For the ensuing analyses only the results of relevance to the main hypothesis 
will be reported (the full set of statistical results can be found in Appendix E). 
 
4.3.2.1 Exclusion Criteria 
To ensure that the data analyzed were from participants who used their hint to derive 
the appropriate rule, participants were excluded if they reported not noticing a 
difference in their attended dimension during training (58 participants, 21.2% of the 
sample). It was assumed that despite the difficulty of the discrimination, giving 
participants a hint should have made it easy to eventually discover a difference 
between the categories in their attended dimension during training. Thus any 
participants who failed this criterion were probably not following the instructions. 
Participants who failed the manipulation check were also excluded (a further 17 
participants, 7.9% of the remaining sample) for the same reason. Note that neither of 
these exclusion criteria require participants getting the 2AFC rule-identification 
question correct. As with Experiment 1, participants were also excluded if they scored 
< 55% accuracy in the last half of training (a further 11 participants, 5.6% of the 
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remaining sample). After applying these criteria there were a total of 187 participants 
remaining (97 in the Consistent group and 90 in the Inconsistent group). 
 
4.3.2.2 Questionnaire 
Figure 4.10 shows the proportion of participants in each of the four groups 
that selected each option in the 3AFC self-report question for color and size in 
Experiments 2A (top panels) and 2B (bottom panels) after exclusions. It can be seen 
that across both experiments in both Consistent and Inconsistent groups, the majority 
of participants remaining after exclusions failed to notice differences in their 
unattended dimension during training. 
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Figure 4.10. Proportion of participants who selected each option for the 3AFC self-
report question (after exclusions) for each dimension (left panels: color, right panels: 
size) in Experiment 2A (top panels) and 2B (bottom panels). Note that participants 
who reported not noticing differences in their attended dimension during training 
were excluded. 
 
Figure 4.11 shows the proportion of participants in each group who were able 
to identify the correct difference between the categories after applying the exclusion 
criteria in Experiment 2A (a and b) and Experiment 2B (c and d). Accuracy is 
generally quite high, and there was significantly higher accuracy for color when 
participants were told to attend to color, χ2(1, N = 187) = 16.94, p < .001 (left panels), 
and similarly for size, χ2(1, N = 187) = 7.24, p = .007 (right panels). The proportion 
of participants identifying the rule for color and size did not differ between 
experiments, largest χ2(1, N = 187) = 3.32, p = .068, but a larger proportion of 
  
193 
participants in the Consistent group were able to identify the correct category 
difference for color, χ2(1, N = 187) = 8.55, p = .003, and also for size, χ2(1, N = 187) 
= 11.72, p = .001. A possible explanation for these group differences in rule 
identification is that the reduction of rule validity at test may have resulted in more 
errors when attempting to identify the rule in the subsequent questionnaire.  
 
Figure 4.11. Accuracy for the 2AFC rule-identification question (after exclusions) for 
Experiment 2A (upper panels) and Experiment 2B (lower panels).  
 
4.3.2.3 Training  
There was a significant increase in accuracy over the four training blocks, 
F(1,179) = 130.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .421, that did not interact with test condition, 
F(1,179) = 1.57, p = .211, ηp2 = .009, attention group, F < 1, nor experiment, F < 1. 
As with Experiment 1, the analysis was repeated for the whole sample. The results 
were the same except that the interaction between training block and experiment was 
significant, F(1,271) = 4.23, p = .041, ηp2 = .015.   
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4.3.2.4 Category Judgements 
Attended Dimension. The categorization results for variations along the 
attended dimension are shown in Figure 4.12a. Inspecting Figure 4.12a, the overall 
pattern is similar to Experiment 1 (Figure 4.8a), and the Consistent Group seems to be 
performing better than the Inconsistent Group. While a monotonic gradient appears to 
be present in the Consistent Group, the Inconsistent Group appear to show a different 
pattern of generalization that resembles a peak shift. The categorization data were 
analyzed in a 2x2x2x(5) ANOVA with experiment, attention group, and test group as 
between-subjects factors and test stimulus as the within-subjects factor. As predicted, 
the Consistent group’s accuracy was significantly higher overall than the Inconsistent 
group, F(1,179) = 10.59, p = .001, ηp2 = .056. There was an overall linear and 
quadratic trend, smallest F(1,179) = 24.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .120, and a significant 
interaction between the quadratic trend and test group, F(1,179) = 5.00, p = .027, ηp2 
= .027, but no significant interaction between the linear trend and group, F(1,179) = 
1.03, p = .312, ηp2 = .006.  
 
Figure 4.12. Categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for variations on the 
attended dimension in Experiment 2 (combining Experiments 2A and 2B). Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Since there was a significant interaction between the quadratic trend and group 
(indicating  group difference in the pattern of generalization), planned analyses were 
conducted in a similar manner to Experiment 1, testing for a linear trend in the 
Consistent group and a peak shift in the Inconsistent group. In the Consistent group, 
there was a significant linear trend, F(1,93) = 24.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .207, indicating 
that a monotonic gradient was present and suggesting that generalization occurred on 
the basis of a relational rule. To test for the presence of peak shift in the Inconsistent 
group, the highest of the three middle points (Near1, Near2, Near3) was again 
compared to the two endpoints (Train and Far) and the critical alpha value was 
Bonferroni-corrected to .017. Using the Near1 point, there was a significant rise in 
accuracy from the Train stimulus, t(89) = 4.90, p < .001, d = .526, and a significant 
fall in accuracy to the Far stimulus, t(89) = 2.42, p = .009, d = .261, indicating a peak-
shifted gradient. The presence of peak shift in the Inconsistent group suggests that 
when rule validity is reduced on test, rule-based generalization was disrupted and 
instead, participants generalized on the basis of similarity to physical features of the 
stimuli.  
Unattended Dimension. Categorization accuracy for generalization along the 
unattended dimension is shown in Figure 4.13a. The data were analyzed in a similar 
way to Experiment 1, but looking only at linear trends and associated interactions. 
Similarly to Experiment 1, there was no significant linear trend overall, F < 1, and 
this did not interact with test group, F(1,179) = 1.14, p = .287, ηp2 = . 006, attention 
group, F < 1, nor experiment, F < 1. Again, the Consistent group had significantly 
higher categorization accuracy than the Inconsistent group, F(1,179) = 395.3, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .688, presumably because the Consistent group were able to rely on their 
attended dimension while the Inconsistent group could not28.  
 
 
Figure 4.13. Categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for variations on the 
unattended dimension in Experiment 2 (combining Experiments 2A and 2B). Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
4.3.2.5 Typicality Ratings 
 Attended Dimension. The typicality ratings for the attended dimension are 
shown in Figure 4.12b, and were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. There 
was a significant linear trend, F(1,179) = 98.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .355, which interacted 
with test group, F(1,179) = 22.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .110, but not with attention group, 
F(1,179) = 3.14, p = .078, ηp2 = .017, nor experiment, F < 1. The linear trend was also 
significant within the Consistent and Inconsistent groups, smallest F(1,86) = 13.22, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .133. Similarly to Experiment 1, the linear trends show that for the 
Consistent group, the highest categorization accuracy was achieved for the test stimuli 
that participants considered to be least typical of the category, providing further 
                                                
28 In contrast to Experiment 1, the Inconsistent group did not perform significantly better than chance 
at categorizing test stimuli that varied on the unattended dimension, t(89) = 1.10, p = .137 (one-tailed).  
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evidence that participants in the Consistent group were generalizing on the basis of a 
relational rule. A monotonic gradient in categorization accuracy can always be argued 
to be the rise of a peak shift that spans a large width of the category dimension 
(Livesey & McLaren, 2009), but the presence of these descending typicality gradients 
confirms that the monotonic gradient in categorization is based on more than just the 
perceived similarity of the test stimuli to those seen in training.   
Unattended Dimension. There was a significant overall linear trend for 
typicality ratings in the unattended dimension (Figure 4.13b), F(1,179) = 76.6, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .300, with steeper gradients in the Consistent group than the Inconsistent 
group, F(1,179) = 9.56, p = .002, ηp2 = .051. The linear trend was also significant in 
both Consistent and Inconsistent groups, smallest F(1,86) = 18.52, p < .001, ηp2 =.177.  
 
4.3.2.6 Summary 
In Experiment 2A and 2B, participants were explicitly instructed to attend to a 
particular dimension. For category judgements of stimuli varying along the attended 
dimension, evidence was found of reduced accuracy in the Inconsistent group, as well 
as a different pattern of generalization to the Consistent group. Importantly, neither of 
these effects interacted with experiment, suggesting that reducing the applicability of 
a rule on test disrupted rule-based generalization, and this was not due to differences 
in the physical stimuli presented. Planned analyses revealed that in the Consistent 
group, a monotonic gradient of generalization was present, consistent with rule use, 
and in the Inconsistent group, a significant peak shift effect was found, consistent 
with generalization on the basis of similarity to physical features. Further evidence for 
generalization on the basis of a rule was provided by the typicality ratings, where the 
Consistent group performed at the highest level of accuracy for stimuli they rated to 
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be the least typical of the category. Interestingly, the test manipulation affected not 
just category judgements but perceptions of typicality, with the Inconsistent group 
showing a flatter gradient in their typicality ratings. While there were some higher-
order interactions with attention group, and experiment (see Appendix E for the full 
results), the key results discussed above were not found to interact with experiment or 
attention group.   
The peak shift in the Inconsistent group is surprising given previous literature 
demonstrating that peak shift only occurs in the absence of a relational rule (e.g. 
Aitken, 1996; Livesey & McLaren, 2009), and since the majority (77/90) of 
participants in the Inconsistent group were able to correctly identify the rule-relevant 
difference between categories. The fact that participants were explicitly directed to 
use a particular dimension during training, and the fact that participants were 
excluded if they claimed that they did not notice any difference between the 
categories during training given this hint, leaves little chance that the remaining 
participants were mostly guessing correctly. 
It should also be noted that while a peak shift was found in the Inconsistent 
group, the linear trend was also significant, F(1,86) = 5.92, p = .017, ηp2 = .064, 
suggesting that perhaps participants were generalizing on the basis of a rule and 
similarity. This might be expected if participants have derived a rule and are simply 
unsure whether to use it and therefore show a mixture of generalization gradients. The 
effect of reducing rule validity might therefore be to undermine certainty or 
confidence in applying the rule, and it may be the case that this certainty changes on a 
trial-by-trial basis, with the pattern of generalization dictated by rule applicability on 
the previous trial.  
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4.4 Sequential Reanalysis 
To test this hypothesis, a post-hoc sequential analysis was conducted of the 
categorization data in both experiments whereby the critical test trials where the 
attended dimension was varied were divided into ‘repetition’ and ‘alternation’ trials. 
Repetition refers to trials where the previous trial varied the same dimension (and 
therefore a rule on the attended dimension was previously applicable in both groups), 
and alternation refers to trials where the previous trial varied the other (unattended) 
dimension (and therefore a rule on the attended dimension was not previously 
applicable in the Inconsistent group but was applicable in the Consistent group). The 
data from the subgroup in Experiment 1 who were able to notice differences in at least 
one dimension during training were combined with the data from Experiment 2, with 
experiment (1 vs. 2) added to the analysis as a between-subjects factor. The results for 
the sequential analysis are shown in Figure 4.14a, with the corresponding typicality 
ratings shown in Figure 4.14b. It is firstly apparent that the Consistent groups show 
roughly monotonic gradients for both repetition and alternation trials, but the 
Inconsistent groups are showing different patterns of generalization based on the 
previous trial. Since this is a post-hoc analysis, only the results of interest will be 
reported.  
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Figure 4.14. Sequential analysis: categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for 
variations on the attended dimension on trials where a rule was applicable on the 
previous trial (repetition trials) or was not applicable on the previous trial (alternation 
trials). The data combine the subgroup from Experiment 1 who reported noticing 
differences in at least one dimension during training (n = 85) and participants in 
Experiment 2 (n = 187).  
 
4.4.1 Inconsistent Group 
The data for the Inconsistent group were analyzed in a 2x(2x5) ANOVA with 
experiment (1 vs. 2) as the between-subjects factor and previous trial (repetition vs. 
alternation) and test stimulus as within-subjects factors. There was an effect of 
previous trial on overall accuracy, F(1,125) = 5.34, p = .022, ηp2 = .041, with lower 
accuracy for trials where the rule could not be used on the previous trial. There was a 
significant overall linear trend, F(1,125) = 5.42, p = .021, ηp2 = .042, that did not 
interact with experiment, F < 1, but importantly, did interact with previous trial, 
F(1,125) = 4.77, p = .031, ηp2 = .037. The interaction between linear trend and 
previous trial did not further interact with experiment, F < 1. Planned analyses 
showed that a significant linear trend was present in the repetition trials, F(1,125) = 
10.65, p = .001, ηp2 = .079, but not in the alternation trials, F < 1. Instead for the 
alternation trials, using the Near1 point, there was a significant rise in accuracy from 
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the Train stimulus, t(126) = 4.99, p < .001, d = .416, and a significant fall in accuracy 
to the Far stimulus, t(126) = 3.68, p < .001, d = .330 (see Figure 4.14a). Thus while an 
overall linear trend was found, this appears to have been driven by the repetition trials, 
suggesting that participants were consistently using a relational rule only on trials 
where the previous trial varied the attended dimension, which might have made them 
more certain that their rule was applicable. On trials where the previous trial varied 
the other dimension and their rule could not be used, participants did not consistently 
generalize using a relational rule but instead generalized on the basis of similarity, 
showing a peak shift.  
 
4.4.2 Consistent Group 
The Consistent group also showed a significant overall linear trend, F(1,143) 
= 11.38, p = .001, ηp2 = .074, but unlike the Inconsistent group, this did not interact 
with previous trial, F < 1 (see Figure 4.14a). There was also no main effect of 
previous trial, F < 1, and none of these results interacted with experiment, largest 
F(1,143) = 1.64, p = .203, ηp2 = .011. Whether the same or different dimension was 
varied on the previous trial had no effect on generalization in the Consistent group, 
who showed consistent rule-based generalization throughout test, since they could use 
their rule on every trial.  
 
4.4.3 Summary 
Within the same participants in the Inconsistent group, a peak-shifted and 
monotonic gradient of generalization were both observed, depending on the 
applicability of a rule on the previous trial. In contrast, the typicality ratings in the 
Inconsistent group did not appear to differ in the same way (see Figure 4.14b), 
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suggesting that what was changing on a trial-by-trial basis was participants’ tendency 
to use a relational rule based on its recent applicability, rather than changing 
perceptions of similarity between the test and training stimuli. This analysis reinforces 
the conclusion that disrupting rule use serves to undermine participants’ certainty or 
proficiency in applying their rule and leads them to switch between generalizing on 
the basis of rules and similarity on a trial-by-trial basis. The results of this sequential 
analysis indicate that participants apply rules in a flexible way as a function of recent 
difficulty in the applicability of the rule, suggesting a possible condition that can limit 
rule use.  
 
4.5 General Discussion 
 In two experiments, categorization accuracy and typicality ratings were 
compared between a group who were able to derive a relational category rule during 
training and apply that rule consistently on test, and a group who could only apply 
that rule easily on half of the trials on test and therefore only use that rule 
inconsistently. During training, the color and size of stimulus features were predictive 
of category membership and it appeared that in Experiment 1, and especially in 
Experiment 2, participants attended to one of the dimensions and used that dimension 
to derive a relational category rule. On test, participants either experienced test trials 
where information was present on both color and size dimensions, making a rule on 
the attended dimension relatively easy to apply on all trials (Consistent group), or test 
trials where information was only present on the attended dimension on half of the 
test trials, making a rule concerning the attended dimension very difficult to apply on 
50% of trials and thereby rendering its application on test inconsistent (Inconsistent 
group). The test trials of interest were those in which the rule was clearly valid and 
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easy to apply in both groups (i.e. where the attended dimension was varied). Although 
participants showed good evidence of learning and reported noticing simple relational 
rules, when rule application was made difficult on test, a peak-shifted generalization 
gradient emerged, with declining accuracy at the extrema of the test range. This 
suggests that participants engaged in both rule-based and feature-based generalization 
during test, with the expression of each varying according to the difficulty of applying 
the rule on the previous trial.  
Although the general pattern of results were similar between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 (compare Figure 4.8a and 4.12a), predicted differences in the pattern of 
generalization between Consistent and Inconsistent groups were not apparent 
statistically in Experiment 1. Experiment 1 found numerically lower categorization 
accuracy in the Inconsistent group but the resulting generalization gradient was 
roughly monotonic in both Consistent and Inconsistent groups (based on a significant 
positive linear trend and the absence of statistical evidence of peak-shift). In 
Experiment 2, when participants were explicitly told to attend to a particular 
dimension in order to encourage reliance on a rule during training, divergent patterns 
of generalization in the Consistent and Inconsistent groups became much clearer. The 
Inconsistent group performed at a lower level of accuracy than the Consistent group 
and also produced a different pattern of generalization. The Consistent group in 
Experiment 2 showed a monotonic gradient of generalization consistent with rule use. 
Although the Inconsistent group also showed an increasing gradient as revealed by a 
significant linear trend, the gradient was also peak-shifted, with a significant decline 
in accuracy at the extrema despite a large proportion of participants (77/90) being able 
to identify the relational category rule. This is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
the first demonstration of peak shift in categorization despite self-reported knowledge 
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of a simple relational rule derived during training, and suggests that when rule use is 
disrupted, participants revert to generalizing on the basis of similarity.  
Further, the sequential analysis showed a within-participant dissociation in 
generalization based on whether the rule was applicable on the previous trial. Rule 
applicability on the previous trial had no effect on the monotonic gradients in the 
Consistent group, while in the Inconsistent group the overall linear trend interacted 
with previous trial. Follow-up analyses in the Inconsistent group showed a peak shift 
only on trials where they could not use their primary rule easily on the previous trial, 
and a monotonic gradient only on trials where they could use their rule on the 
previous trial. This not only confirms that participants in the Inconsistent group did 
acquire a rule but also reinforces the conclusion that reducing rule applicability on test 
serves to undermine the likelihood of applying that rule. In contrast, participants in 
the Consistent group showed a monotonic gradient that was unaffected by the nature 
of the previous trial, presumably since their rule was applicable on all test trials.  
 
4.5.1 Mechanisms Responsible for Monotonic Generalization Gradients 
Monotonic gradients of generalization over a wide range of test stimuli are 
most easily interpreted as indicative of the use of a relational rule. However, one 
problem with assuming that monotonic categorization is synonymous with relational 
rule use is that the same pattern can be derived from other psychological processes. 
An associative model (e.g. Ghirlanda & Enquist, 1998) can, in principle, simulate a 
monotonic gradient if a broad generalization gradient is assumed which spans a wide 
range of the dimension (Livesey & McLaren, 2009). The monotonic gradient can thus 
be interpreted as the rise in accuracy in a peak shift that has not been given the 
opportunity to come down due to testing a limited range. The inclusion of typicality 
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ratings addresses this problem to some extent. It is clear that the Consistent group, 
who show greater evidence of a monotonic gradient, do not show broader 
generalization on the typicality ratings. In fact, generalization gradients for typicality 
fell more sharply in this group compared to the Inconsistent group. The typicality 
ratings complement the evidence from self-report measures that monotonic gradients 
are correlated with identification of the underlying relationships between stimuli. This 
evidence is important because relying on self-report measures to divide and compare 
participants is effectively correlational and, furthermore, it has been argued that 
participants have poor introspective skills and can report knowledge of rules that were 
not responsible for their behavior at test (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The declining 
typicality ratings for the Consistent group lend some validity to using self-report 
measures to assess rule use and category knowledge.  
 
4.5.2 Mechanisms Responsible for Peak-shifted Generalization Gradients 
It is tempting to conclude that the peak shift shown in the Inconsistent group 
in Experiment 2 is due to the same basic associative processes used to explain peak 
shift in animals, especially since it was found under conditions where rule application 
was hindered. Error-correction learning models account for the peak shift 
phenomenon with impressive quantitative precision (Blough, 1975; Ghirlanda & 
Enquist, 1998; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002), while it is not clear how a rule-based 
account could explain why accuracy was best at a stimulus slightly removed from the 
training values . When considered in light of the human literature on peak shift, the 
results in this chapter seem wholly consistent with the idea that associative processes 
always operate in human categorization or discrimination studies, but are usually 
masked by higher-order rule-learning which dominates performance at test (Livesey 
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& McLaren, 2009). Relational rules, especially simple ones that are easy to articulate 
and apply, should reduce the difficulty of discriminating between categories and thus 
it is to the participants’ advantage to search for a rule to improve their performance. If 
rules have primacy over associative information in governing responding, then only 
when the task requirements and stimuli make it difficult to derive a rule (e.g. Aitken, 
1996; Wills & Mackintosh, 1998) can evidence of peak shift emerge.  
It is also possible that participants in the Inconsistent group were generalizing 
on the basis of a conservative similarity rule that describes the physical characteristics 
of the experienced category. Note that the content of learning in a rule of this form is 
still clearly different to the content of learning of a relational rule that describes the 
relationships between the stimuli. Peak shift can be explained if we assume that 
participants are adopting a conservative decision-rule (e.g. “respond left when the 
circles are mostly small, but not too small”) whereby the training stimuli are still too 
similar to each other to enable confident categorization but the stimuli that are slightly 
more extreme are less likely to suffer from confusability. An alterative explanation is 
that participants encode an average value of all the stimuli currently seen, and use this 
stored stimulus as a referent to then compare all subsequent stimuli against (Capehart, 
Tempone, & Hébert, 1969; Thomas, 1993). Participants may then form a rule such as 
“respond left when the circles are slightly smaller than the average”. Again, since the 
training stimuli only deviate slightly from the average, participants are most accurate 
in categorization on test stimuli that are very similar to the training stimuli but more 
dissimilar to the opposite category (i.e. the Near1 test stimulus). Whatever the exact 
specification of the similarity rule, the results of the sequential analysis can be 
explained by participants switching between two rules – one based on similarity and 
the other based on relations.  
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Alternatively a peak shift may represent relational rule use that is affected by 
stimulus similarity. Participants may know, for example, that artworks in the left 
category had smaller circles, but at the extreme ends of the dimension where the 
circles become very small, participants may be uncertain of the applicability of their 
rule due to the stimuli being dissimilar to the training stimuli. Although possible, this 
explanation seems unlikely due to the reasonable limits on the range of each 
dimension tested (see Figure 4.5). There is no obvious reason why participants would 
regard their rule as applicable to the Near1 stimuli but not to the Near3 and Far 
stimuli. Still, the evidence showing that rule use is affected by similarity between test 
and training stimuli (e.g. Allen & Brooks, 1991; Hahn et al., 2010) suggests that 
further exploration of the nature of rules that participants derive and their willingness 
to extrapolate that rule on extreme test stimuli is needed. Whether similarity-based 
generalization in humans is accomplished via learning an explicit similarity rule, or 
through non-rule-like associative learning processes is difficult to determine 
empirically since both accounts make essentially the same predictions. In any case, 
similarity-based generalization certainly does not require an explanation in terms of 
rules, and it is clear that the content of learning differs to that of generalization based 
on a relational rule. 
 
4.5.3 Interaction between Rules and Similarity 
Livesey and McLaren (2009) showed that the emergence of a relational rule 
during test resulted in a peak-shifted gradient being replaced by a monotonic one, 
leading them to suggest that the operation of rule learning and other executive 
processes meant that evidence of associative processes would be hard to find. The 
current study however, shows that the presence of a relational rule does not entail that 
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evidence of associative learning will be overridden. Rather, the results from the 
sequential analysis shows that under certain conditions, relational rules can only be 
fully expressed on trials where participants are confident that it is applicable. This is 
also consistent with Natal, McLaren, and Livesey (2013), who argued that the content 
of associative learning enters into category judgements along with rules and is subject 
to cognitive control. In their study, they found different levels of accuracy and 
patterns of generalization based on whether participants could verbalize a relational 
category rule. However, they found that both rule-learners and feature-learners were 
able to reverse the category assignments when asked to, suggesting that associative 
learning in this context does not automatically bias actions and instead is subject to 
cognitive control. Similarly, the fact that peak shift was found in Experiment 2 once 
rule use was disrupted suggests that knowledge about the physical features of the 
stimuli and a relational rule are stored concurrently, with associative learning 
expressed only under conditions where participants are not willing or able to use a 
rule. Similar to Livesey and McLaren (2009) and Natal, McLaren, and Livesey (2013), 
the current results indicate that higher-order rule learning and learning about physical 
features of stimuli are integrated into category judgements and that there is a certain 
degree of cognitive control over how participants generalize. The results are 
consistent with the idea that associative learning processes operate alongside rule 
learning, but may not always be expressed due to rule-based generalization having 
priority on test (McLaren et al., 2014). The primacy of rules is supported by literature 
indicating that participants prefer to use a single dimension when confronted with 
categorization tasks involving stimuli with multiple dimensions (Ahn & Medin, 1992; 
Regehr & Brooks, 1995), and the success of models which assume that participants 
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initially search for simple rules and then memorize exceptions (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & 
McKinley, 1994).  
These findings are also relevant to theories of categorization that propose two 
separate, qualitatively different learning processes (e.g. Ashby et al., 1998; Smith, 
Patalano, & Jonides, 1998), as well as hybrid models of categorization. Hybrid 
models assume that rule- and similarity-based processes are qualitatively similar (e.g. 
Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Pothos, 2005, Verguts & Fias, 2009), but vary based on 
the number of dimensions they consider (Pothos, 2005), or the abstractness of the 
feature that is considered (Verguts & Fias, 2009) or attention to rules or exemplars 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). In particular, models that assume competitive 
processes with only a single process ‘winning’ and determining behavior would need 
to incorporate an assessment of rule applicability to explain these results. With both 
dual-process and hybrid models of categorization, the utility of a process is assumed 
to determine its use (Hahn et al., 2010). Thus these models could conclude that the 
test manipulation reduced the utility of using a rule, and therefore its ability to 
influence responding decreased. This explanation assumes awareness of the reduction 
in utility of a rule on test, in the absence of feedback. Further studies investigating 
factors that cause participants to switch between using relational rules and similarity 
may further inform the development of models that assume competitive processes, 
whether qualitatively distinct or similar.  
Although the sequential analysis demonstrates that participants switch 
between monotonic and peak-shifted patterns of generalization, the experiments in 
this chapter cannot reveal whether the switch was due to a conscious decision to use 
or refrain from using a rule, or alternatively whether the conditions at test ‘activated’ 
a representation of the rule which determined its use. Participants’ certainty or 
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confidence in their rule may have been directly affected as a result of its applicability 
on the previous trial, and therefore participants may have made a conscious decision 
whether or not to use the rule based on this changing degree of uncertainty. 
Alternatively, the changes in rule applicability on a trial-to-trial basis may have 
strengthened or weakened ‘activation’ of the rule in a similar manner to activation of 
outcomes via associative strength, and lead to participants being more or less willing 
to use their rule. Note that this latter explanation implies that there is much less 
cognitive control over rule use than the former explanation.  
 
4.5.4 Typicality Ratings 
Interestingly, typicality gradients were steeper for the Consistent Group than 
the Inconsistent group in Experiment 2 (Figure 4.12b). The flatter typicality gradient 
in the attended dimension for the Inconsistent group can be explained if we assume 
that participants are attending less to their attended dimension than group Consistent. 
Disrupting rule validity on test may have led participants in group Inconsistent to 
search for additional information other than their attended dimension to aid their 
judgements. Since at test it is now obvious that two dimensions are varying, 
participants may have started focusing on the unattended dimension as well. As these 
values did not change between stimuli, typicality ratings incorporating the unattended 
dimension would thus be flatter. However, since the same pattern of results was also 
found for the stimuli that actually did vary along the unattended dimension, a more 
likely explanation is that participants may have started to attend to the irrelevant 
features of the stimuli (e.g. the location of circles), which would also have had the 
same effect. In fact, any attention directed away from the attended dimension when 
judging typicality would have made the typicality gradient flatter.  
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Further, since the group difference did not interact with experiment, these 
results cannot be explained using differences in the ‘attended dimension’ stimuli 
presented to the Consistent and Inconsistent groups on test, since these were equated 
in Experiment 2B. It would seem that when a rule is rendered less valid on test in the 
Inconsistent group, participants overgeneralize perceptions of typicality to non-typical 
category members in comparison to the Consistent group, effectively considering 
dissimilar stimuli as being typical of the category. This may reflect uncertainty in the 
boundaries of the category as a direct result of the lack of applicability of a rule. This 
is an intriguing result as it suggests that undermining the applicability of a relational 
rule has effects not just on categorization accuracy but also when judging perceptions 
of similarity of novel category members. Whether this was a direct result of 
disrupting rule use or the result of changes in attention is not determinable in these 
experiments, and is a potential avenue for future research. 
Another interesting result regarding the typicality ratings for test stimuli 
varying the unattended dimension was that in Experiment 2, descending typicality 
ratings were found in both groups despite flat generalization gradients for 
categorization. In other words, despite a lack of stimulus control by the unattended 
dimension in categorization judgements, it seems that participants in both groups 
were sensitive to variations in the unattended dimension in their typicality judgements. 
This might suggest that participants did actually learn about the physical features of 
the unattended dimension despite the hint directing them to attend to the other 
dimension. The dissociation in categorization and typicality may reflect the fact that 
participants were selectively focusing on their attended dimension in order to use a 
rule on this dimension when making categorization judgements (which would have 
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resulted in a flat generalization gradient), but considering both dimensions when 
rating the typicality of the stimuli.  
 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results in this chapter show that in simple category learning, 
the presence of a relational rule does not necessarily entail that a monotonic gradient 
of generalization will result. Rather, whether the test conditions make that rule 
applicable determines whether participants show a monotonic or a peak-shifted 
gradient of generalization. When rule application on test was consistent, participants 
generalized using a relational rule, but when rule application on test was rendered 
inconsistent, participants may have been uncertain of their rule and reverted to 
generalizing on the basis of similarity. A within-subjects demonstration of 
participants switching between rule- and similarity-based generalization as a function 
of rule applicability on the previous trial was provided, suggesting that both kinds of 
learning are stored concurrently, and their respective influences on behavior can 
change dynamically throughout test. 
 
 
  
  
213 
 
 
  
  
214 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate the differences in learning that occur 
as a result of changing the verbal instructions to a range of putatively implicit and/or 
associative learning tasks. This involved primarily comparing learning under 
incidental (uninstructed) conditions with conditions where participants had the 
intention to learn about specific stimulus attributes. This chapter will summarize the 
results in each paradigm, address the research questions posed in the General 
Introduction, and discuss the implications of these results for theories of learning.  
 
5.1 Summary of Results 
5.1.1 Sequence Learning 
 Sequence learning, as investigated in the serial reaction time (SRT) task, is 
considered to be one of the best examples of implicit learning since participants make 
speeded responses to targets and do not usually suspect the presence of contingencies 
in the underlying sequence of responses (Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998; Destrebecqz 
& Cleeremans, 2003). Chapter 2 looked at the effects of providing a written hint to 
encourage discovery of a relational rule describing a set of probabilistic contingencies 
in a SRT task. Participants in both groups were asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to a target that could appear in one of three locations (left, top, 
or right) on screen, by pressing the corresponding arrow key. The target was 
constrained such that it could not appear in the same location on two successive trials, 
meaning that the target always moved in a clockwise or anti-clockwise direction on 
each trial. Unbeknownst to the No Hint group, the target locations followed a 
probabilistic sequence such that 75% of the time, the target would move in a 
particular (cued, randomly chosen to be clockwise or anti-clockwise for each 
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participant) direction, and the remaining 25% of the time, the target would move in 
the opposite (miscued) direction. The Hint group were given written instructions 
telling them that most of the time, the target would be moving in one direction, and 
that they should try and figure out which direction this was, while the No Hint group 
performed the task in the absence of this information. The dependent measure of 
interest indexing sequence learning was the cueing effect (difference in RT on cued 
and miscued trials), but explicit knowledge tests were also added after the SRT task to 
ensure that the hint was having the desired effect of promoting rule learning and 
increasing explicit sequence knowledge.  
 Experiments 2.1 (Chapter 2, Experiment 1) and 2.2 sought to establish the 
pattern of sequential effects that could result in the novel three-choice SRT task 
devised in Chapter 2. Sequential effects are differences in performance that eventuate 
due to the recent history of trials, and occur regardless of whether contingencies (i.e. 
an actual sequence) are present. It was important to investigate sequential effects 
because they are well established in other two-choice RT tasks (e.g. Bertelson, 1961; 
Remington, 1969; Soetans, Boer, & Hueting, 1985), and sequential effects have been 
noted to contaminate measures of sequence learning (Jones, Curran, Mozer, & Wilder, 
2013). Across Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, it was shown that a reliable pattern of 
sequential effects was found in both the reaction times (RT) and error data. The same 
overall pattern was displayed in the absence of contingencies in both Experiments 2.1 
and 2.2, and on cued and miscued trials following experience with the probabilistic 
contingencies in Experiment 2.2. While reliable interactions were found when 
dividing the subsequences according to the directions of the third- and fourth-order 
transitions, the largest sequential effects were found at the second-order level, 
specifically comparing subsequences consisting of a repetition of target direction 
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(XYZ subsequences) to subsequences consisting of an alternation of target direction 
(ZYZ subsequences). Participants were both slower and less accurate to respond on 
ZYZ trials in both Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, and this difference was present on both 
cued and miscued trials in Experiment 2.2 after the contingencies were removed, 
suggesting that sequential effects and sequence learning are additive in this context. 
Due to the potential for this sequential effect to inflate the magnitude of the overall 
cueing effect due to the relative imbalance of XYZ and ZYZ subsequences in cued 
and miscued trials (see Table 2.2), Experiments 2.3-2.6 examined sequence learning 
on XYZ and ZYZ trials separately to control for this potential confound. This 
separation of the analyses by subsequence turned out to be a critical for the group 
differences found in the subsequent experiments.  
 Experiments 2.3-2.5 compared cueing effects between a Hint group, who were 
given a written hint encouraging them to work out the direction that the target would 
be traveling in “most of the time”, and a No Hint group, who performed the task as 
usual under incidental learning conditions. Experiments 2.3 and 2.4 found selective 
effects of the hint in increasing the size of the cueing effect, with the hint improving 
performance for XYZ subsequences, but not for ZYZ subsequences, while 
Experiment 2.5 found a general advantage for the Hint group for both XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences. The results of Experiment 2.6 suggested that the difference in the 
effect of the hint between Experiments 2.3-2.4 and Experiment 2.5 was due to a 
difference in the way the hint was delivered to participants in Experiment 2.5. 
Experiment 2.6 compared a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ version of the hint: one where 
participants were given the written hint to read (as was the case in Experiments 2.3 
and 2.4), and one where the experimenter read out the hint to the participant and 
emphasized that there was a correct answer that would either be clockwise or 
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anticlockwise. Experiment 2.6 found that this stronger version of the hint selectively 
increased the cueing effect for ZYZ subsequences, whereas cuing for XYZ 
subsequences was equivalent for the weak and strong forms of the hint. This finding 
from Experiment 2.6 suggested that these subtle differences in the delivery of the hint 
in Experiment 2.5 compared to Experiments 2.3-2.4 allowed participants in the Hint 
group to express their knowledge on both XYZ and ZYZ subsequences. 
Experiments 2.4 and 2.5 revealed significantly better performance on the 
explicit knowledge tests by the Hint group suggesting that the hint was effective in 
increasing the amount of explicit sequence knowledge. Above-chance performance 
was also found for the No Hint group in Experiment 2.5, but not in Experiments 2.3-
2.4, suggesting that the No Hint groups had some degree of explicit sequence 
knowledge that was difficult to detect. Despite the inconsistent performance of the No 
Hint groups in the explicit knowledge tests within these experiments, significant 
cueing effects for both subsequences in RT performance were found across 
Experiments 2.3-2.5. Experiments 2.4-2.5 also implemented a transfer phase at the 
end of the training phase to assess whether the hint afforded better transfer in 
situations where the contingencies were removed but explicit sequence knowledge 
was still applicable. The transfer phase in Experiment 2.4 where the target locations 
were changed to the left, bottom, and right of the screen, eliminated cueing effects in 
both groups. A different transfer phase in Experiment 2.5 showed that cueing effects 
persisted when participants switched hands to respond but this did not differ between 
groups or subsequences. These results suggest that the hint did not benefit transfer in 
SRT performance once features of the task were changed, and that retention of the 
perceptual features of the task, but not the motor component (i.e. the hand used to 
respond) was important for exhibiting transfer of sequence knowledge.   
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The results in Chapter 2 suggest that sequence learning is affected by abstract, 
explicit knowledge, contrary to previous studies showing a lack of benefit of explicit 
sequence knowledge with probabilistic contingencies (Jiménez, Méndez, & 
Cleeremans, 1996; Stefaniak et al., 2008). At the same time, the benefit of explicit 
learning in SRT tasks was found to be highly dependent on the exact instructions 
given, as well as the properties of the subsequences to be learned. It is clear that 
simply drawing conclusions about the cognitive penetrability of implicit learning 
from the benefit or lack of benefit of explicit knowledge is too simplistic, since within 
the same participants, Experiments 2.3 and 2.4 found that it is possible for explicit 
knowledge to benefit learning on some subsequences and not others. Further, the hint 
had a limited benefit in regards to transfer performance in Experiments 2.4 and 2.5, 
and large cueing effects were found in the absence of the hint, suggesting that the role 
of explicit knowledge in sequence learning (and perhaps motor learning in general) 
may be limited (see Sanchez & Reber, 2013, for a similar conclusion). 
 
5.1.2 The Prototype Distortion Task 
 Chapter 3 examined another paradigm where learning has been claimed to be 
implicit – the prototype distortion task. In this task, participants are usually exposed to 
a set of visually similar stimuli constructed around a category (A) ‘prototype’ (the 
average or ideal exemplar), and then tested on their ability to categorize novel stimuli 
into that same category (make A/not-A judgements), as well as their ability to 
recognize the exemplars that they were shown (make old/new judgements). Learning 
in this task has traditionally been considered to be implicit because of the intact 
categorization performance of amnesic patients who exhibit impaired memory of seen 
exemplars (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1993).  
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The experiments in Chapter 3 tested an often-assumed property of learning in 
the prototype distortion task – its emergence under incidental conditions. Much of the 
prototype distortion literature uses an exposure phase where participants are not told 
about the existence of a category or the nature of subsequent tasks, but require 
participants to perform an alternative task where they may learn incidentally (e.g. 
pointing to the center dot, Knowlton & Squire; thinking about the appearance of the 
stimuli, Bozoki, Grossman, & Smith, 2006). Chapter 3 employed a more cognitively-
engaging visual search task as a means of incidental exposure to test whether learning 
about prototype-centered stimuli could occur automatically, and whether any 
differences would arise between this Search group and a group who were told to 
memorize a set of prototype-centered stimuli for a subsequent memory test 
(Memorize group).  
Two novel sets of stimuli were constructed for these experiments – one 
involving 10 lines and the other involving 10 circles, and their respective features 
were distorted in systematic ways to create the category exemplars. The dependent 
measure of interest was familiarity ratings for old (previously seen) and new stimuli at 
matched levels of distortion. A descending prototypicality gradient (highest ratings 
for low distortions of the prototype and lowest ratings for high distortions of the 
prototype) was taken to be indicative of learning the similarity structure of the 
category, and higher familiarity ratings for old than new stimuli were taken to be 
indicative of recognition ability.  
Experiment 3.1 sought to establish whether prototypicality gradients could 
occur in the absence of exposure, in order to control for this learning-at-test effect in 
subsequent experiments. This was important to confirm whether any incidental 
learning that resulted was actually due to the exposure phase and not to participants 
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explicitly learning about the category during the test phase. Using a mock-subliminal 
procedure (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999), whereby participants were misled into 
believing that they were presented with subliminal stimuli, Experiment 3.1 found 
‘false’ prototypicality gradients despite no exposure to the stimuli prior to the test 
phase, and no differences between recognition and categorization tests. Steeper 
prototypicality gradients and higher ratings for old stimuli were found in both 
categorization and familiarity tests in a separate group of participants who were 
exposed to the stimuli. Thus, the stimuli created for these experiments appeared to be 
subject to the same learning-at-test effects that have been demonstrated using other 
sets of stimuli (Bozoki, Grossman, & Smith, 2006; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). The 
size of the false prototypicality gradient after mock-subliminal exposure was then 
used as a point of comparison to determine whether incidental learning about the 
category occurred in the Search groups in subsequent experiments. 
 Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 used a familiarity test to assess both recognition and 
the prototypicality gradient. The choice to use a single measure was motivated by the 
suggestion that parameter differences between categorization and recognition tasks 
might be responsible for dissociations between amnesic patients and healthy controls 
despite both indexing the same memory trace (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Zaki et al., 
2003). Using the same familiarity test to assess both category learning (through the 
prototypicality gradient) and recognition (through comparison of ratings for old and 
new test stimuli) should minimize these parameter differences. Experiments 2 and 3 
compared learning between two groups: a Memorize group who were required to 
memorize the stimuli for a subsequent memory test (which they were aware of), and a 
Search group who were required to search through the stimuli for an ‘odd one out’ 
and respond according to the identify of that target (whether the line width was 
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thicker or thinner, similar to contextual cueing, see Chun & Jiang, 1998). The visual 
search task was assumed to engage participants’ cognitive functions more extensively 
than previous incidental learning conditions in the prototype distortion task, where 
there was no way to assess whether participants were actively performing their given 
task (e.g. pointing to the center dot, Knowlton & Squire, 1993). Indeed, the high level 
of accuracy in the visual search task suggested that participants were sufficiently 
engaged in their task during the exposure phase.  
 Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 were identical except that the number of trials in the 
exposure phase was doubled in Experiment 3.3. In both experiments, explicit 
memorization of the stimuli led to a steeper prototypicality gradient, but did not result 
in a clear improvement of recognition. Surprisingly, the Search groups were found to 
show above-chance levels of discrimination between old and new exemplars, 
suggesting that they had learned incidentally about the stimuli during exposure, but 
their prototypicality gradient was found to be no greater than the false prototypicality 
gradient exhibited after mock-subliminal exposure in Experiment 3.1. Experiment 3.3 
added another Search group where the stimulus disappeared after a response was 
made (Search-Terminate group), to test whether any incidental learning that occurred 
in the Search groups could be attributed to explicit learning that occurred in the 
residual exposure time after the target was found and a response was made. No 
differences were found between the Search and Search-Terminate groups in 
Experiment 3.3, suggesting that any incidental learning that occurred in the Search 
groups did in fact result from visual search.  
  The experiments in Chapter 3 found no support for the idea that learning 
about a prototype-centered category of stimuli could occur incidentally, since the 
prototypicality gradient in the Search groups was found to be no different to the 
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magnitude of the false prototypicality gradient exhibited in the absence of exposure. 
Mysteriously though, some learning must have occurred during visual search since the 
Search groups were able to recognize exemplars they had seen before. A tentative 
explanation was offered alluding to the possibility of differences in the stimulus 
features encoded as a result of explicit memorization or visual search (encoding of the 
configural or specific features of the stimuli respectively). In any case, it was clear 
that instructions inducing an intention to learn about the stimuli produced a stronger 
prototypicality gradient and therefore suggests that learning about prototype-centered 
categories of stimuli is enhanced by intentional memorization. This was the case even 
though the stimuli were complex, composed of multiple features and difficult to 
describe verbally or by using a simple rule. Thus, learning in the prototype distortion 
task is not implicit in the sense of resulting automatically from incidental exposure, 
and studies using the prototype distortion task should consider the nature of the 
encoding conditions carefully and account for learning-at-test effects by using a 
mock-subliminal control group (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999).  
 
5.1.3 Post-Discrimination Generalization 
 Chapter 4 examined differences in the pattern of generalization as a function 
of instructed attention and rule applicability at test. The stimuli used in Chapter 4 
were similar to the circle stimuli used in Chapter 3 and comprised of 10 circles of 
varying sizes, colors and locations on a black square background. Participants were 
required to solve a categorization task where the stimuli differed on two dimensions 
(color and size of each circle) that were perfectly correlated during training (e.g. 
category 1 had greener and smaller circles and category 2 had bluer and larger circles). 
There were two between-subjects variables of interest. The first was selective 
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attention to either the color or size of the circles. The attended and unattended 
dimension was determined post-hoc in Experiment 4.1 but was explicitly manipulated 
through instructions in Experiment 4.2. This manipulation produced large differences 
in the pattern of generalization on test in both experiments, with monotonic gradients 
of generalization resulting when the attended dimension was varied, but flat 
generalization gradients when the unattended dimension was varied. These 
generalization gradients indicated that participants formed a relational rule on the 
category dimension on which they were attending during training, no stimulus control 
was acquired by the unattended dimension.  
However, a separate manipulation of rule applicability on test influenced the 
results in a way that was of greater theoretical interest. This manipulation involved 
presenting stimuli on test where a relational rule derived on the attended dimension 
could only be used on half of the test trials. This was achieved by introducing stimuli 
with dimension (color or size) values set at the midpoint of the two categories, such 
that attention to, and use of a relational rule on that dimension was not helpful for 
accurate categorization. Therefore the primary comparison in Chapter 4 was between 
a group where a rule could be used consistently (Consistent group), and a group 
where a rule could only be used inconsistently at test (Inconsistent group).  
In Experiment 4.2, reducing the applicability of a rule at test significantly 
impaired overall accuracy in categorization and changed the pattern of generalization. 
The Consistent group produced a monotonic gradient of generalization, consistent 
with rule use, and the Inconsistent group produced a peak-shifted gradient, consistent 
with similarity-based generalization and analogous discrimination studies in animals 
(e.g. Hanson, 1957). Evidence of rule use in the Consistent group was provided not 
just by the generalization gradient in category judgements on test but also by the 
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typicality ratings. The Consistent group showed the best level of categorization 
accuracy for stimuli at the extreme ends of the dimension, while simultaneously 
acknowledging those same stimuli to be least typical of the category. Interestingly, 
the manipulation of rule application on test not only produced a peak-shifted 
generalization gradient but also a flatter typicality gradient, perhaps indicating some 
uncertainty of the category boundaries as a result of increased rule uncertainty or 
attention to other stimulus features that were irrelevant for accurate categorization.  
None of these group differences were found in Experiment 4.1, although the 
pattern of results appeared to be quite similar between Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. The 
lack of significant group differences in Experiment 4.1 suggests that the effect of 
manipulating rule applicability at test was dependent on verbal instructions directing 
participants to attend to a particular category dimension. The instructions presumably 
facilitated formation of a relational rule on the attended dimension as participants 
would have been attending to that dimension from the beginning of training. This may 
have allowed participants in Experiment 4.2 to discover a rule sooner than 
participants in Experiment 4.1, increasing their confidence in that rule, and perhaps 
allowing for a greater effect of subsequently disrupting application of that rule on test.  
Further, the results of a post-hoc sequential analysis showed in the 
Inconsistent group, a peak shift on trials where their primary rule could not be used on 
the previous trial, but a monotonic gradient on trials where their rule could be used on 
the previous trial. This within-participants demonstration of both peak shift and a 
monotonic gradient was interpreted as participants learning about a relational rule as 
well as the physical features of the stimuli, with uncertainty of rule application on the 
previous trial dictating the pattern of generalization that was expressed.  
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5.2 What are the Effects of Instructions on Learning? 
The empirical questions posed in the General Introduction will now be 
addressed in turn, with the associated theoretical implications discussed for each. 
Verbal instructions were used within this thesis to induce an intention to learn, 
provide explicit knowledge about the content that participants were to learn about, or 
to direct attention towards a specific feature of the stimuli or task. Where possible, 
attempts were made to control for influences on behavior that were unrelated to the 
phenomena of interest (sequential effects in Chapter 2 and learning-at-test in Chapter 
3). The instructions used in this thesis were varied and could have had multiple effects 
on the participants. These effects could include increasing motivation to learn, 
enhancing attention in a general or selective way, or engaging a separate learning 
mechanism that otherwise would not have been engaged. While it is difficult to 
specify exactly how the instructions influenced each participant in each paradigm, 
some inferences can be made based on the manner in which instructions induced 
changes in learning.  
 
5.2.1 General Effects on Motivation and Attention 
The simplest explanation of the results in this thesis is that instructions 
increase motivation to learn by informing the individual that the task contains 
regularities and/or contingencies. This increase in motivation to learn may have 
simply increased overall attention to the task, resulting in general improvements in 
learning. Throughout each chapter, there were results consistent with this 
interpretation. In the SRT task, participants in the Hint group showed a larger cueing 
effect than the No Hint group, and also performed at a higher level of accuracy on the 
explicit knowledge tests. Participants who memorized the stimuli in the prototype 
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distortion task showed steeper prototypicality gradients, suggesting that they had 
learned more about the similarity structure of the category, and participants in 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 were more accurate at categorizing stimuli that varied their 
attended dimension than the unattended dimension.   
However, the benefit of the instructions also showed selectively in its effects. 
In Chapter 2, the hint produced larger cueing effects for one type of subsequence 
(XYZ) but not another (ZYZ) when given in its subtle form. In Chapter 3, 
memorization of the stimuli in the prototype distortion task produced a steeper 
typicality gradient, but did not reliably improve recognition of seen exemplars. In 
Chapter 4, categorization accuracy was better for variations on the attended than the 
unattended dimension but this was modulated by the degree of similarity between the 
test and training stimuli. Thus, while the instructions in each chapter may have 
increased motivation to learn and enhanced overall attention to the task, this alone is 
not sufficient to explain all the results. The findings might be better explained in 
terms of changes in selective attention, or in terms of different learning mechanisms 
operating in each condition.  
 
5.2.2 The Role of Selective Attention 
In Experiments 2.3 and 2.4, a selective benefit of the hint was found on XYZ 
subsequences (trials in which the target direction moved in a consistent direction on 
two consecutive trials, e.g. clockwise – clockwise), while there was no evidence of a 
benefit for ZYZ subsequences (trials in which the target direction alternated, e.g. 
clockwise – anticlockwise). One explanation for this result concerns the relative 
salience of the two subsequences. XYZ subsequences may have been particularly 
salient to the Hint group if they were searching for the predominant direction. Trials 
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on which the target direction repeated may have been particularly salient in either 
reinforcing or disconfirming their hypotheses concerning the cued direction. This 
selective benefit for the most salient subsequences fits well with a capacity-limited 
explicit learning mechanism that searches for useful information and tests hypotheses.  
However, it is possible that participants in the No Hint group also learned 
explicitly, and the effect of the hint simply increased attention (and therefore learning) 
of XYZ subsequences. The general improvement in cueing for both XYZ and ZYZ 
subsequences for the Hint group in Experiment 2.5 might be explained by the 
increased clarity of the strong version of the hint allowing participants to more easily 
attend to ZYZ subsequences. Perhaps in Experiments 2.3 and 2.4, the weak version of 
the hint was ambiguous and due to the probabilistic nature of the contingencies, 
participants entertained more complex rules or thought there was a possibility that the 
cued direction would switch, leading them to closely attend to the direction of the 
target for the whole task and in particular, to trials on which the target direction 
moved consistently. In contrast, clarifying that there was a correct answer that was 
either clockwise or anticlockwise simplified the task by effectively reducing the task 
to deciding on the cued direction. Participants in the Strong Hint group may have 
figured out the cued direction earlier than participants in the Weak Hint group, 
meaning that participants were not actively searching for the cued direction 
throughout the whole task and thus XYZ trials were no longer particularly salient or 
relevant to their hypotheses.  
 The group differences in the prototype distortion task can also be explained 
using selective attention. The Search groups may have learned incidentally as a result 
of visual search, but through encoding the individual features of the stimuli serially 
during their task. In contrast, the instructions given to the Memorize groups 
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specifically asked them to study the stimuli as a whole (see Appendix C), perhaps 
leading them to encode the configural features of the stimuli. Encoding the specific 
features of the stimuli may have allowed the Search groups to recognize seen 
exemplars and show a level of recognition equivalent to the Memorize groups 
because they were employing a similar search strategy at test to find individual 
features that they recognized. However, this strategy may have meant poorer ability to 
detect similarity between exemplars in the Search groups (because they have only 
encoded the specific features of the stimuli and the exemplars were created by 
distorting each feature of the stimuli independently), leading to an impaired ability to 
generalize to novel stimuli on test. Thus, the Search groups’ focus on specific 
stimulus features may have been the reason why the prototypicality gradients were 
similar in magnitude to that observed after mock-subliminal exposure. The 
speculative conclusion was made that previous prototype distortion studies employing 
incidental tasks may have actually encouraged configural encoding of the stimuli, and 
this was responsible for any learning that eventuated and not incidental learning per se.  
  It is easier to infer the role of selective attention in the experiments in Chapter 
4, as attention was explicitly manipulated in Experiment 4.2, and participants were 
asked at the end of the experiment to report the phase in which they noticed 
differences in each dimension. This allowed for exclusion of participants who did not 
attend to the instructed dimension during training in Experiment 4.2. Across both 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, flat generalization gradients were found for test stimuli that 
varied the unattended dimension, indicating a lack of stimulus control and no learning 
of the unattended dimension. In the categorization task employed in this chapter, it 
seemed that attention was necessary for learning about a stimulus dimension. This 
may be partly due to the difficulty of the training phase and the complexity of the 
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stimuli ensuring that attention was maintained to a single dimension throughout 
training. One can easily imagine a situation in which participants master the 
discrimination using their attended dimension and then look for further information to 
assist them in their categorization judgements.29 The differences in the pattern of 
generalization between Consistent and Inconsistent groups however, are more 
difficult to explain in terms of selective attention to physical features. This result will 
be discussed in more detail shortly.  
 In summary, many of the results in this thesis can be explained by changes in 
selective attention as a result of the specific instructions given. This highlights the 
importance of ensuring that task instructions in learning paradigms are not misleading 
or ambiguous, as they can have large effects on what trials participants attend to 
(Chapter 2), what features of the stimuli participants attend to (Chapter 3), and what 
dimensions of the stimuli participants attend to (Chapter 4). The results in this thesis 
show that it is critical to ensure that instructions in a given learning task direct 
participants’ attention in a way that is deemed to be appropriate for the experimenter’s 
aims.  
 
5.2.3 Dissociable Learning Processes? 
An alternative way to explain the selective nature of the instructional 
manipulations is that changing learning orientation also changes the relative influence 
of dissociable learning processes. As mentioned in the General Introduction, if a dual-
process framework is adopted, it is impossible to ensure that tasks are process-pure 
and tap into a single process (Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Reingold & Merikle, 1988). 
As such, it may be that both implicit and explicit processes operate under incidental 
                                                
29 Indeed, there was evidence that participants learned about the unattended dimension in Experiment 
4.2  
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learning conditions. While the task may not explicitly encourage participants to learn, 
they may be naturally suspicious about the aim of the experiment from the beginning 
or may attempt to search for additional information once they have mastered the task 
sufficiently to respond accurately. Despite this possibility, the assumption was made 
that the instructions in this thesis should at least encourage the use of explicit 
processes. This implies that the contribution of explicit processes would be greater in 
the instructed or intentional conditions than the uninstructed or incidental conditions. 
It was also assumed that the contribution from explicit processes in the incidental 
conditions would be minimal. The following discussion considers the plausibility of 
an account that follows from these assumptions.  
Subtraction logic must also be assumed in order to attribute any group 
differences to the additional influence of explicit processes in the instructed 
conditions. That is, it must be assumed that implicit or associative processes operate 
equally in both incidental and intentional conditions. This assumption is more 
difficult to defend, since selective attention has just been proposed as an explanation 
of the obtained group differences, and some associative models contain attentional 
mechanisms that modulate learning (e.g. Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). 
Yet, this argument has been made by some researchers (e.g. McLaren et al., 2014), 
and both associative and implicit mechanisms are typically regarded as automatic in 
their operation. One of the proposed criteria for automatic processes is their 
invariance under all circumstances (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and neither associative 
nor implicit learning mechanisms, as currently described, require intention to initiate. 
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As such, to make interpretation from a dual-process perspective more tractable, it will 
be assumed that associative and implicit mechanisms operate equally in all groups30.  
It has been argued that qualitative differences in learning (i.e. differences in 
the pattern of learning and not simply the overall amount) are indicative of dissociable 
learning processes that are differentially engaged by altering learning orientation 
(Jones & McLaren, 2009). The results in the SRT task in Chapter 2 can be taken to 
support this idea, especially when considering the remarkable consistency of the 
cueing effect across all 8 fourth-order subsequences in Experiment 2.2 (see Figure 
2.4), in contrast to the selective effect of the hint in Experiments 2.3 and 2.4. An 
implicit mechanism might be expected to learn about all subsequences since in the 
absence of the hint, all target locations and subsequences are more or less equally 
salient.31 The results contained in Chapter 2 are similar to those found by Jones and 
McLaren (2009), who found that changing learning orientation from incidental to 
intentional resulted in participants switching from learning about subsequences that 
ended in an alternation in target location (i.e. XY, YX), to learning about 
subsequences that end in a repetition of target location (i.e. XX, YY). While their task 
was a 2-choice SRT task where repetitions and alternations referred to target location 
and not direction, the pattern of sequential effects found in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
were reminiscent of the repetition and alternation effects found with target location in 
2-choice SRT tasks. Both sets of results may be explained by intentional learning 
conditions engaging explicit learning mechanisms, which selectively favor the most 
salient subsequences (those consisting of repetitions of event statistics).  
                                                
30 Note that if humans do learn using two mechanisms, but explicit mechanisms have primacy in 
influencing behavior, then it is empirically impossible to verify whether implicit mechanisms operate 
equally across all learning conditions, as any manipulation that affects the operation of the explicit 
mechanism will also affect behavior. 
31 Perhaps making an exception for long runs of repetitions and alternations, which usually show the 
fastest reaction times in sequential effect experiments (e.g. Bertelson, 1961; Cho et al., 2002).   
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It is less clear whether the Search and Memorize groups in Chapter 3 were 
learning in different ways since both the prototypicality effect and recognition were 
assessed using the same test, and the complex nature of the stimuli meant that the 
categories could not be learned by forming a simple rule. As discussed above, the 
results might be better explained in terms of selective attention. It might be argued 
that learning in the Search groups was implicit because learning occurred incidentally 
during visual search and learning about complex visual stimuli presumably involves 
incremental accumulation of information. However, in Chapter 3, an explicit learning 
strategy would amount to accumulating information in a similar way since the nature 
of the stimuli meant that encoding each discrete stimulus in declarative memory 
separately would be difficult. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that different 
mechanisms were engaged in the Memorize and Search groups, although there was 
certainly a difference in intentionality. Further studies are needed to confirm whether 
the observed group differences remain after attention to configural or specific features 
of the stimuli is equated.  
The result in this thesis that provides the strongest evidence of dissociable 
learning processes concerns the manipulation of rule applicability in generalization in 
Chapter 4. This was possibly because the nature of the test (a generalization test) 
provided the clearest means to observe patterns of responding that would either be 
consistent or inconsistent with a relational rule. While attention was clearly a critical 
factor in these experiments in determining the overall level and pattern of 
categorization accuracy on test, differences in generalization on the attended 
dimension also eventuated as a result of manipulating the degree of rule applicability. 
Although this manipulation does not concern an instructional manipulation like the 
other chapters, the group differences were certainly dependent on instructions to 
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attend to a particular dimension. In any case, this result is important because it seems 
to demonstrate a situation in which associative and rule-based processes might 
interact. 
In Experiment 4.2, the Consistent group showed a monotonically increasing 
generalization gradient with the highest level of accuracy for stimuli at the extreme 
ends of the dimension (e.g. stimuli with the bluest and greenest circles), consistent 
with applying a relational rule (e.g. “left category has greener circles”). This is 
consistent with previous studies employing discrimination tasks with simple stimuli 
differing on a single dimension (e.g. Wills & Mackintosh, 1998). Interestingly, peak 
shift, a phenomenon arising from post-discrimination generalization in animals (e.g. 
Hanson, 1959), was found in a group who could only apply their rule on half of their 
test trials. The explanation proposed was that this reduced their certainty in their rule, 
leading them to revert to generalizing on the basis of similarity to the physical 
features of the stimuli, which they must have learned during training alongside their 
rule. This interpretation was supported by the sequential analysis, where participants 
expressed both peak-shifted and monotonic gradients of generalization, depending on 
the applicability of the rule (and presumably their uncertainty or confidence in their 
rule) on the previous trial.  
As discussed, the descending gradients in the typicality ratings as well as the 
high levels of accuracy in identifying the category difference on the attended 
dimension are indicative of rule learning in the Inconsistent group. The more 
contentious question is whether the peak shift in the Inconsistent group is indicative 
of associative learning processes. Alternative explanations of the peak shift were 
discussed in Chapter 4 and included failure to extrapolate a relational rule to the ends 
of the dimension, or a conservative similarity rule (e.g. “It belongs in category 1 if the 
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circles are green, but not too green”). It is worth stating that if peak shift is the result 
of an explicit similarity rule held by the Inconsistent group, then it remains to be 
explained how and why participants learn and maintain two rules during training, and 
why the relational rule has precedence in responding on test but suffers more than the 
similarity rule when the reliability of the attended dimension (which they both depend 
on) is disrupted.  
Instead, peak shift in this instance is more easily explained in associative 
terms. The few demonstrations of peak shift in the human generalization literature 
have been situations in which rule formation is difficult (e.g. Lewis & Johnston, 1999; 
Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Wills & Mackintosh, 1998), and are exactly the situations 
in which it has been claimed associative processes have the best chance to affect 
behavior (Mackintosh, 1995). Peak shift is well explained by connectionist models 
employing elemental representation of stimulus dimensions (e.g. Blough, 1975; 
Ghirlanda & Enquist, 1998), and there are multiple animal studies demonstrating this 
effect (e.g. Blough, 1973; Terrace, 1968; Hanson, 1957). If an associative explanation 
of peak shift is accepted, it can be concluded that rather than associative learning 
automatically influencing behavior and producing unconscious knowledge, 
associative learning produces conscious information that enters into reasoned 
judgements and responses. In other words, while the mechanism that produces the 
knowledge is still different to that of rule or propositional learning, once learnt, that 
information can then interact with knowledge of different forms. It would seem then, 
that in the absence of the manipulation of rule applicability, propositional learning 
processes have a dominating influence on behavior, perhaps due to the fact that the 
process of learning is itself conscious and therefore provides a stronger justification 
for behavior.   
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In summary, there are aspects of the current results that suggest the operation 
of dissociable learning processes. Changes in post-discrimination generalization 
gradients suggested use of rules, and advantages afforded by increased knowledge of 
the contingencies in the SRT task benefitted performance selectively. The results can 
be interpreted as arising from one process that formulates abstract rules, and another 
process that learns associations or instances. Even proponents of a single-system view 
of learning (e.g. Shanks & St. John, 1994) accept that instructions may invoke 
different ‘strategies’ that learn information that is qualitatively different in content. 
Importantly, Shanks and St. John claim that the instance-based strategy operates when 
participants are asked to memorize or observe instances, which presumably are 
situations in which participants still have the intention to learn. The fact that 
intentional memorization produces differences in learning when compared to 
incidental exposure (Chapter 3) suggests that the intentionality of learning has an 
effect even within instance-based learning strategies. Thus, instructional 
manipulations seem to be a reliable method of producing learning that is qualitatively 
different in content, suggesting the existence of multiple learning strategies or 
processes.  
 
5.3 Incidental Learning 
 There should be little doubt that the instructions used in this thesis were 
successful in engaging explicit learning processes, but it may be more contentious 
whether separate learning mechanisms were employed under incidental conditions. 
One of the empirical questions addressed in this thesis was the extent to which 
learning could occur incidentally, in the absence of conscious intention. There is no 
doubt that humans can learn incidentally. The efficiency in which learning is 
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accomplished under incidental conditions has led Logan (1988) to claim that 
incidental learning is closer to intentional learning than no learning at all. The 
experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 are consistent with the vast amount of experimental 
evidence showing that the intention to learn is not necessary for learning (e.g. Nissen 
& Bullemer, 1987; Chun & Jiang, 1998). Large cueing effects were found in the No 
Hint groups in Chapter 2, and the Search groups in Chapter 3 showed evidence of 
discriminating between old and new stimuli despite performing a visual search task 
with complex stimuli. The role of intention in learning is thus not a necessary one, 
suggesting that there is a degree to which learning can be automatic since it does not 
require conscious effort or intention to initiate. Learning thus satisfies one of the 
criteria proposed for an automatic process, (e.g. see Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and 
suggests that there are situations in which learning occurs as a by-product of 
processing information (see Jiménez, 2003). Although there are other criteria for 
automatic processes (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) that 
learning may not satisfy, at the very least, it would suggest that not all learning is the 
result of deliberate, effortful reasoning. This would suggest that single-process 
theories that postulate that learning is always of this nature (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009) 
might need to be revised. In contrast, associative models of learning can easily 
accommodate the fact that incidental learning occurs since they do not require 
intention to operate.   
 However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some participants in the 
incidental conditions throughout Chapters 2 and 3 did in fact possess an intention to 
learn despite the incidental nature of their instructions or task. If this were the case, it 
would seem that the proportion of participants who did so in Chapter 2 was not large, 
since the No Hint groups showed lower levels of explicit sequence knowledge than 
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the Hint groups. The paradigms themselves also help to ensure that learning is 
incidental. For instance, both the SRT task and visual search task required speeded 
responses, and are easy to perform, discouraging the need for participants to seek out 
additional information to aid them in responding. In Chapter 3, the addition of the 
Search-Terminate group in Experiment 3.3 ensured that participants had no residual 
exposure time to study the stimulus. These aspects of the results strongly suggest that 
any learning that occurred in the No Hint groups, and Search groups, was in fact 
incidental. 
 
5.3.1 Requirements of Incidental Learning 
 One might question why incidental learning occurred in the No Hint group in 
Chapter 2 and the Search group in Chapter 3, but not for the unattended category 
dimension in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, there was no stimulus control by the unattended 
dimension in category judgements, despite the color and size dimensions of the 
stimuli being perfectly correlated during training. This may be because the color and 
size dimensions were separable, rather than integral dimensions (Garner, 1978), 
meaning that attention to one dimension does not entail attention to the other 
dimension. In fact, when attention was directed at a particular dimension, participants 
would not need to process the unattended dimension at all in order to accurately 
categorize all stimuli. This stands in contrast to the SRT task, where participants are 
required to process the location of each target since their responses need to 
correspond to the target location on each trial (and it is the sequence of target 
locations that participants learn about).32  
                                                
32 But note that processing of the target locations does not entail processing of target direction.   
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What is intriguing is that the stimulus dimensions of the stimuli used in the 
prototype distortion task are also separable (e.g. color, line thickness and location in 
the circle stimuli), and yet incidental learning of these stimuli did occur, as seen by an 
ability of the Search groups to recognize old stimuli. One way to explain this 
discrepancy between incidental learning in the prototype distortion task with the lack 
of incidental learning in the categorization task is through differences in selective 
attention deployed as a result of visual search. It may be the case that participants’ 
attention was focused on a single dimension in the categorization task while attention 
was more diffuse during visual search. Despite the fact that participants used a single 
dimension (line width) to distinguish the singleton, perhaps the active process of 
searching for a singleton is particularly conducive to incidental learning of complex 
stimuli. This certainly accords with the ease with which contextual cueing effects are 
found (e.g. Chun & Jiang, 1998).  
It seems that what is necessary (but perhaps not sufficient, see Weidemann, 
Satkunarajah, & Lovibond, 2016) for incidental learning to occur is for participants to 
actively process the relevant information in making their responses. This conclusion 
is similar to Logan’s (1988) instance theory, which states that attention to a stimulus 
necessarily results in encoding in memory, as well as Jiménez’s (2003) 
characterization of implicit learning as the by-product of attention. Thus, to provide 
the best chances of observing incidental learning, the responses that participants make 
in a task must rely on attention to the relevant information to be learned. However, 
incidental learning does seem to be limited to learning of instances or associative 
information. Across all three chapters, there was no evidence of rule learning under 
incidental conditions.  
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5.3.2 Implications for Implicit Learning 
 The implicit status of learning in two different paradigms was assessed in this 
thesis. Chapter 2 showed that sequence learning emerged reliably under incidental 
learning conditions but was not impervious to instructions inducing an intention to 
learn. Chapter 3 showed that a prototypicality gradient that was significantly greater 
than a learning-at-test effect did not emerge under incidental exposure conditions 
(although recognition did) and was also strengthened by verbal instructions to 
memorize the stimuli. In both paradigms, it seems that verbal instructions and 
intention to learn can affect the strength of implicit learning effects.  
Questions remain about whether learning in the SRT and the prototype 
distortion tasks are in fact implicit. In fact, it is debatable whether “implicit learning” 
as a unitary construct is valid or useful at all. As discussed in the General Introduction, 
there is disagreement over the functional characteristics of implicit learning (Frensch, 
1998), how to assess awareness (Shanks & St. John, 1994), and whether implicit and 
explicit learning processes share information with one another (Lewicki, 1986; 
Stadler & Frensch, 1994). If implicit learning is conceived as a non-intentional 
mechanism that accumulates statistical regularities or instances as a result of 
processing, it would seem that sequence learning in the No Hint groups in Chapter 2, 
and the ability for the Search groups in Chapter 3 to recognize seen exemplars after 
visual search, would count as implicit. However, in both paradigms, explicit processes 
were found to improve learning, and there was some evidence that participants in the 
No Hint group could explicitly report their knowledge. Thus, the results in Chapters 2 
and 3 suggest that the notion of implicit learning being an independent process that is 
unaffected by explicit processes (e.g. Song, Howard, & Howard, 2007; Willingham, 
Nissen, & Bullemer, 1987) may need to be revised.  
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5.4 Implications for the Single-Process View 
 The current results clearly implicate a role for explicit and propositional 
processes in learning, but simultaneously show that it is possible for incidental 
learning to occur. A single-process account might be able to accommodate these 
seemingly conflicting results if it can explain how an effortful propositional 
mechanism can come to function so efficiently under incidental conditions, and 
specify how differences in learning result as a consequence of manipulating the verbal 
instructions given to participants. One answer that may be proposed is that 
propositional processes can function under a small degree of effort and conscious 
intention, but under those conditions is unlikely to produce sensible rules or strong 
propositional knowledge, resulting in a small amount of learning and knowledge that 
is fragile and not easily verbalized. Instead, what propositional processes learn under 
incidental conditions is functionally equivalent to simple associations that are instance 
or feature-based, and are not abstract or relational.  
In other words, if it is assumed that both incidental and intentional conditions 
engage propositional mechanisms to a different degree, and this produces qualitative 
changes in the output of learning, then the results in this thesis can be explained. 
Adopting this view would imply that the conditions under which participants learn are 
important because they can shift the qualitative properties of the content of learning. 
Investigating these qualitative shifts is arguably more theoretically interesting than 
deciding on the number of learning processes we possess (see Cleeremans & Dienes, 
2008). Indeed, the distinction between single- and dual-process theories starts to 
become meaningless in this context, as both theories have the same task of explaining 
how learning can vary as a result of changing learning orientation. One of the aims of 
this thesis was to attempt to characterize the nature of interaction between associative 
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and cognitive processes assuming that they both exist, and as such the single-process 
view will not be considered further33. 
 
5.5 Implications for the Dual-Process View 
In the next section, a tentative conclusion will be drawn from the dual-process 
perspective about how implicit and explicit, or associative and propositional learning 
might interact to determine behavior. This is necessarily complex and may be subject 
to multiple parameters concerning the nature of the task at hand as well as other 
cognitive processes such as working memory or attention. However, many 
researchers have acknowledged the theoretical importance of this challenge (e.g. 
McLaren et al., 2014; Mitchell et al., 2009; Sloman, 1996) and the experiments 
contained in this thesis hopefully will provide a starting point in this endeavor. For 
simplicity, the debate will simply be framed in terms of associative and cognitive 
processes, where the two are treated as qualitatively distinct in their functional 
properties and output.34  
 
5.5.1 Learning vs. Performance 
Firstly, it is important to make a distinction between learning and performance. 
A dual-process theory should specify not only the conditions under which each 
learning process will operate, but also how the outputs of such processes interact to 
produce behavior. This is critical because there are two results within this thesis that 
demonstrate a situation in which learning may have occurred, but was simply not 
expressed. The first instance concerns the fact that the Hint group in Chapter 2 did not 
                                                
33 Note that the ensuing discussion is still relevant to single-process theories of learning if it is framed 
in terms of an associative-/instance-based strategy and a rule-based strategy that are both conscious and 
exist within a single system (e.g. Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
34 Note that some authors regard associative and cognitive processes as resulting from the same 
computational hardware (e.g. McLaren et al., 2014; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). 
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show a larger cueing effect for ZYZ subsequences in Experiments 2.3 and 2.4. One 
might claim that if the aim of the hint was to encourage participants to derive an 
abstract, relational rule, then that knowledge should have affected all subsequences 
equally since the rule is applicable to every trial. The fact that it did not might be 
taken as evidence that the hint was somehow unhelpful or that participants did not 
derive the desired relational rule.  
An alternative explanation discussed in Chapter 2 is that the Hint group used 
the hint successfully to derive a relational rule, but the expression of their knowledge 
on ZYZ trials was hindered due to the alternation in target direction making it 
difficult to respond. In other words, the deficit was in performance, rather than 
learning. The sequential effects in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 both support this idea, 
with slower and less accurate responding on ZYZ trials compared to XYZ trials. It 
may be that explicit sequence knowledge is difficult to exhibit on trials where 
responding is difficult. The perfect and near-perfect performance of the Hint group in 
selecting the cued direction of motion in Experiments 2.4 and 2.5 respectively also 
supports the fact that the Hint groups did in fact acquire the relevant rule and 
therefore knowledge of all contingencies.  
The second instance concerns the sequential analysis of generalization in the 
Inconsistent group in Chapter 4. Here, two different patterns of generalization were 
expressed within the same group of participants, one consistent with rule use and 
another consistent with peak shift. Participants in the Inconsistent group generalized 
on the basis of a rule when their rule was applicable on the previous trial, and 
generalized on the basis of similarity when their rule was not applicable on the 
previous trial at test. This sequential analysis suggests that participants had learned 
about a relational rule, and about the physical features of the stimuli during their 
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categorization training. Since the Consistent group exhibited generalization consistent 
with rule use throughout the whole test phase, it can be concluded that the presence of 
a rule usually obscures any evidence of similarity-based generalization if that rule is 
clearly relevant on test. Therefore, if a dual-process view is adopted, there may be 
instances in which people learn associatively, but this does not translate into 
performance if participants also derive a relational rule (see Livesey & McLaren, 
2009; McLaren et al., 2014, for similar ideas). This may be due to the conscious 
nature of cognitive processes and their associated output being more likely to 
dominate behavior. If the cognitive system usually dominates behavior, it becomes an 
important task for future research to specify the conditions under which associative 
learning can be observed.  
 
5.5.2 Factors determining Interaction 
What follows, is a speculative account of two such parameters that may 
determine interaction between associative and cognitive processes. It will be assumed 
that separate factors govern the relative influence of cognitive and associative 
processes in learning, and then in determining behavior. This thesis has already 
suggested one factor that might determine interaction in the relative contribution of 
each process during learning – whether the individual has the intention to learn. Since 
cognitive processes are conscious and effortful in their initiation and operation, it 
should not be controversial to claim that they are more likely to operate (or operate 
more effectively) under intentional than incidental conditions. Intentional learning 
conditions can be induced through instructions as in this thesis, or may arise due to 
intrinsic motivation in the individual to ‘figure out’ the aims of the experiment or 
search for helpful rules to simplify the task at hand.  
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The influence of intention (as induced by instructions) can be subsumed into 
the broader factor of cognitive control. This factor has already been suggested by 
McLaren et al. (2014) as a critical parameter dictating whether learning is associative 
or cognitive in nature35. Cognitive control might affect the relative contribution of 
each learning process, as well as the expression of learning. For example, 
manipulations or tasks which give the participant little opportunity to think and reason 
during the learning phase may allow associative learning to be the primary mode of 
learning (see Mackintosh, 1995). Implicit learning tasks that employ complex stimuli 
that are not easily memorized or speeded responses where the participant does not 
have time to think carefully may mean that learning is better accomplished 
incidentally than intentionally memorizing or using abstract rules. Similarly, 
expression of rules or explicit knowledge on more direct tests of learning may not be 
possible if the task is demanding or difficult. Thus one reason why some implicit 
learning tasks seem impervious to explicit knowledge is because the nature of the task 
(involving speeded responses, complex stimuli or sequences etc.) ensures that the 
degree of cognitive control is low, meaning that the relevant explicit knowledge 
cannot be easily applied to the task (e.g. Jiménez, Méndez, & Cleeremans, 1996).  
The second factor determining whether or not explicit processes impact 
learning, or whether or not explicit knowledge impacts performance, is the utility of 
that process (or knowledge) in a given task. That is, explicit learning, or explicit 
knowledge, will be used to the extent that it is useful or practical in a task. One of the 
reasons why tasks such as the SRT task are considered to be good examples of 
implicit learning is because the task itself (responding to a target) is easy to perform 
without needing to derive rules or make explicit predictions. The same can be said of 
                                                
35 Although note that McLaren et al. (2014) claim that cognition is simply controlled association, 
which is something that not all dual-process theorists might agree on.  
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the visual search task employed in Chapter 3. Under these situations cognitive 
processes are unlikely to contribute to learning since there is no obvious reason for 
their initiation. 
However, if cognitive processes are initiated, the utility of the resultant 
knowledge might then determine whether behavior will be affected. Chapter 2 
demonstrated that contrary to previous studies demonstrating no effect of explicit 
knowledge in probabilistic sequence learning (e.g. Jiménez, Méndez, & Cleeremans, 
1996), explicit sequence knowledge can benefit sequence learning as long as that 
knowledge is sufficiently simple to hold in working memory and apply to the task. 
Chapter 4 showed that while the presence of a relational category rule was easily used 
on test when that rule continued to be clearly applicable, generalization in line with 
similarity to shared perceptual features emerged once application of that rule was 
disrupted. One interpretation of the results in Experiment 4.2 was that the effect of the 
test manipulation reduced the utility of the rule in the Inconsistent group, leading 
participants to revert to generalizing on the basis of similarity. This may have been a 
deliberate switch between two conscious strategies, or an effect of uncertainty 
resulting in a change to more intuitive category judgements based on the perceptual 
features of the stimuli. Similarly, it may be the case that once the cognitive system 
extracts a useful rule, the utility of associative information is reduced and thus has 
little influence on behavior, since that rule should adequately summarize all the 
necessary (associative) information and therefore be more useful for the participant.   
 These two parameters represent highly speculative attempts to integrate the 
findings from the varied paradigms within this thesis. Due to the difficulty in devising 
decisive tests to determine whether associative or propositional learning has occurred 
(and indeed many of the results in this thesis can be interpreted from multiple 
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perspectives), it is obviously very difficult to begin specifying their manner of 
interaction. Still, the importance of examining the interaction between processes has 
been noted from both single- and dual-process advocates (McLaren et al., 2014; 
Mitchell et al., 2009; Sloman, 1996), and investigating the parameters that influence 
the interaction may also be informative in describing the operational characteristics of 
different learning strategies or processes. Regardless of whether a single- or dual-
process stance is adopted, the results in this thesis highlight the importance of 
considering how verbal instructions and learning orientation can change learning and 
behavior.  
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 In conclusion, human learning proceeds incidentally but is also altered by 
verbal instructions inducing an intention to learn. Verbal instructions can change what 
participants attend to in a task, determine whether participants derive abstract rules or 
learn about associations, and influence the ability of participants to generalize their 
knowledge to novel stimuli. The results in this thesis suggest that human learning is 
highly sensitive to the exact verbal instructions given, and highlight the importance of 
considering learning orientation in tasks that are presumed to assess implicit or 
associative learning. Manipulating verbal instructions and intention may provide a 
reliable means to change the content of learning, allowing for a better understanding 
of whether we possess separable learning processes and how they might interact.  
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Appendix A 
Results from the Training Phase in Experiment 2.2 
Table A1. 
ANOVA results for RTs in the training phase of Experiment 2. 
 F p ηp2 
cueing 
fourth 
third  
second 
cueing * fourth 
cueing * third 
fourth * third 
cueing * fourth * third  
cueing * second 
fourth * second 
cueing * fourth * second 
third * second 
cueing * third * second 
fourth * third * second 
cueing * fourth * third * second 
1.71 
.264 
5.03 
31.41 
2.19 
.026 
1.42 
.110 
6.63 
7.29 
4.68 
.125 
.032 
5.10 
.014 
.212 
.615 
.042 
<.001 
.161 
.875 
.254 
.745 
.022 
.017 
.048 
.729 
.860 
.040 
.906 
.109 
.019 
.264 
.692 
.136 
.002 
.092 
.008 
.322 
.342 
.251 
.009 
.002 
.267 
.001 
 
 
 
Table A2. 
ANOVA results for errors in the training phase of Experiment 2. 
 F p ηp2 
cueing 
fourth 
third  
second 
cueing * fourth 
cueing * third 
fourth * third 
cueing * fourth * third  
cueing * second 
fourth * second 
cueing * fourth * second 
third * second 
cueing * third * second 
fourth * third * second 
cueing * fourth * third * second 
10.56 
1.97 
.031 
.049 
6.46 
.043 
.001 
.024 
4.20 
7.03 
4.23 
.304 
.165 
.225 
.178 
.006 
.183 
.863 
.828 
.024 
.839 
.974 
.879 
.060 
.019 
.059 
.590 
.690 
.643 
.680 
.430 
.123 
.002 
.004 
.316 
.003 
<.001 
.002 
.231 
.334 
.232 
.021 
.012 
.016 
.013 
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Figure A1. RTs (a) and proportion of errors (b) for cued and miscued trials for each 
fourth-order subsequence in the training phase of Experiment 2. Subsequences are 
divided according to whether transitions at the second-order (XYZ vs. ZYZ, shown as 
separate lines), third-order (left vs. right points connected by lines), and fourth-order 
(left vs. right side of the figures) level were the same or different direction to the first-
order transition (YZ). Cued and miscued trials are shown as separate lines. 
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Appendix B 
Additional Analyses for the Transfer Phase in Experiment 2.4 
 
In the Hint group, the cueing effects displayed in the transfer phase were 
found to be significant in RT for both XYZ and ZYZ subsequences and XYZ errors, 
smallest t(38) = 3.52, SEM = .005, p = .001, but the ZYZ cueing effect was 
marginally non-significant in errors, t(38) = 1.84, SEM = .013, p = .073. In the No 
Hint group, the cueing effect for XYZ subsequences was marginally non-significant 
in RTs, t(36) = 1.88, SEM = .005, p = .068, significant in XYZ , t(36) = 3.18, SEM 
= .008, p = .003, significant in ZYZ RT cueing, t(36) = 4.38, SEM = .003,  p < .001, 
and not significant in ZYZ errors, t < 1.  
  
267 
Appendix C 
Instructions used in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 
 
Instructions given to Memorize group: 
This experiment will test your VISUAL MEMORY abilities. In this experiment, you 
will be presented with various visual stimuli. In the first phase, the stimuli will appear 
on screen for a short time and then disappear. While they are on screen, please pay 
attention to the stimuli and try and MEMORIZE them. Try not to focus on specific 
features, but rather memorize the stimulus as a whole. Your memory of the stimuli 
will be tested later. You will be told when the stimuli have stopped displaying. Press 
spacebar to begin. 
 
Instructions given to Search group: 
This experiment will test your VISUAL SEARCH abilities. In this experiment, you 
will be presented with different stimuli. The stimuli will appear on screen for a short 
time and then disappear. The stimuli will either contain 10 circles, or 10 lines. On 
each trial one of the circles or lines will be different to the rest. In other words, there 
is an ODD ONE OUT. The odd one out will have a line width that is either 
THICKER or THINNER than the rest (see example). If you think that the odd one out 
is THICKER than the rest press A (on the left). If you think the odd one out is 
THINNER than the rest, press L (on the right). You only need to press A or L once. 
Try and respond as fast as you can, while still being accurate. If the stimulus 
disappears and you still haven’t responded, just guess. You will be timed out 
otherwise and the next trial will begin. If you have any questions, please ask the 
experimenter now. Otherwise, press spacebar to begin. 
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Note that there will be no feedback given, so you will not know whether you are 
correct or not. So just try your best. Remember, you can still respond quickly after the 
stimulus has disappeared. If you see the words ‘Too slow’, it means that you have 
been timed out. If you don’t, it means that your response has been recorded. Press the 
spacebar to begin. 
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Appendix D 
Unfolded Dimension for Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 
 
Figure D1. Categorization accuracy and typicality ratings for the unfolded attended 
(upper panels) and unattended (lower panels) dimensions in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. 
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Appendix E 
Additional Statistical Results from Experiment 4.2 
 
Training 
The Consistent group performed significantly better overall in training, 
F(1,179) = 5.62, p = .024, ηp2 = .028, and participants in Experiment 4.2B 
outperformed those in Experiment 4.2A, F(1,179) = 23.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .115, but 
there was no main effect of attention group, F < 1.  No other interactions were 
significant, largest F(1,179) = 1.78, p = .183, ηp2 = .010. Experiment 2A and 2B were 
run at different times but the main effect of group is difficult to explain due to 
participants in all groups receiving the same training. In any case, there was no 
evidence that participant in different groups or experiments learned at different rates. 
 
Category Judgements 
Attended Dimension. The Attend Size group (figure E1c) had higher 
categorization accuracy than the Attend Color group (figure 8a), F(1,179) = 4.47, p 
= .036, ηp2 = .024. A significant interaction between the linear trend and attention 
group was also found, F(1,179) = 4.62, p = .033, ηp2 = .025. Inspection of Figures E1a 
(Attend Color) and E1c (Attend Size) reveals that this interaction is due to 
participants in both Consistent and Inconsistent groups showing a monotonic gradient 
when told to attend to size, but more pronounced group differences for those told to 
attend to color.  
Unattended Dimension. There was a significant 4-way interaction between 
linear trend, attention group, test group, and experiment, F(1,179) = 4.80, p = .030, 
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ηp2 = .026, and a significant interaction between the main effect of attention group and 
experiment, F(1,179) = 5.93, p = .016, ηp2 = .032.  
 
Typicality Ratings 
Attended Dimension. The 4-way interaction with linear trend, attention group, 
test group and experiment was significant, F(1,179) = 6.45, p = .012, ηp2 = .035. 
Typicality ratings were higher overall for the Attend Size group (figure E1d) 
compared to the Attend Color group (figure 8b), F(1,179) = 9.76, p = .002 ηp2 = .052, 
and also higher for the Inconsistent group than the Consistent group (figure 6b), 
F(1,179) = 5.64, p = .019, ηp2 = .031. There was also a significant interaction between 
attention group, test group, and experiment, F(1,179) = 14.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .076.  
Unattended Dimension. There were steeper gradients in the Attend Color 
group than the Attend Size group, F(1,179) = 6.28, p = .013, ηp2 = .034. There was a 
significant main effect of attention group, with significantly higher typicality ratings 
overall in the Attend Size group, F(1,179) = 5.42, p = .021, ηp2 = .029, and a 
significant interaction between attention group, test group, and experiment, F(1,179) 
= 8.88, p = .003, ηp2 = .047.  
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Figure E1. Categorization accuracy and typicality judgements for variations on the 
attended dimension split by attention group (a and b: attend color, c and d: attend 
size) and experiment (e and f: Experiment 4.2A, g and h: Experiment 4.2B). Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Table E1. 
Full ANOVA results for category judgements for variations on the attended dimension. 
 F p ηp2 
test stim (linear) 
test stim (quadratic) 
test stim * attention group 
test stim * test group (linear) 
test stim * test group (quadratic) 
test stim * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group 
test stim * attention group * experiment 
test stim * test group * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group * 
experiment 
attention group 
test group 
experiment 
attention group * test group 
attention group * experiment 
test group * experiment 
attention group * test group * experiment 
24.46 
27.29 
4.62 
1.03 
5.00 
.348 
.466 
1.07 
.002 
1.53 
 
4.47 
10.59 
1.02 
.823 
.543 
1.43 
3.23 
<.001 
<.001 
.033 
.312 
.027 
.556 
.496 
.303 
.965 
.217 
 
.036 
.001 
.315 
.366 
.462 
.234 
.074 
.120 
.132 
.025 
.006 
.027 
.002 
.003 
.006 
.000 
.008 
 
.024 
.056 
.006 
.005 
.003 
.008 
.018 
* Note that the results for test stim refer to the linear trend (unless otherwise 
specified) and not the main effect. 
 
 
 
Table E2. 
Full ANOVA results for category judgements for variations on the unattended 
dimension. 
 F p ηp2 
test stim 
test stim * attention group 
test stim * test group  
test stim * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group 
test stim * attention group * experiment 
test stim * test group * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group * 
experiment 
attention group 
test group 
experiment 
attention group * test group 
attention group * experiment 
test group * experiment 
attention group * test group * experiment 
.641 
.735 
1.14 
.001 
.012 
.772 
2.25 
4.80 
 
.323 
395.3 
.653 
.001 
5.93 
.002 
1.39 
.424 
.392 
.287 
.975 
.912 
.381 
.136 
.030 
 
.570 
<.001 
.420 
.976 
.016 
.966 
.240 
.004 
.004 
.006 
.000 
.000 
.004 
.012 
.026 
 
.002 
.688 
.004 
.000 
.032 
.000 
.008 
* Note that the results for test stim refer to the linear trend and not the main effect. 
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Table E3. 
Full ANOVA results for typicality ratings for variations on the attended dimension. 
 F p ηp2 
test stim 
test stim * attention group 
test stim * test group  
test stim * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group 
test stim * attention group * experiment 
test stim * test group * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group * 
experiment 
attention group 
test group 
experiment 
attention group * test group 
attention group * experiment 
test group * experiment 
attention group * test group * experiment 
98.57 
3.14 
22.08 
.617 
.621 
.565 
3.07 
6.45 
 
9.76 
5.64 
2.18 
.082 
.216 
1.01 
14.64 
<.001 
.078 
<.001 
.433 
.432 
.453 
.082 
.012 
 
.002 
.019 
.142 
.775 
.642 
.317 
<.001 
.355 
.017 
.110 
.003 
.003 
.003 
.017 
.035 
 
.052 
.031 
.012 
.000 
.001 
.006 
.076 
* Note that the results for test stim refer to the linear trend and not the main effect. 
 
 
 
 
Table E4. 
Full ANOVA results for typicality ratings for variations on the unattended dimension. 
 F p ηp2 
test stim 
test stim * attention group 
test stim * test group  
test stim * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group 
test stim * attention group * experiment 
test stim * test group * experiment 
test stim * attention group * test group * 
experiment 
attention group 
test group 
experiment 
attention group * test group 
attention group * experiment 
test group * experiment 
attention group * test group * experiment 
76.57 
6.28 
9.56 
.025 
.284 
<.001 
.582 
1.61 
 
5.42 
.013 
1.19 
.037 
.133 
2.91 
8.88 
<.001 
.013 
.002 
.875 
.595 
.990 
.447 
.206 
 
.021 
.908 
.277 
.848 
.716 
.090 
.003 
.300 
.034 
.051 
.000 
.002 
.000 
.003 
.009 
 
.029 
.000 
.007 
.000 
.001 
.016 
.047 
* Note that the results for test stim refer to the linear trend and not the main effect. 
 
 
 
 
